

FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE

on high Pentagon budgets and on any intervention abroad. Groping for a strategy to neutralize growing Soviet military might, Nixon and Kissinger apparently duped themselves. In Tucker's view, they thought the job could be done painlessly through the economic and diplomatic "carrots" (U.S. trade, SALT) offered by detente.

By mid-1975, Tucker contends, Kissinger recognized that his detente policy had failed. Since then, he has backed higher military spending and tougher anti-Soviet policies. But, ironically, his Democratic successors accepted and extended Kissinger's original approach.

According to Tucker, Carter took office convinced that new conditions—chiefly, the nuclear stalemate and the West's economic dependence on the Third World—made the superpowers' military strength largely irrelevant. The new keys to global pre-eminence were economic power and ideological appeal—traditional American strengths and Soviet weaknesses. Carter resolved not to repeat Kissinger's mistake—which stemmed from a preoccupation with Soviet muscle—of vainly opposing leftist forces in the Third World.

Tucker argues that military strength is still the basis of national power. And the Soviets are determined to use such strength to expand their influence throughout the Third World. America now finds its access to vital Persian Gulf oil threatened and its ability to spur NATO resistance to the Soviets diminished.

Requests for higher defense spending in 1980 and a new willingness to protect the Persian Gulf indicate that Carter has abandoned old illusions, says Tucker. But the military weakness they helped to create will take years to overcome.

The First Hostage Crisis

"First Time Farce" by Bruce Hardcastle,
in *The New Republic* (Dec. 22, 1979), Sub-
scription Services Department, P.O. Box
705, Whitinsville, Mass. 01588.

Everything was reversed in the first U.S.-Iranian "hostage" crisis, writes Hardcastle, a Mideast scholar at the National Archives who reconstructed the bizarre affair from declassified U.S. documents.

The incident began on the morning of March 27, 1935, when the shiny chauffeur-driven Packard bearing Iranian Ambassador Ghaffar Khan Djalal, his wife, and dog was stopped for speeding by police chief Jacob T. Biddle in the hamlet of Elkton, Md. Biddle was ready to let the group go with a warning when an infuriated Djalal—who allegedly smelled of drink—grabbed the chief by the tie and shook him. Djalal's claims to diplomatic immunity as a "minister of Iran" impressed no one at the county sheriff's office. Exclaimed one bystander, "Why, he's just a damned preacher!" The Iranian was detained for 1 hour and 45 minutes, before a local justice of the peace dropped all charges.

A formal apology from Secretary of State Cordell Hull and the swift dismissal of Chief Biddle seemed to settle the matter. No complaint was heard from Shah Reza Pahlavi (father of the current Shah) in Tehran.

FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE

But the Ambassador soon seized on his arrest as an opportunity to blackmail Hull into a show of esteem that would convince the increasingly skeptical Shah of his diplomatic worth. When Hull refused even to invite the Ambassador to tea, Djalal told his Foreign Minister that his arrest had been part of an American plot to insult Iran. The state-controlled Iranian press was soon branding the United States a land of gangsters who violate "all the existing codes of international law, custom . . . and courtesy."

Five months later, the *New York Mirror* published a story alleging that the Shah had been a stableboy for British diplomats. The still-smoldering Iranian government recalled its envoys. The Iranians waited three years, in vain, for Hull to apologize for the *Mirror*, before returning to Washington. To the Americans, Hardcastle explains, "Iran was not yet important enough for any urgency."

Shifting the Blame

"Civilian Policy Makers and Military Objectives: A Case Study of the U.S. Offensive to Win the Korean War," by Clarence Y. H. Lo, in *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* (Fall 1979), Department of Sociology, Northern Illinois University, DeKalb, Ill. 60115.

Was General Douglas MacArthur "stretching" his orders in late November 1950, when he attempted to drive north to Korea's border with China on the Yalu River? His critics so contend. But according to UCLA sociologist Lo, recently declassified U.S. documents show that the Truman administration explicitly supported MacArthur's ill-fated campaign.

By November 1950, the tide of war in Korea had turned. A counterattack by United Nations forces begun in September had pushed the North Koreans back beyond the 38th Parallel, deep into their own territory. At that point, MacArthur launched his offensive to reach the Yalu. He was surprised by 300,000 Chinese troops and suffered one of the worst U.S. defeats since the Civil War.

Civilian leaders in Washington later claimed that MacArthur's advance caught them unawares. No one, wrote Secretary of State Dean Acheson, knew what MacArthur was "up to" in the "amazing military maneuver that was unfolding before disbelieving eyes."

Yet, as early as September 9, the White House's National Security Council had urged "a roll-back in Korea north of the 38th Parallel," provided the Chinese or the Soviets did not intervene. On November 20, Acheson, Defense Secretary George C. Marshall, and White House adviser W. Averell Harriman rejected on Truman's behalf proposals by the British Foreign Secretary and U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff to stop MacArthur well short of the Chinese border—despite word of Chinese troops massing in Manchuria and recent U.S. skirmishes with Chinese "volunteers." On November 21, the Joint Chiefs of Staff specifically