

La Cina dei Cinesi by Gino Nebiolo, Priuli & Verlucca, publishers.

"Everybody reads the works of Mao" is the title of this 1967 poster. Times change. The once ubiquitous portraits of Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) have been removed from most of China's public places — including the Great Hall of the People, or parliament building, in Beijing (Peking).

Mao's China

Mao Zedong died in 1976 after leading the Chinese Communists to victory and ruling the People's Republic for 27 years. His "New China" has long fascinated Western scholars. Now Mao's record is being scrutinized anew, notably by his successors in Beijing. Was Mao, in fact, a brilliant social architect? Did he actually forge an egalitarian society? Is the "Chinese model" really an example to other poor Third World nations? In academe, the answers used to be yes. Here, journalist Dick Wilson takes a fresh look at Mao's character and political style; demographer Nick Eberstadt reconsiders Mao's economic performance; political scientist Harry Harding re-examines American Sinologists' benign interpretations of the chaotic Cultural Revolution; and six Chinese refugees, interviewed by scholar-diplomat Michael Frolic, describe the world Mao made.



THE GREAT HELMSMAN

by Dick Wilson

As every Chinese schoolboy knows, Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) was born into a poor peasant family and grew up amid the hunger and degradation of daily existence in late imperial China. Though he never went to a university, he became headmaster of an elementary school in provincial Changsha in 1920, and a major political force in his native Hunan province. From there, he went on to become the supreme ruler of a quarter of mankind for a quarter of a century, an unprecedented feat in human history.

Mao brought to this role extraordinary talents. A dynamic

and charismatic leader, he developed a political creed for China during the 1940s that seemed Marxist and yet not "extreme"; imported, but somehow Chinese. Later, during the '50s and '60s, Mao basked in the applause of foreign scholars, politicians, and journalists for his apparent success in finding indigenous solutions to the problems of revitalizing an exhausted society, solutions based on self-reliance, hard work, and an imaginative interpretation of communist doctrine.

"To Fight Is Pleasure"

Yet Mao's 27-year reign, from his triumph over Chiang Kai-shek in 1949 to his death in 1976, ultimately left China in a state of confusion, doubt, alienation, and economic disarray. Millions of his countrymen had been killed for political reasons; millions had starved to death; millions more had had their liberties disproportionately curtailed. And for what? For a rate of economic growth that has been only modest, on average, and remains highly erratic from year-to-year; an educational system damaged almost beyond repair; a bitterly divided ruling party; and a citizenry suspicious and withdrawn.

Mao, his former colleagues now declare, was a brilliant guerrilla leader during the early days of the revolution, when the outnumbered Communists took on, first, the better-organized forces of Chiang's Kuomintang (Nationalist) Party, and, later, the better-equipped Japanese invaders. He, above all, led his comrades to victory in the 1946-49 civil war. He was also, they concede, a valuable helmsman in the initial attempt during the early 1950s to steer the Chinese revolution along conventional Soviet lines.

During the final two decades of his life, however, he seemed to go wild, launching nationwide campaigns without consultation or preparation. The Hundred Flowers campaign (1957) offered intellectuals freedom of speech but then punished them for their heresies. This was followed by the backyard iron smelters of the Great Leap Forward (1958-59), which brought economic

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Since 1949, for various reasons, China has fought with many of its neighbors—and, in 1950–53, with the United States in Korea. Note: In 1979, the Chinese dropped the Wade-Giles method of alphabetizing the Chinese language in favor of the pinyin system. Thus, for example, Chungking, in Szechwan, became Chongqing, in Sichuan. This map uses Chinese, not Western, place names: Xizang (Tibet); Guangzhou (Canton); and China's two great rivers, the Huang (Yellow) and the Chang (Yangtze). Shanghai is still Shanghai.

disaster, and then by the Cultural Revolution (1966–76), when Mao waged open war against his own party and kindled an upsurge of anarchism whose effects are still being felt.

