

**FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE**

---

member of the National Security Council staff under President Carter.

The country the Bolsheviks wrested from the Romanovs in 1917 had "neither a tradition of rights of the nobility, nor of private property, which might have helped diffuse State powers," notes Odom. Ever since Peter the Great (who ruled from 1682 to 1725), Tsars had also been obsessed by fears of Western attack. Only a powerful military, they believed, could conquer neighboring lands as buffer states, keep their non-Russian populations in line, and make sure the peasants produced enough food to maintain an Army.

After the Revolution, Lenin's pledges of "peace, bread, and land"—and self-determination for nationalities—promised to change all that. But Lenin also believed that no worthy "proletarian" regime would actually move to secede from the new Soviet Union. When some did, the Bolsheviks substituted a Red Army for the Imperial force and crushed nationalism in the Ukraine, Georgia, and Armenia. Later, they placed the economy on a permanent wartime footing (starting with the First Five Year Plan of 1928) and forcibly collectivized agriculture.

In short, the central issues of the Russian Empire—how to support a strong Army, how to control the centrifugal tendencies of diverse nationalities, how to keep the needs of the state paramount—remain unresolved today. Ever-increasing Western trade concessions will not bring about liberalization within the USSR or abate international tensions, for either would reduce the power of the Soviet state and alter the *domestic* status quo.

The Soviet Union's imposing military strength makes a return to Cold War-style containment and U.S. nuclear superiority impossible. But East-West stability can be attained. Odom calls for a Western military build-up aimed at making the United States (with its allies) "pre-eminent" over the Soviets (and their allies) in nuclear and conventional fighting capabilities; a Western policy of denying the Soviets strategic goods and of linking all other commerce to diplomatic concessions; and active political, moral, and sometimes material support for those who resist Soviet designs—in Afghanistan, the Horn of Africa, Cuba, Eastern Europe, and inside the Soviet Union itself.

### *Beyond Cloak and Dagger*

"Intelligence in the 1980s" by William E. Colby, in *The Information Society* (vol. 1, no. 1, 1981), Crane, Russak & Co., 3 East 44th St., New York, N.Y. 10017.

For centuries, spies were the backbone of government intelligence, ferreting out secrets and occasionally manipulating events. Then, during World War II, General William Donovan, head of the U.S. Office of Strategic Services (forerunner of the Central Intelligence Agency), introduced a new approach, employing a corps of academic specialists to analyze information available publicly as well as data gathered by agents in the field. Today, writes Colby, who directed the CIA under President Ford, a third revolution is transforming intelligence-

## FOREIGN POLICY &amp; DEFENSE



Reprinted by permission of United Features Syndicate, Inc.

*The United States can not afford many more surprises like the Shah's ouster in 1979, writes former CIA Director William Colby.*

gathering from a "secret service" into a "public function."

Failure to anticipate the Shah's fall in Iran, Colby observes, underscored the need for intelligence agencies capable of predicting the future—not simply compiling facts about the present. In recent years, American intelligence services have begun to experiment with war games, hold mock meetings of the Soviet Politburo, and invite outside specialists to challenge in-house forecasts. Colby applauds these efforts. He also urges the reintegration of intelligence researchers and policymakers—long separated for fear that involvement in policy disputes would tarnish the objectivity of data collectors.

Maintaining national security today also requires that intelligence agencies expand their focus beyond politics and military might to pay more attention to energy, trade, social and cultural forces, and psychological factors. Intelligence officials should draw more on government expertise from outside the "spook" community—e.g., the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, and Energy. Grouping intelligence analysts from many disciplines into geographic teams should be a top CIA priority during the 1980s, Colby argues.

Even as the CIA and its sister agencies cast their nets more widely, they should distribute their catch to a broader audience. Colby wants the CIA to publish more of its data systematically (as the Bureau of Labor Statistics does, for example). In-depth assessments of foreign leaders or world trouble-spots—too sensitive for *official* release—could be distributed to "private intermediaries" such as journalists or academics who can bring their own expertise to bear on thorny problems. Intelligence gathering, Colby concludes, "has become too important to be left to the government."