stead of more "compromise-prone" legislatures), even "moderate" civil-rights activists eventually underwent a philosophical conversion. Judges set quotas and numerical guidelines to measure progress. In 1974, the NAACP firmly endorsed reparations when it backed the University of Washington Law School's admissions quota for blacks, saying it served "remedial objectives." Today, Killian observes, "race thinking" pervades American life.

Affirmative action's defenders deny charges of "racism" by pointing to their benign intentions. But Killian contends that the policy has already produced angry rivalries over "group rights." (Have Korean immigrants of the 1960s and '70s, for instance, suffered more in America than white ethnics not eligible for federal preferences?). Moreover, as sociologist William J. Wilson has argued, affirmative action has mostly helped those skilled black individuals who need it least. It has not changed the lives of the black urban "underclass."

The Long Road North

"Chicanos in the United States: A History of Exploitation and Resistance" by Leobardo F. Estrada et al., in *Daedalus* (Spring 1981), American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 165 Allandale St., Jamaica Plain Station, Boston, Mass. 02130.

Throughout America's history, Mexican immigration has frequently been encouraged—not only by labor-hungry U.S. businessmen and farmers but by the federal government, as well. So note the authors, a team of Mexican-American scholars.

Economic troubles in Mexico and the tremendous growth of agriculture in the Southwest touched off the first great waves of Mexican immigration to the United States. This occurred just when World War I created both enormous European demand for American produce and a labor shortage in the United States. All told, from 1900 to 1930, an estimated 250,000 Mexicans sought their fortunes north of the Rio Grande. Their labors were a boon to U.S. railroad tycoons, food processing magnates, and farmers. And, since the overwhelming majority never left the Southwest, their presence was not viewed as a threat by increasingly nativist Midwesterners and Northerners. Thus, when Congress slapped immigration curbs on foreign ethnic groups in 1924, Mexicans were not included.

The Great Depression of the 1930s stirred popular resentment of Mexican workers. From 1929 to 1934, more than 400,000 were deported (including some 200,000 born here). But World War II brought another about-face. In 1942, the United States and Mexico launched the *bracero* program, through which Washington underwrote Mexican workers' travel costs and guaranteed a minimum wage. In force through 1964, the program brought nearly five million Mexicans north.

Today, 14.6 million Chicanos make up the second-largest U.S. minority group (behind blacks). Growing at between 2.2 and 3.5 percent an-

nually, their numbers could double in 20 years—even as the American population's overall growth rate levels off. Fifty-eight percent of Chicanos still live in the Southwest, but ever since the 1920s, higher wages have drawn many to Kansas City, Chicago, Gary, Detroit, and other cities in the North.

Younger Chicanos seem to be making economic gains. The median education of the second generation is 11.1 years, compared with 5.8 years for their immigrant grandparents. But Chicanos, as yet, are not well-represented in the professional ranks; two-thirds work where job opportunities are shrinking (e.g., heavy industry). Chicanos are not likely to catch up with the Anglo majority in the workplace, the authors conclude, in the decades immediately ahead.

More Cops, Less Crime?

"The Relationship of Criminal Victimization, Police per Capita and Population Density in Twenty-Six Cities," by David Schichor, David L. Decker, and Robert M. O'Brien, in *Journal of Criminal Justice* (vol. 8, no. 5, 1980), Pergamon Press, Maxwell House, Fairview Park, Elmsford, N.Y. 10523.

Can robberies and assaults be curbed simply by putting more policemen on the beat? Are high crime rates the inevitable result of overcrowding in central cities? Criminologists disagree. But three sociologists at California State College, San Bernardino, find that the answers depend on the offense.

The authors examined 1974 Justice Department statistics on police per capita, 1976 Census Bureau figures on population density, and 1974 criminal victimization rates supplied by U.S. Law Enforcement Assistance Administration surveys for 26 large American cities.

They found that cities with the densest populations had the lowest rates of assault without theft—e.g., rape or aggravated assault. The same held true for property crimes without human contact, including household burglary. But property crimes *with contact* were highest in these cities.

Since the most crowded urban centers tend to have the largest law enforcement agencies, the authors sought to isolate the role of police in deterring crime. They discovered that cities with the most police per capita suffer slightly fewer nonviolent property crimes than do their less well protected counterparts. Added police manpower was somewhat more effective in preventing rape and other simple assaults, but it had virtually no impact on thefts with contact.

It appears that rape, other violent assaults, and household burglaries are most likely to occur in quiet neighborhoods that contain just enough victims and homes to attract criminals. Increased police patrols, the authors suggest, could help in such areas to reduce these crimes by increasing the likelihood that felons will be spotted "in the