Nearly 50,000 Chinese laborers landed in California during the Gold Rush of the 1850s. According to Locke and King, of the National Cancer Institute, many quickly found work laying railroad track or serving as cooks in mining camps. But in 1870, as California's white and Chinese populations grew, the U.S. economy nosedived. Competition from white jobseekers drove the more affluent Chinese into businesses with minimal overhead and labor costs (e.g., grocery stores). Others took less sought after jobs as houseboys, waiters, and laundrymen. Through 1920, the proportion of American Chinese employed in these "personal services" rose from 40.9 to 58 percent.

White racism and the boom-and-bust course of the U.S. economy in the late 19th century prompted Congress to bar Chinese immigration in 1882, 1892, and 1902 (a ban that continued until 1943). But beginning in the 1930s, reports of Japan's brutal invasion of China softened American prejudice. Moreover, growing numbers of U.S.-born Chinese had adopted American ways. As a result, career opportunities widened. Finally, highly-educated Chinese refugees streamed to the United States following the Communist takeover in 1949. By 1970, the proportion of Chinese working in personal services had plummeted to 7.1 percent (still higher than the 2.3 percent figure for whites). Chinese employed in manufacturing more than doubled, from 7.6 to 17.3 percent. And the proportion of professionals jumped from 2.2 to 21.2 percent, surpassing the figure of 17 percent for working whites. Today, higher percentages of Chinese men hold college degrees than do white or black males.

Chinese are still overrepresented in some fields. In 1970, 83 percent of Chinese men in personal services worked in food services—chiefly in restaurants—compared with 24 percent of white males. Relatively few Chinese are salaried managers and administrators. And most Chinese professionals work in technical areas such as science and engineering—which the authors suggest stems from the language obstacles facing many educated immigrants who might otherwise have become lawyers or teachers.

**The Public and Abortion**


After rising steadily during the 1960s, pro-abortion sentiment declined during the 1970s, report University of Houston sociologists Ebaugh and Haney.

Polls measuring approval of various justifications for abortion show that public support peaked shortly after the Supreme Court's 1973 *Roe v. Wade* and *Doe v. Bolton* decisions legalized the operation. That year, between 81 and 91 percent of respondents supported abortion for "hard" reasons—protecting a mother's health, ending a pregnancy caused by rape, and guarding against children with serious birth de-
fcts. Roughly 50 percent also favored abortion for "soft" justifications—low income, pregnancy out of wedlock, and a married couple's wish not to have more children.

After 1975, as the Pro-Life movement gathered strength and garnered publicity, support waned for "soft" reasons. For instance, in 1975, 51 percent of respondents had agreed that low income justified abortion, a 6 percent increase over 1972. But this figure dropped to 45 percent in 1978. Support for abortion on demand for married women rose from 38 to 44 percent from 1972 to 1975, but fell back to 39 percent by 1978.

From 1972 to 1978, Jews held the most "liberal" views on abortion, Catholics the most "conservative." Whereas 90 percent of Jews consistently approved abortion under any circumstances, between 13 and 20 percent of Catholics thought abortion was never justified. Protestant attitudes fell in between. Respondents under 30 years old consistently supported abortion on demand between 1972 and 1978.

College-educated persons held more liberal attitudes than individuals with only high-school educations. But, surprisingly, a person's sex was not a reliable predictor. Men proved slightly more liberal on abortion every year except 1974, when an average of 64 percent of both men and women approved "hard" and "soft" reasons for abortion.

Black Revisionism

"Racist" and "white apologist" are labels pinned on scholars such as Daniel P. Moynihan and Nathan Glazer, who have questioned government plans designed to uplift poor blacks—even as these efforts have largely failed.

Such attacks have intimidated other white scholars from taking issue with conventional liberal strategies, claims Friedman, a LaSalle College sociologist. But, he reports, a handful of black social scientists are now taking the lead in disputing the view that massive federal programs will eliminate black poverty; these black scholars are also raising doubts about the benefits of forced busing and affirmative action programs. Though they differ on specifics, they share a common refusal to blame black poverty today solely on racism.

University of Chicago sociologist William Julius Wilson, for instance, has argued that the end of state-sanctioned segregation during the 1950s and '60s and the rise of service "industries," such as information processing and government, have diminished race as a barrier to black economic progress. Entry into these expanding industries, he contends, depends on schooling. The black underclass is impoverished less by discrimination than by lack of training.

Thomas Sowell, a widely published economist at UCLA, holds that varying "attitudes of self-reliance" affect the different success rates