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death, the mourner can meet his obligations by spending a certain amount of time contemplating a loved one's demise. In fact, Hamlet's primary objection to his mother's behavior is her haste in remarrying: "The funeral baked meats/ Did coldly furnish forth the marriage tables."

In the case of murder, elemental justice demands revenge as well. Still, the conventions of mourning—and drama—require delay. Revenge must be slowly contemplated. The decision to strike cannot be hasty, for it symbolically brings the mourning period to an end.

Nevertheless, even the ghost who commanded it recognizes Hamlet's deed as "Murder most foul, as in the best it is." Taking a life in the name of love, writes Welsh, only underscores "the futility of revenge." Hamlet's retaliation fails. At the play's end, no happy ghost walks the stage pronouncing that its soul can finally rest. There is no satisfaction: Hamlet has not avenged his father's death. (He strikes at the murderer Claudius only after being fatally wounded.) Rather than bringing mourning to a close, the bloody outcome gives rise to new sorrow.

OTHER NATIONS

A Matter of Revenge

"Iran's Foreign Devils" by Roy Parviz Mottahedeh, in *Foreign Policy* (Spring 1980), P.O. Box 984, Farmingdale, N.Y. 11737.

By supporting the seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and many Iranians have put nationalist sentiments ahead of true fealty to Islamic teachings. This reflects the Iranians' powerful xenophobic urge to avenge long years of alleged foreign domination, writes Mottahedeh, who teaches Islamic history at Princeton.

Islam's traditional protection of foreign traders and diplomats dates to medieval days, when Muslim rulers dealt with other nations from a position of equal, sometimes superior, might. But by the 19th century, Muslim power had ebbed.

The Russians were the first to abuse privileges granted by Iran (then Persia). The Treaty of Turkmanchai (1828) ratified a Russian border-war victory and gave the tsar's officials virtual veto power over Persian courts in cases involving Russian residents. Soon, other European nations were turning limited privileges into "devices for economic exploitation" and wresting blanket immunity from local laws—which insulted and humiliated many Muslims.

The deposed Shah's father, Reza Pahlavi, regained many of Iran's sovereign powers during the 1920s and won broad popular support. But his abdication in 1941 (forced by the Soviets and the British after he

tilted toward Nazi Germany) and the 1953 CIA-orchestrated coup that restored his son to the throne made the Pahlavis seem no more than foreign puppets.

In 1962, as economic troubles sparked a surge of anti-Shah feeling, the United States pressed for diplomatic immunity from local laws for all American technical advisers in Iran. This infuriated many Iranians, including clerics. Among them was the Ayatollah Khomeini. Between jail terms for sedition, he denounced the Iranian parliament's approval of the Americans' immunity as a "crime," a "shameful vote . . . in contradiction to Islam."

Just before he was sent into exile in 1964, Khomeini predicted that the United States would try to expand these privileges; indeed, Washington soon secured diplomatic immunity for its advisers' dependents. By 1975, Mottahedeh writes, many Iranians believed that all 85,000 Americans assisting the Shah's army and economic development had "some standing that made them a community not fully subject to Iranian law."

Khomeini's anti-Americanism intensified in exile. Since the Shah's overthrow it has shaped Iran's treatment of U.S. citizens. In May 1979, all special American privileges were revoked by the Revolutionary Council. But U.S. diplomats still enjoyed immunity. Last October 28, Khomeini told Iranians, "All the problems of the Muslims stem from America." Seven days later, his militant followers stormed the embassy.

A Permanent Junta in Brazil?

"The Post-1964 Brazilian Regime: Outward Redemocratization and Inner Institutionalization" by Candido Mendes, in *Government and Opposition* (Winter 1980), London S.E.P.S., Houghton St., London WC2A 2AE, United Kingdom.

The military regime that has ruled Brazil since 1964 is a junta with a difference, writes Mendes, a political scientist at Rio de Janeiro's Sociedad Brasileira de Instruçao. Unlike their counterparts in Peru and Bolivia, the current President, General João Baptista Figueiredo, and his predecessors have sought to create a stable, permanent military state.

Off and on, the military has dominated Brazilian politics since defeating Paraguay in the War of the Triple Alliance (1865–70). The revolving-door civilian governments that ran Brazil for 75 years after the overthrow of Emperor Pedro II in 1889 ruled at the Army's pleasure. But not until 1964, when inflation reached 106 percent and middle-class rioters filled the streets, did the armed forces oust an elected President, João Goulart, and openly take over.

To assure continuity, General Humberto Castelo Branco, the Army's chief of staff, immediately granted Goulart's top bureaucrats a limited voice in decision-making. Civilians retained important powers even after Castelo Branco's successor, General Arturo de Costa e Silva, sus-