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of the scientists and economic managers central to Deng's plans were trained in the Soviet Union, or by Soviet personnel in China. They make up an important pro-Moscow pressure group. Further, the regime still regards itself as unalterably opposed to capitalism. The Sino-Soviet dispute began as a doctrinal squabble, Robinson notes. But having adopted market-oriented reforms themselves, the Chinese no longer revile the Soviets as "revisionists" but simply as power-hungry "hegemonists." Since Mao's death, Beijing has twice made diplomatic overtures to Moscow—in mid-1977 and in mid-1979. They were cut short, respectively, by the Vietnamese invasion of China's ally, Cambodia, and by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Ultimately, Robinson writes, Beijing aims to supplant both U.S. and Soviet power in East Asia. But for the time being, he contends, the United States must strengthen China to help counterbalance Soviet might. Only by building up its own military and reducing the need for a "China crutch" will Washington prevent the price of future cooperation—acquiescence in Beijing's dominance of her neighbors, including Taiwan—from rising too high.

A 'Massive' Ploy

"The Origins of Massive Retaliation" by Samuel F. Wells, Jr., in *Political Science Quarterly* (Spring 1981), Ste. 500, 619 West 114th St., New York, N.Y. 10025.

"Massive retaliation," the nuclear doctrine first articulated by President Eisenhower in 1954, evokes a frightening image of the Strategic Air Command "on rampage" against Moscow at the slightest provocation. Actually, says Wells, a Wilson Center scholar, it was a far subtler strategy, shaped by politics and a desire to cut defense outlays.

Eisenhower was elected in 1952 after he promised to end the deadlocked Korean War and to cut military expenditures (then consuming 70 percent of the federal budget). "If our economy should go broke," he said during the campaign, "the Russians would have won even a greater victory than anything they could obtain by going to war." But the former NATO commander was under intense pressure from hard-line Republicans who demanded a credible new global strategy to replace Truman's "containment" doctrine.

"Massive retaliation" offered a solution to Eisenhower's political problems. Although it depended on weapons and air power developed under Truman, the policy sounded new and stern. And, by relying on nuclear might, Eisenhower was able to justify cutting back America's post-Korea conventional forces. His fiscal 1955 budget called for \$31 billion for the military, down from the \$41.5 billion Truman had sought right before leaving office in 1953.

Eisenhower consciously exaggerated what he meant by massive retaliation, writes Wells. *New York Times* columnist James Reston voiced the popular view when he said in 1954 that the administration meant to use nuclear weapons against the Soviets even in the event of a local

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"Don't be afraid— I can always pull you back," says Eisenhower's Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, in this 1956 Herblock cartoon.

From Herblock's Special for Today, Simon and Schuster, 1958.

brush-fire war. Ike's Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, later soft-pedaled that notion, but toughened public rhetoric by Vice President Richard Nixon and others seemed to belie his disclaimer.

Eisenhower clearly was prepared to use nuclear weapons in situations short of total war—say, a Chinese invasion of Southeast Asia. But documents show that Eisenhower did not really intend to blanket Moscow or Beijing with hydrogen bombs in every conflict with the communists. He was notably cool to proposals to employ atomic bombs to save the French at Dien Bien Phu in Vietnam in 1954.

Eisenhower's deliberate ambiguity allowed him to placate hawks at home while reinforcing the deterrent effect against the Soviet Union and China. But "massive retaliation" as popularly understood, says Wells, was "more symbol than reality."

Persian Gulf Folly?

"America Engulfed" by David D. Newsom, in *Foreign Policy* (Summer 1981), P.O. Box 984, Farmingdale, N.Y. 11737.

Less than one month after the December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, President Carter plunged the United States into a new global commitment—defense of the oil-rich Persian Gulf against "outside forces." More recently, President Reagan has stated his desire to station U.S. ground forces in the region. Newsom, Carter's Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, charges that this new strategy is probably unnecessary and nearly impossible to execute.

The Carter Doctrine "grew out of last minute pressures for a Presidential speech," recalls Newsom. No detailed study of its implications was made before or after the address. Nor has one been undertaken by