Why was Mao unable to work with his colleagues in the party leadership? What facets of his personality led to this tragedy? It is important to recall Mao's early experiences. At school in his native Hunan province, he was clearly a determined lad. In 1911, he was one of two student protesters who cut off their queues as a gesture of defiance against the effete Imperial Manchu rule—and forcibly sheared off the pigtailed of 10

others who had promised to do so but then got cold feet. He told his boyhood friend Siao Yu in 1921: "In order to reform a country one must be hard with oneself, and it is necessary to victimize a part of the people." Mao knew from very early days these harsh truths about politics and revolution.

He was a dogged fighter. His earliest known poem reads:

To fight with Heaven is infinite pleasure!
 To fight with earth is infinite pleasure!
 To fight with men is infinite pleasure!

In 1919, when a girl in his town committed suicide rather than consent to an arranged marriage, Mao condemned the society that had driven her to desperation but did not condone her act itself. "We should struggle against society in order to regain the hope that we have lost," he wrote in the local newspaper. "We should die fighting." He was never wounded, but he did spend his life in battle—fighting the Kuomintang in the 1930s, fighting the Japanese in the '40s, fighting the earth for its grain in the '50s, and fighting human nature to make it more collective and less selfish in the '60s.

At school, he insisted that his beloved *Romance of the Three Kingdoms*, the 14th-century Chinese classic, was literally true. When a teacher explained that it was a fictionalized version of history, thus contradicting Mao in front of his school friends, Mao complained to the headmaster. When the headmaster took the teacher's side, Mao petitioned the mayor. After that, Mao left the school.

Mao was enormously proud. He never tired of boasting to his school friends of the essay on which he had been given the very rare and distinguished mark of 105 out of 100. Chen Yi, Mao's foreign minister from 1958 to 1972, once recalled how, in 1949, the other Chinese Communist Party leaders wanted to make amends to Mao for their inadequate, sometimes wavering, faith in his (successful) strategy during the Revolution. Mao would not allow them to apologize. Chen Yi advanced this as an example of Mao's modesty, but it is actually a parable of pride: Mao would never again leave himself vulnerable to colleagues whose lack of trust had wounded him in the past.

His ambition equaled his pride. Mao was always fascinated by power. During classroom debates over the famous characters of Chinese history, for example, young Mao defended as expedient the tyranny of Emperor Liu Pang (reign: 202–195 B.C.), who, to strengthen his hold on the throne, executed all of his generals and old friends, and their families.


In 1921, Mao spent an evening drinking with a fellow dele-

gate at the first Chinese Communist Party Congress. They discussed who in Chinese history had become great by his own efforts, to which the answer came, only two: the first Han emperor and Sun Yat-sen, the father of the new Republic of China. Mao banged his fist on the table and cried excitedly: "I will be the third." Twenty-eight years later, just before entering the capital to proclaim the People's Republic, Mao jocularly remarked, "As soon as we enter Beijing [Peking], I'll be an emperor." (Indeed, he soon thereafter took up residence in Beijing's Forbidden City, site of the imperial palaces.)

An early and persistent trait in Mao's character was a stubborn refusal to bow to authority. He argued endlessly with his father, and once cursed him in front of guests. Mao was forced to kowtow in apology, both publicly and privately, but he would bend only one knee. In 1936, he flatly told American journalist Edgar Snow that "I learned to hate my father," a remarkable statement, especially for a Chinese. Time and again, Mao was rejected by his intimates and peers and nursed resentment against them as a result. MIT political scientist Lucian Pye suggests that the first instance of this could have been at the tender age of three, when Mao's younger brother arrived to compete with him for their mother's affections.

Even more important was the fact that his schooling was delayed because of his poor circumstances in a remote village. By the time he began attending a real public school, he was a good five years older than most of his classmates, bigger, better developed, and obviously out of place. Inevitably, he was laughed at by his classmates, by the teachers, and by the students of his own age in upper classes. He endured this humilia-

This Swedish cartoon from the 1960s portrays Mao as a dragon made up of millions of Chinese, each chanting a quotation from "the little red book."



