of these committed "economic crimes"—e.g., tax evasion or black marketeering. A black market, notes Fernandez, requires "the collusion of many in society," and suggests widespread support for such activities.

With 40 percent of Cuba's population under the age of 15, disaffection among today's young people promises trouble. The younger refugees know Castro not as a revolutionary hero but as the head of an unresponsive government. They have been hit particularly hard by poor economic conditions. Unable to find jobs or housing, they must put off marriage and starting families. Others feeling the pinch include unskilled workers, thanks in part to Havana's planned shrinkage of the construction industry. Only rural Cubans—beneficiaries of land reforms and tax breaks—seem to remain loyal to their leader.

It is premature to declare "a crisis of socialism in Cuba," says Fernandez. But the Freedom Flotilla carried storm warnings for Castro.

Portugal since 1974

"The Armed Forces Movement and the Portuguese Revolution: Two Steps Forward, One Step Back" by John L. Hammond, in *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* (Spring 1982), New Life Center, Northern Illinois University, DeKalb, Ill. 60115.

On April 25, 1974, a group of junior military officers ousted Portugal's 40-year-old Fascist regime. Their aims were to stop 13 years of war in Portugal's African colonies—Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique—and to establish democratic government. But the officers found themselves at the head of a socialist revolution they had not sought, writes Hammond, a CUNY sociologist.

The wars had cost Portugal dearly—in 1968, 42 percent of the national budget; by 1974, 4,800 lives. Massive popular rallies supporting the coup began almost immediately. Suddenly free to demonstrate, urban workers went one step further, launching strikes and "miniature coups" against business executives.

Hoping to consolidate its rule, the new regime obligingly lurched leftward. The army began overseeing radical farmworkers' forcible seizure of the *latifundios* (plantations). The government nationalized banks and major industries, including oil, steel, railroads, and tobacco.

But there was resistance. Multinational firms shut down their Portuguese offices. Domestic anger grew over dislocations accompanying the end of the wars: the return of 700,000 settlers and 150,000 soldiers and the loss of colonial resources. Elections in the spring of 1975 showed the radicals, though highly vocal, to be a minority. In November, right-wing officers moved against leftist troops in Lisbon and arrested their leaders.

Today in Portugal, banks and major industries are still state owned (though run as profit-seeking ventures); workers retain their unions and the right to strike (though they no longer have much say in the management of nationalized firms); and some farm cooperatives continue in operation (though many others have been restored to their original owners). But the power of the old agricultural and colonial trade interests, says Hammond, has flowed to the middle class—to medium-scale capitalists, professionals, and technocrats, whose access to political influence and financial resources was made possible by the overthrow of the Fascist autocracy.

Czechoslovakia: the Party's Over

"Husak's Czechoslovakia and Economic Stagnation," by Vladimir V. Kusin, in *Problems of Communism* (May-June, 1982), Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20404.

The economic outlook for Czechs during the 1980s is bleak, says Kusin, a senior research analyst for Radio Free Europe. Already, even by optimistic official accounts, per capita income growth is at a standstill.

Why? The trouble began more than a decade ago. The spirit of liberal reform that flowered in the Prague Spring of 1968 withered under the Russian invasion that soon followed. Czechoslovakia's move toward a market economy was cut short. President Gustav Husák, who succeeded Alexander Dubček in 1969, established traditional Communist-style centralization. His plan: a program of industrial investment aimed at growth in the gross national product. Husák also purged the Czech Communist Party. One-third of all officeholders and tens of thousands of "able managerial personnel" were ousted.

Despite the turmoil, the system worked for a time. Czechs rallied behind the only cause they could safely support—increased production and consumption. During 1971–75, Czech personal spending shot up by 27 percent. In 1971, there was one car for every 17 people; by 1975, there was one for every 10.

But the worldwide oil shocks of the '70s hit the Czechs hard, as the Soviets, their chief supplier, began gearing prices to OPEC's. By 1980, the Czechs were paying five times the 1970 price of oil. Last year, under pressure from Moscow, the government announced a 10-percent cut in oil purchases that is certain to trim industrial production. Meanwhile, the heavy emphasis on investment has led nowhere because of chronic inefficiency. At the end of 1980, construction of 30,000 industrial plants—tying up 21 percent of all capital funds in the economy—was still unfinished. In October 1981, prices of gasoline and heating oil went up 25 to 75 percent; food prices, 17 to 41 percent.

Shifting back to a market-oriented economy, even if Moscow allowed it, would now completely discredit Husák's government. Trying Poland's approach—borrowing from the West—is anathema to "doctrinal purists." The only way out, says Kusin, is to tinker with central planning policies, tighten discipline, and cooperate closely with the Soviets. That approach, of course, was tried before.