

POLITICS & GOVERNMENT

rangeland. It is a thankless task. Eventually, Kirschten concludes, local politicians may decide that this is one responsibility they do not want. That way, at least, "they will still have the feds to kick around."

Ike as Activist

"Eisenhower as an Activist President: A Look at New Evidence" by Fred I. Greenstein, in *Political Science Quarterly* (Winter 1979/80), 2852 Broadway, New York, N.Y. 10025.

The conventional portrait of Dwight Eisenhower as a President "more attentive to golf than to government" is pure fiction, says Greenstein, a political scientist at Princeton. Newly released documents at the Eisenhower Library show the wide scope of Eisenhower's "hidden hand leadership."

Eisenhower's critics often accuse him of abdicating too much policymaking power to his staff, notably to presidential assistant Sherman Adams and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. But copies of Eisenhower's frequent memos to them make clear that it was he who set policy. The President, in fact, preferred that his staff have the limelight: The public perceptions of the two men—Adams, the "abominable no man," and Dulles, the "grim cold warrior," Greenstein contends, "preserved Eisenhower's ability to appear as a benevolent national and international leader."

"Don't get hysterical—I'm watching all the time," read the caption of this 1958 cartoon by Herblock. The conventional view of Eisenhower's Presidency is being challenged as more White House papers become available to historians.



From Herblock's Special for Today. Simon and Schuster, 1958.

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Transcripts of Eisenhower's conversations show that he often feigned ignorance of important issues before the press. For example, during the 1955 Quemoy-Matsu crisis, he sought to skirt the question of using U.S. forces to protect the islands. ("Don't worry, Jim," he told his press secretary before a news conference, "if that question comes up, I'll just confuse them."). And if the President's daily schedule seemed relaxed, it was because at the time the administration did not consider it appropriate to make his full list of meetings public.

Eisenhower once wrote that he viewed the federal government as "too big, too complex, and too pervasive" to be guided by one individual. He preferred to conserve his "public prestige" by appearing to remain above the political fray (unlike Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, says Greenstein, who "sought to enhance their professional reputations as political operators"). The advantage of Eisenhower's low-key approach may be that it avoided "raising expectations about what the President as an individual can ever accomplish."

The Future of Revenue Sharing

"An S.O.S. For Revenue Sharing" by Richard P. Nathan, in *Commonsense* (Summer 1979), Republican National Committee, 310 First St. S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003.

Congress should think twice before cutting off the states from federal revenue sharing in the name of "budgetary austerity," warns Nathan, professor of public affairs at Princeton.

First adopted in 1972, the general revenue sharing program—centerpiece of the Nixon administration's "New Federalism"—distributes \$7 billion a year in general purpose grants to state and local governments. In 1979, congressional conservatives failed in an attempt to cut the states' portion (\$2.3 billion; local governments receive the remainder) from the 1980 budget. The program comes up for renewal this year, and Washington policymakers may again be tempted to sacrifice the states' share in order to cut the 1980 federal budget deficit, projected at \$28.4 billion.

Proponents of the cut point to the big budget surpluses of some (though not all) states. Yet those surpluses, Nathan contends, consist almost entirely of funds set aside to cover future retirement benefits for state and local government workers. Moreover, stopping federal grants to states would hurt local governments; in a Brookings Institution study headed by Nathan, seven of eight states monitored were found to be using their federal revenue to help city and county governments, mostly to pay the costs of public education.

Perhaps the most serious consequence of ending state participation in revenue sharing is the harm that could be done to the American constitutional system. Already, more than half of all federal grants to states and localities (excluding welfare), or roughly \$30 billion, go di-