Courtesy of Ewert Karlsson, Sweden.

tion in order to get an education.

Again, when Mao first moved to Beijing and tried to audit university lectures on political philosophy, he was rudely snubbed. The professor who stopped speaking in mid-sentence when he learned of Mao's status, had, as Mao later put it, "no time to listen to an assistant librarian speaking southern dialect."

Mao was handicapped by his Hunanese speech, which was almost unintelligible to the Chinese of Beijing. He shunned radio broadcasts. During French President Georges Pompidou's 1973 visit to China, Mao observed that the French Ambassador, who was with them throughout their discussions, spoke French like Napoleon. To this Pompidou noted rather severely that Napoleon had spoken with an Italian accent. "Yes," Mao replied, "and people laughed at him."*

"Just a Monkey"

In spite of these rebuffs, and perhaps as a response to them, Mao in a kind of reverse snobbery retained to the end his frugal peasant habits, eating the simplest of food, wearing patched and frayed clothes, and sleeping on a hard wooden bed.

Mao did on occasion betray feelings of diffidence and self-doubt. After the collapse of the Great Leap Forward in 1959, he lamented that he was "a complete outsider when it comes to economic construction." At the height of the Cultural Revolution in 1966, he wrote to his wife that he felt like the monkey in the Chinese legend who called himself king when the tigers were away. "I have become a king in this way," he told her, "although I am just a monkey."

But he was more likely to confess errors with bravado and petulance, and without a shred of intellectual sincerity. "Even Confucius made mistakes" was one of his most revealing lines. On another occasion he asserted: "I do not care about being alone. The truth is always on the side of the minority. Even if the entire Politburo and Central Committee are against me, the Earth will go on rotating."

He was unsure of the loyalty of his comrades. In 1941, he complained that only three leaders were loved by the Communist Party cadres: his lieutenant Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai), Wang Ming (the Kremlin-backed rival for the party chairmanship), and Peng Dehuai (the brilliant general who, years later,

*It is interesting that the experience of coming up from "the sticks" with a "southern dialect" and being laughed at (always a powerful incentive to achieve and command) in the metropolitan capital was not confined to Napoleon and Mao. The Georgian Stalin went through the same experience, and even Hitler spoke German with a soft Austrian accent. Could there be here the germ of a new theory on the origins of modern dictatorship?

MAO AND THE RUSSIANS

Adhering to orthodox Marxist theory, the Russians long underestimated Mao and the Chinese Communists, believing Chiang Kai-shek's bourgeois Kuomintang (Nationalist) Party to be the inevitable, if transient, heir to postfeudal China. Indeed, just after World War II, even as China edged toward renewed civil conflict, Joseph Stalin signed a treaty of friendship with the Kuomintang. (He was not so neighborly a year later, when Soviet armies occupying Manchuria stripped the region's factories of industrial equipment valued at \$1 billion.)

Past differences were put aside after Mao's unexpectedly swift victory over Chiang in 1949. Stalin granted diplomatic recognition to the People's Republic within 48 hours of its birth in 1949; a few months later, he played host to Mao in Moscow. He was not impressed with the Chairman. He told aides that Mao "doesn't understand the most elementary Marxist truths." Even so, a 30-year Treaty of Friendship and Alliance resulted. The Chinese got a surprisingly modest amount of aid—some \$1.5 billion between 1949 and 1960—in exchange for (temporary) Soviet control of Manchuria's ports and railways and forfeiture of the Chinese claim on Outer Mongolia. The bear's embrace was tight: From 1952 through 1955, the Soviet Union accounted for more than half of China's minuscule foreign business.

But to Mao, aid and trade were never as important as ideology. After Nikita Khrushchev denounced Stalin's personality cult in 1956, Mao decided the new Russian leader was a "turnip communist" (that is, red only on the outside). Nevertheless, the charges against Stalin may have led Mao to his own reassessment; in 1958, to the astonishment of "the Soviet elder brothers," Mao downgraded the Kremlin's "heavy" model of industrial development in favor of the Great Leap Forward.

