
PAPERBOUNDS

THE RETURN OF EVA PERON, with The Killings in Trinidad. By V. S. Naipaul. Vintage reprint, 1981. 245 pp. \$2.95

Much of the Third World is "doomed to remain half-made." Such is the estimate of V. S. Naipaul, whose novels and "obsessional" reports from underdeveloped nations have earned him a reputation as a successor to Joseph Conrad. This book of travel essays from the 1970s—on Trinidad, Zaire, and Argentina (with a side trip to Uruguay)—paints a mottled picture of delusions and decay. Argentines lack history, asserts Naipaul, himself a Trinidad-born Indian. Unable to face their own "artificial, fragmented colonial society," they claim "the achievements and authority of Europe." Meanwhile, in Uruguay, interest rates swell to 60 percent, and employees of the state oil company rush to work early because there are not enough chairs to go around. In Zaire, Joseph Mobutu honors the 19th-century despotism of Belgium's King Leopold II by imitating it. Writes Naipaul: "The chief threatens; the people are cowed; the chief relents; the people praise his magnanimity." Finally, Naipaul dissects a fraudulent black-power commune in Trinidad. It was financed, he says, by chic British do-gooders who "keep up with revolution as with theatre" and visit trouble spots "with return air tickets." Somber reading.

POLITICAL CONTROL OF THE ECONOMY. By Edward R. Tufte. Princeton reprint, 1981. 168 pp. \$4.95.

Most Americans do not particularly care *what* economic policies are implemented, just so long as they *work*. In this widely praised study, Tufte, a Yale political sci-

entist, quantifies the voters' influence on economic planning—and the impact of prosperity (or the lack of it) on elections. He calculates that an average 1 percent increase in real disposable income nationwide leads to a 1.3 percent increase in the vote for an incumbent President (Democrat or Republican). Moreover, from 1946 to 1976, the median rate of growth in real disposable income per capita was 3.3 percent in years when incumbent Presidents sought re-election, compared to 1.7 percent otherwise. (During campaigns, Presidents typically boosted veterans' and social security benefits and federal aid to states and cities; taxes to help cover these costs were raised later.) Tufte strongly favors the "competitive rigors of the political arena" over the alternatives. But he also notes the inevitable by-product: "a lurching, stop-and-go economy."

THE MAKING OF ELIZABETHAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1558–1603. By R. B. Wernham. Univ. of Calif., 1981. 109 pp. \$3.95 (cloth, \$15.50)

During the reign of Elizabeth I (1558–1603), England was but "a bone between two dogs," writes Wernham, an Oxford historian. Yet, by artful military moves and deft diplomacy, Elizabeth managed to keep both Henry IV of France and Philip II of Spain from swallowing up her weaker, less populous nation. To make sure that neither French nor Dutch ports would be used to launch an invasion, Elizabeth first harassed the Spanish occupiers of the Netherlands (allowing British volunteers to fight alongside Dutch dissidents), while she distracted France (by sending troops to bolster the Huguenots in France's first War of Religion).