

**FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE**

The Shah's own stormy career, meanwhile, produced a split personality. Having returned from exile in 1953, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi came to see himself as a child of destiny. Yet, the Shah was an indecisive autocrat. Described as "neurotic, even pathological" by American diplomats, he leaned heavily on the United States for support and guidance. In late 1978, faced with incipient rebellion and debilitated by anticancer drugs, the Shah waffled between violent repression and conciliation. He turned to Washington for direction.

The Carter administration, say the authors, gave him conflicting signals. National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski urged the Shah to maintain control at any cost. Cyrus Vance's State Department believed the Shah was doomed and opposed further repression. According to the authors, President Carter never reconciled this conflict.

After U.N. Ambassador Andrew Young referred to revolutionary leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini as a "saint," and Brzezinski mused publicly that radical Islamic forces in Iran might incite Muslims in the Soviet Union, the Shah concluded (erroneously) that Carter had secretly asked Khomeini to serve as America's new anti-Soviet surrogate in the Persian Gulf. In December 1978, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi made his decision to leave Iran.

*Wonder Weapons?*

"PGMs: No Panacea" by Daniel Goure and Gordon McCormick, in *Survival* (Jan.-Feb. 1980), The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 23 Tavistock St., London, WC2E 7NQ, England.

"What can be seen, can be hit and what can be hit, can be destroyed." So say some NATO officials, confident that precision-guided munitions (PGMs) will soon offset the Soviet bloc's growing conventional military superiority in Central Europe. Private defense consultants Goure and McCormick caution against relying too much on these highly accurate, sophisticated, hand-held weapons.

PGMs appeal to many Western defense officials as a cheap way to restore the military balance in Europe. But, the authors contend, PGM proponents have neglected an important change in Soviet military thinking. If the Soviets invade Western Europe, it will not be with a simple tank-led blitzkrieg, of the sort that could be vulnerable to the small, mobile, PGM-equipped squads envisioned by some NATO strategists. Since the 1960s, Soviet doctrine has increasingly stressed a "combined arms" approach. Warsaw Pact tank divisions are now supported by weapons and infantry numerous enough to destroy Western PGM units. The main improvements: self-propelled artillery, rocket launchers, surface-to-surface missiles, and PGMs of their own.

PGMs have technical limitations, too. Operators must be able to track their target continuously from launch to impact. During the 1973 Mideast War, the Israelis frustrated Arab troops armed with Soviet PGMs by spreading smokescreens and electronically jamming the new

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*U.S. Army.*

*U.S. precision-guided munitions such as this TOW missile are designed to offset Soviet tank strength.*

weapons. Further, most PGMs have ranges below 900 yards—well within the reach of Soviet tank guns. And many PGMs fire only two or three rounds per minute, rates too slow to stop waves of speeding tanks.

Relying too heavily on PGMs could lock NATO into a risky defense strategy that counts on stopping Soviet invaders swiftly just after they cross the Iron Curtain, the authors contend. Such a static defense is much less likely to deter attackers than the ability to wage a long conventional war—an expensive, politically touchy option NATO may not be able to avoid.

*The Jolly  
Green Giants*

“Search and Rescue in Southeast Asia, 1961–1975” by Capt. Earl H. Tilford, Jr., in *Air University Review* (Jan.-Feb. 1980), Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Rescuing downed pilots in Indochina strained the U.S. Air Force’s helicopter capabilities to the limit. But the “chopper” force—previously used to fly mercy missions in the United States and pluck astronauts from the sea—came through with flying colors.

From 1961 until 1964, the Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service had to borrow scarce Army and Marine Corps helicopters, reports Tilford, an Air Force captain. These slow, lightly-armed choppers made easy targets for communist small-arms fire.

New equipment, introduced in late 1965, helped turn the tide. The long-range Sikorsky HH-3C/E (“Jolly Green Giant”), for example, car-