pended the constitution and stiffened press censorship in 1968. Today, a mix of civilian economists and military officers manage Brazil's large state corporations; the profit-minded generals allow these concerns to run free of "political interference."

Moreover, Brazil's generals, says Mendes, have developed a set of "internal checks and balances" designed to prevent both destabilizing dissent within the Army and one-man rule. The Presidency, for example, rotates every six years among the country's leading generals. The post, writes Mendes, is seen as a "military mission"; at its end, "the incumbent [is] required to leave . . . as if he were being relieved of a routine assignment."

Rapid growth (nearly 10 percent annually during the 1970s) and a few social reforms have dampened most violent opposition to military rule. But despite occasional talk of "redemocratization," observes Mendes, Brazil's generals have no intention of stepping down. The restoration of the right of habeas corpus and the periodic easing of censorship are merely tactical moves aimed at enhancing the regime's staying power.

Soviet Crime

"The Geography of Soviet Criminality" by Louise Shelley, in *American Sociological Review* (Feb. 1980), Dept. of Sociology, University of Illinois, Urbana, Ill. 61801.

What is the crime capital of the Soviet Union? Surprisingly, it is not Moscow—nor Leningrad—but the much smaller port city of Vladivostok, in the Eastern Maritime region. According to Shelley, an American University sociologist, strict Soviet controls have not wiped out crime but shifted lawbreakers and crime-prone elements of the population to the USSR's small eastern and northern cities.

In the Soviet Union, criminal offenders living in big cities who are sentenced to prison terms of five or more years automatically lose their rights to reside there after release. The restriction is easily enforced; since 1932, all Soviet citizens have carried domestic passports that enable the authorities to regulate both travel and choice of residence. In effect, Soviet policy has removed experienced criminals from the largest cities and dumped them into the nation's newer, medium-sized towns.

The movements of law-abiding citizens also contribute to turning small cities into crime centers. Eight million Soviet citizens (roughly 5 percent of the Soviet population) move to new homes each year. The majority seek to escape the drudgery of life on collective farms. But Russia's larger cities are closed to most "outsiders." Thus, migrants are forced to opt for the small cities. (The period between 1959 and 1970 saw 73 Soviet cities attain populations of more than 100,000.) Many of the migrants are young males, the group most prone to crime in any society. Though generally better-educated, these young men from the villages often have trouble adjusting to city life and live in substandard housing. They frequently get into mischief—public drunkenness, burglaries, even murder.

Apparently, the key factor is not a city's size but the instability of its population. One cluster of Byelorussian towns grew by two-thirds in 10 years—and found that its crime rate grew even more quickly. The USSR's three largest cities (Moscow, Leningrad, and Kiev), by contrast, enjoy crime rates far below those of the smaller Soviet cities. Thus, thanks to government policy, the geography of Soviet crime differs markedly from that of other industrialized countries.

Workers of the Persian Gulf

"Migration and Development: The Changing Perspective of the Poor Arab Countries" by J. S. Birks and C. A. Sinclair, in *Journal of International Affairs* (Fall–Winter 1979), Box 4, International Affairs Bldg., Columbia University, New York, N.Y. 10027

The spectacular economic development of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and other thinly populated Persian Gulf countries depends not only on petroleum exports but on manpower imports. More than 4.5 million foreign workers labor on Gulf construction and industrial projects; they include almost 3 million Arabs from poverty-ridden Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and North and South Yemen.

The number of Arab migrant workers in the Gulf has increased roughly 10-fold since the 1973–74 OPEC oil-price hikes. The migration has proved to be a mixed blessing back home, write World Bank consultants Birks and Sinclair. Jobs in the oil kingdoms provide an alternative to local unemployment. The wages sent home by migrants supply needed foreign exchange. (In 1976, the $397 million that Jordan's workers earned abroad offset fully 31.2 percent of the country's payments for imports.) But the new influx of cash has fueled inflation. And lucrative job opportunities in the Gulf take away not only skilled professionals but also farmers and herders. In Oman, acreage devoted to winter-wheat crops has fallen 75 percent due to labor shortages.

A sharp decline in the oil kingdoms' demand for Arab migrant workers has already begun. Saudi Arabia and the others are already turning to non-Arab workers—notably South Koreans, Filipinos, Indians, and Pakistanis. In 1970, Asian workers constituted 25.8 percent of the migrant labor force (83,900 workers) in small oil kingdoms such as Kuwait and Bahrain. By 1975, their share had jumped to 45.8 percent. Why? Asian workers pose no political threats to Persian Gulf regimes. They are easier to keep isolated and far less likely to settle permanently.

The authors predict that, in five years, Asians will comprise 55 percent of the Persian Gulf's much reduced 1.67 million–man migrant work force; Arabs will comprise only 40.5 percent. By 1985, in the poorer, labor-surplus Arab nations, continued low economic growth combined with resurging unemployment will bring new tensions, even as the financial benefits from migration decline.