

POLITICS & GOVERNMENT

Berkeley, the federal government intervened on the basis of "tentative and uncorroborated" scientific findings that failed to stand up to subsequent scrutiny.

A "guilty until proven innocent" mode of regulation, Havender contends, is the product of a naive faith in science that reached its peak among U.S. academics during the 1960s, filtering "upwards" to bureaucrats, politicians, and the press. The result: some misguided prophylactic legislation, often backed up by overly fastidious regulation, in such areas as job safety, toxic waste, air and water pollution.

Thus, the Delaney Amendment (1958) banned *any* food additive found to cause cancer in *any* animal in a single study, despite scientists' own ingrained wariness and their emphasis on duplicatable results. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration, overwhelmed by its responsibility for evaluating thousands of new chemicals, has drawn up "generic" guidelines that provide answers in advance to thorny questions (for example, should benign as well as malignant tumors be counted in determining carcinogens?) over which scientists heatedly disagree.

The costs of the present system, Havender argues, include the money spent by Washington in making, litigating, and enforcing its decisions; reduced productivity in industry; unemployment. Moreover, excessive regulation has hurt both science and the taxpayer: The heavy expense of developing a new drug (or pesticide) can now be recouped only if the new chemical solves a widespread problem markedly better than anything else does. Small advances and treatments for rare diseases do not pay for themselves and are apt to come less frequently.

It is time to shift the burden of proof, Havender concludes, away from claims built on "gossamer and opportunism" and "back toward proving harm."

The 'Movement' Reconsidered

"The 'Movement' and Its Legacy" by Peter Clecak, in *Social Research* (Autumn 1981), 66 West 12th St., New York, N.Y. 10011.

The so-called "Movement" of the 1960s, a heterogeneous mixture of Left politics and youth "counterculture," failed to live up to the high hopes of its various spokesmen and academic sympathizers. Social inequities were not eliminated, and the core of American values—individualism, competition, the work ethic—survived, shaken but intact. Yet, according to Clecak, a social scientist at the University of California, the legacy of the Movement is "powerful, complex, largely salutary—and probably enduring."

The Old Left began dying in the '40s, a victim of right-wing harassment and ideological exhaustion. Yet even during the prosperity and tranquility of the Eisenhower-Kennedy years, a breed of young college-educated radicals was in the making, inspired as much by beat-

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nik attitudes and styles as by early struggles to end racial segregation in the South. Mostly children of affluence, these unlikely rebels saw links between their personal troubles (a nagging sense of meaninglessness, disenchantment with materialism) and larger public issues. Indeed, it was this merger of private and public concerns that gave the youthful Movement its vitality and broad appeal, even before the Vietnam draft loomed up as a focus for campus protest.

Why did such a lively social phenomenon fade by 1973? Certainly its many spokesmen lacked a clear, consistent ideology. Its strongest original elements—the white Students for a Democratic Society and the black Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee—were eclipsed as the Movement expanded. The fusion of communitarian visions and “revolutionary” politics, which seemed to unite Maoists and hippies, white radicals and Black Panthers, was fragile; the violence of extremists (such as the Weathermen) and external events (the “winding down” of the war) led to the Movement’s decline.

The irony, writes Clecak, was that the initial ideological fuzziness of the Movement enabled it to gather wide campus support. But as anti-war protest mounted, self-styled “New Left” leaders spouting Marxist rhetoric alienated more moderate “fellow travellers.”

The Movement’s anti-establishment spirit lives on, most obviously in some liberal single-issue advocacy groups—environmentalists, pacifists, feminists. But a continuing search among adults for individual self-fulfillment, accompanied by a distrust of doctrinaire politics, may be the more lasting legacy.

FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE

*‘MAD’ Was
Not so Bad*

“Tilting Toward Thanatos: America’s Countervailing Nuclear Strategy” by Louis Rene Beres, in *World Politics* (Oct. 1981), Princeton University Press, 3175 Princeton Pike, Lawrenceville, N.J. 08540.

Until 1980, American nuclear strategy stressed “massive retaliation” against Soviet cities in the event of a Soviet attack on this country or its European allies. The prospect of “mutual assured destruction” (MAD), it was believed, would make starting a nuclear conflict unthinkable for either side. But, in July 1980, President Jimmy Carter signed Presidential Directive 59, adopting a “countervailing” strategy that called for a graduated U.S. nuclear response to Soviet aggression; its principal targets are Soviet missile silos. Beres, a professor at Purdue, writes that this directive, which still represents U.S. policy, “can only hasten the