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office space, and free mailing privileges to former Chief Executives. By refusing to testify before the House Un-American Activities Committee in 1953, Truman also established precedent for the "ex-executive privilege" later invoked by Richard Nixon.

Truman threw most of his energies into party politics, and here the limits of his influence are most evident. He worked hard for his party's presidential candidates—Stevenson, in 1956, and Kennedy in 1960. But before their nominations, he tried in vain to rally support for *his* favorites—Averell Harriman and Stuart Symington.

Like other ex-Presidents—Theodore Roosevelt, Herbert Hoover, Gerald Ford—Truman expected to retain more power than he did. But, says Giglio, his loyalty to old associates (e.g. Harriman and Symington) and to old policies—notably his "gradualist" approach to race relations—diminished the role he had hoped to play.

Republicans Heading South

"Republicans Flow South" by Robert H. Freymeyer, in *American Demographics*, (June 1982) P.O. Box 68, Ithaca, N.Y. 14850.

In the 1980 presidential election, Ronald Reagan won 13 of 16 Southern states. Some political analysts cite a national swing to the right or a general weakening of old party ties as the cause of this Republican sweep. Freymeyer, a sociologist at Gettysburg College, offers another explanation: More than four million Northerners have migrated to the once solidly Democratic South in the past decade, and a disproportionate number of them have been Republicans.

According to poll data, only seven percent of the South's voters in the presidential election of 1952 were migrants from the North. By 1976, the figure had climbed to 25 percent. Of these migrants, 37 percent are Republicans (compared to 27 percent of native Southerners), and only 42 percent are Democrats (versus 60 percent of the natives). Not surprisingly, Florida, a retirees' haven, has seen the biggest influx. Three-fourths of all Republicans there are migrants. In the 1968 presidential election, claims Freymeyer, migrants handed the state to Richard Nixon. Forty-three percent of Florida voters were transplanted Northerners, of whom 63 percent voted for Nixon. Only 22 percent of the migrants voted for the Democrat Hubert Humphrey, and native Southerner George Wallace won only 15 percent of their vote.

What changes can be expected as a result of this new Republican voice in the South? Freymeyer predicts a continued growth in Republican influence. In 1980, for example, six Southern states sent Republicans to the U.S. Senate. In four of those states [Alabama, Florida, Georgia, and North Carolina], Republicans replaced Democrats. On the local level, Freymeyer sees future improvements in Southern schools, since only 21 percent of migrant Republicans say they have confidence in the Southern educational system, compared with 42 percent of native Democrats and 62 percent of native Republicans.

Migrant Republicans should have an even greater impact than their numbers indicate, says Freymeyer: They tend to be more active citizens than do native Southerners, who have the lowest voter turnout rate in the country. "Like the carpetbaggers after the Civil War," he observes, Northerners today are "heading South [and] bringing the Republican party with them."

FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE

Don't Forget the Basics

"Misconceptions in American Strategic Assessment: CIA and DOD" by Richard Ned Lebow, in *Political Science Quarterly* (Summer 1982), 2852 Broadway, New York, N.Y. 10025-0148.

Calculating how many weapons were needed to maintain nuclear deterrence was a simple matter when the United States enjoyed a clear military edge over the Soviet Union. But today, writes Lebow, professor of international relations at Johns Hopkins, the issue is far more murky. And U.S. military planners may be overstating our needs.

A key consideration is the U.S. "residual" force—how many missiles and bombers would survive a Soviet first strike. The two chief sources of estimates on this question, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency, disagree. The CIA's estimates are optimistic, the DIA's are pessimistic. More important, Lebow contends, both agencies err by equating deterrence only with raw numbers of missiles and bombers. Ignored are crucial but hard to measure factors such as psychology, political will, and economic structure.

Both CIA and DIA fear that the prospect of facing a weak U.S. residual force might tempt Moscow to launch a preemptive first strike. As these agencies see it, the Kremlin assumes that Washington would not try to retaliate with a surviving U.S. force that could not eliminate the Soviets' capability to launch a second strike. But Lebow notes a lesson from the past: In wartime, "honor, anger, or national self-respect" may overcome pragmatic considerations. Given their own World War II history, Russians, more than most people, realize that even a devastated, "weak" America would fight back.

Moreover, U.S. military analysts forget that war is waged for political reasons, not merely because one side enjoys a military advantage. And for Moscow, the political "bottom line" is survival. A war-ravaged Soviet Union would probably confront domestic unrest among its ethnic minorities—Caucasians, Muslims—and rebellion in its Eastern European satellites. Moreover, the Soviet economy, deprived of central direction, would be seriously disrupted. Soviet industry is especially vulnerable because it is concentrated close to key railroads. Destroying