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inaccurate answers are simply due to memory lapses.

Moreover, attitudes expressed in polls are not always a reliable indicator of behavior. During the early 1930s, researcher Richard LaPiere crossed the United States with a Chinese couple to measure discrimination. Only one of the 251 restaurants and other public facilities they visited refused them service. Yet when LaPiere later mailed questionnaires to the proprietors, 90 percent stated they would not serve Asians.

In 1970, political scientist Philip Converse reported encountering a different sort of inconsistency. People interviewed on the same issues three times over four years could be divided into two groups: 20 percent had stable attitudes, but 80 percent either had no opinion or repeatedly "flip-flopped" on issues. Yet, Converse found, the shifts tended to balance out, keeping the mean attitude "remarkably stable."

Statistical techniques can correct for some distortions, but a certain amount of error will always remain, say Lewis and Schneider. Public opinion surveys cannot precisely delineate popular attitudes or predict behavior, but, carefully and cautiously conducted, they are useful as broad indicators of what the public is thinking.

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The Pipeline Imbroglia

"Specters and Pipedreams" by Jonathan P. Stern, in *Foreign Policy* (Fall 1982), P.O. Box 984, Farmingdale, N.Y. 11737.

Détente is often said to benefit the Soviet Union more than the West. Ironically, says Stern, a London-based energy consultant, the Reagan administration's recent attempt to get tough with Russia by opposing construction of the Siberian natural gas pipeline to Western Europe also aided Moscow, by weakening the NATO alliance.

The importance of the pipeline, says Stern, has been vastly exaggerated. Western Europe began importing Soviet natural gas in 1968 and now buys some 26 billion cubic meters (BCM) annually. So far, West Germany, France, Austria, and Switzerland together have contracted for an additional 21 BCM annually to be carried by the new pipeline. Soviet hard currency earnings on the new gas will amount to \$3.8 billion per year, not the oft-cited \$10 billion. (Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain, and Greece may also sign contracts soon, though for a smaller total amount.)

Moreover, killing the project would have little effect on Soviet energy development. Regardless of the European pipeline, Moscow plans to build five other pipelines from its Urengoy gas field in Siberia, the world's largest, for itself and its Eastern European allies. Natural gas production will rise from 28.6 percent of all Soviet energy production today to 35-40 percent by 1990.

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Nor will the pipeline make Western Europe dangerously dependent on Moscow. West Germany, Italy, and France will indeed rely on the Soviets for 35 percent of their natural gas, or six percent of their total energy needs. But Stern notes that Soviet oil exports will dwindle after 1985, a year after the pipeline becomes operational, thus keeping down Western Europe's total Soviet energy imports. A sudden cutoff of Soviet supplies would cause problems. But as France demonstrated when Algeria halted shipments of liquefied natural gas in 1980, remedies exist: other sources or kinds of fuel, reduced consumption. Far worse would be increased Western European reliance on OPEC—the only realistic long-term alternative to the pipeline.

The chief threat posed by the pipeline, says Stern, is to Western unity; the episode is a "classic example of how not to manage an alliance."

Gung Ho, Again

"The Marine Corps Faces the Future" by Michael Wright, in *The New York Times Magazine* (June 20, 1982), 229 West 43rd St., New York, N.Y. 10036.

Its ordeal during the Vietnam era "nearly left the Marine Corps a burnt-out case," writes Wright, a *New York Times* editor. Now the Corps' fortunes have improved.

In 1965–73, the Marines lost 13,066 killed and 51,392 wounded in their battles to defend northern South Vietnam. Meanwhile, race riots raged in barracks at home and abroad. Desertion rates soared. Recruiting declined. And in Washington's sour post-Vietnam climate, think-tank analysts, Army critics, and Federal budget-cutters began to question (once again) the need for an austere but large (192,000-man) seaborne intervention force with its own aircraft.

Getting the Corps back to basics was the first task of two successive Marine commandants, Generals Louis H. Wilson and Robert H. Barrow. Starting in 1975, training was improved and discipline tightened; some 5,000 "undesirables" were discharged; many of the best Marines were assigned recruiting duty. Today, 82 percent of all Marine "boots" (trainees) are high school graduates—up from 50 percent seven years ago. First-termers' re-enlistments are up to a record, nearly 50 percent, and the court-martial rate is down.

What gave the Corps new life in Washington were the 1979 Iran crisis and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Some 12,000 Marines were earmarked for President Carter's standby Rapid Deployment Force for the Persian Gulf. President Reagan's subsequent emphasis on a global "maritime" strategy meant a bigger Navy, including reactivated battleships, to help the amphibious Marines fight future "brushfires."

On Capitol Hill, the Marines have friends among both the "reformers," who like the Corps' mobility and frugality (it absorbs only three percent of the Pentagon's budget), and the "hard-liners," who admire Marine combat-readiness. New jet fighters, armored vehicles, advanced antitank and antiaircraft missiles, and amphibious vessels