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jected Anglo-Saxon surnames into Celtic areas of the British Isles but left Celtic cultures intact.

According to the McDonalds' new estimate, which takes into account the ethnic traditions of immigrant Americans as well as "bloodlines," less than half the population south of Pennsylvania was Anglo-Saxon. (Unreliable figures from several states make accurate new nation-wide estimates impossible.)

Where Barker and Hansen classified 64.5 percent of Marylanders as Anglo-Saxon, the McDonalds' figure is 47.4 percent. North Carolina's percentage of Anglo-Saxons drops from 66 to 40.6, while the Celtic percentage rises from 26 to 52.6. In New England, Anglo-Saxons, as expected, comprised a high 77.6 percent of the population, according to the McDonalds.

The proportion of Celts increased within individual states as one moved inland. In North Carolina, for example, Celts made up roughly 40 percent of the inhabitants of most coastal counties but between 63 and 99 percent of the populations of western districts.

"When [Celts] appeared in sufficient numbers, they composed a disruptive element indeed," say the authors. The Whiskey Rebellion of 1794 broke out in western Pennsylvania's Washington County, where more than 75 percent of the population was Celtic. The authors speculate that most of the sectional disputes (East-West as well as North-South) that plagued the young United States were exacerbated, if not caused, by ethnic differences.

### *When Jews Marry Gentiles*

"Processes and Outcomes in Marriages Between Jews and Non-Jews" by Egon Mayer, in *American Behavioral Scientist* (Apr. 1980), Sage Publications, 275 South Beverly Dr., Beverly Hills, Calif. 90212.

Do American Jews marry outside their faith to reject their parents or their religion? Is intermarriage always the first step down the road to assimilation into the larger society? Mayer, a Brooklyn College sociologist, says no.

He surveyed 446 mixed couples in eight American communities. In two-thirds of the marriages, the husband was Jewish. In most of the marriages, the Jewish spouses were better educated. However, whereas mixed marriages with Jewish wives tended to be unions of educational and occupational equals, Jewish husbands were significantly better educated and/or held more prestigious jobs than their non-Jewish wives. Eighty-one percent of the Jewish wives and 80 percent of their husbands held bachelors degrees, compared with 90 percent of the Jewish husbands and only 72 percent of their wives. Further, fully half the non-Jewish wives were housewives, students, retirees, or unemployed. Only 39 percent of the Jewish wives did not work outside the home.

As for the mothers and fathers, roughly three-fifths of the Jewish

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respondents' parents opposed intermarriage; fewer than one-third of the Gentile parents did. But Jewish parents rarely objected to their children dating non-Jews. Mayer argues that far from itching to flout parental wishes, Jewish "exogamists" rarely learn of any objections until relatively late in life.

Mixed couples tend to have more Jews than Gentiles as friends. Ten times more spouses convert to Judaism than leave the faith. And children of mixed marriages are more likely to be raised as Jews than as Christians. (Forty-two percent of Gentile wives, for example, expect their children to be Bar or Bat Mitzvahed, but only 18.7 percent expect them to be confirmed in church.)

When Jewish and non-Jewish values collide in mixed marriages, the Jewish values generally prevail, says Mayer. When the loss of religious identity that many devout Jews fear *does* occur in a mixed marriage, it probably stems "more from Jewish default than from the assimilating tug of the non-Jews they marry."

## Class Differences

"U.S. and British Perceptions of Class" by  
Reeve D. Vanneman, in *American Journal  
of Sociology* (Jan. 1980), University of  
Chicago Press, 5801 Ellis Ave., Chicago,  
Ill. 60637.

With their egalitarian traditions, Americans have always seemed less "class-conscious" than Europeans. Yet a survey of 9,371 British and American voters analyzed by Vanneman, a University of Maryland sociologist, suggests that social class may be slightly more sharply defined by Americans than by Britons.

Sixty-eight percent of Americans surveyed in the 1960s and early '70s described themselves as aware of their class status, versus only about 59 percent of British respondents. Moreover, the criteria used by Britons and Americans to define classes were similar. The fact that an individual worked with his hands was 18 percent more likely to push him into the working class in most British minds and 16 percent more likely to do so in American minds. A college education increased the chances of being labeled middle class by 9 percent in the United States and 7 percent in Britain.

Why, then, is British society perceived as more rigidly class-conscious? Visible differences in makeup between the American and British political parties are one major factor, says Vanneman. Among employed British men and their wives, social class is four times more likely to determine party preference than it is among Americans. In Britain, Conservative and Liberal voters are invariably better educated and wealthier, and hold more prestigious jobs than do Labour Party voters. By contrast, in the 1972 U.S. presidential elections, Nixon and McGovern voters were, in terms of social class and income (if not numbers), nearly identical.

Vanneman writes that class distinctions are more clear-cut in Ameri-