In 1960 came the split: China launched an open propaganda attack on Soviet-style communism. In response, Khrushchev angrily withdrew all Soviet technical advisers, who, to the lasting bitterness of the Chinese, simply abandoned semicompleted projects and took their blueprints home. By the end of the decade, the schism turned violent, with a series of bloody clashes along the Sino-Soviet border. To the Russians, Mao became nothing less than "a traitor to the sacred cause of communism," as the Soviet military newspaper *Red Star* put it.

Mindful perhaps of the Chinese proverb that advises the wise leader to "use the far barbarian to defeat the near barbarian," Mao turned to his old foes, the Americans, for protection from his erstwhile allies. Telling his colleagues that "the ghost of John Foster Dulles has now taken up residence in the Kremlin," in 1971 the Chairman invited Henry Kissinger to visit Beijing.

during the Great Leap Forward broke ranks with Mao and wound up on a farm near the Russian border).

His intimates found him remote. The personal losses he suffered—most of his family and friends were killed by his enemies—might account for some of his coldness, but even Mao's childhood friend Emi Siao commented: "None of us have really understood him. I have known him longer than anyone else, but I have never got to the root of him." And his last wife, Jiang Qing (Chiang Ching), who after Mao's death was denounced as ringleader of the "Gang of Four," confessed to the American sinologist Roxane Witke that she did not really know her husband.


Obviously a career of such length and dazzling originality has its share of mistakes as well as successes. But Mao could learn from his mistakes, and one of the many wise opinions he used to deliver was about preferring men who had tried and erred over those who had never tried at all.

Making a Cat Eat Pepper

His subtly altering policy toward the thorny question of land reform during the 1920s and '30s was a test case of how discretion may be nurtured by experience. The problem: weighing the political advantages of wholesale land redistribution against the disadvantages of so alienating the landed classes as to jeopardize the entire local economy. On this issue, which was central to the early Chinese revolution—Mao once told the American reporter Anna Louise Strong that "A people's war . . . is not decided by taking or losing a city, but by solving the agrarian problem"—Mao did display on the whole good judgment, rarely pushing landowners too hard.

Mao's post-1949 balance sheet is worse, with a string of horrendous mistakes on a huge scale: the Hundred Flowers, the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution.

Until those campaigns, Mao's strong points as a leader outweighed his weaknesses. His outstanding quality was ingenuity and resourcefulness. The joke that the surviving Shanghai capitalists used to retail at their dinner tables in the 1950s, possibly a Chinese version of a Soviet joke, put this expressively. China's "big three" at the time—Mao, his deputy Liu Shaoqi, and Premier Zhou Enlai—were having an argument on how best to administer pepper to a cat (that is, how to engineer voluntary but distasteful social change). Zhou suggested that they wrap the pepper in meat so that the cat would eat it unknowingly, but Mao vetoed this as deceitful. Liu then proposed stuffing the pep-



Mao's 1963 poem, "Reply to Kuo Mo-jo," rendered in his own hand. This excerpt, written top-to-bottom, right-to-left, reads: "So many deeds cry out to be done/and always urgently;/The world rolls on,/Time presses./Ten thousand years are too long./Seize the day, seize the hour!" (The three characters on the extreme left form Mao's signature.) During his 1972 visit to China, President Richard M. Nixon quoted these lines in a speech.

per down the cat's throat with chopsticks. No, said Mao reproachfully, that would be violent. The two lieutenants turned to Mao: How would he do it? Simple, he said, we'll rub pepper on the cat's arse, then he'll lick it off and swallow it, and be happy that he is permitted to do so.

Mao was, in fact, a past master of getting things done with the minimum of violence. He was also adept at isolating his opponents and critics and disarming them through his favorite tactic of siding with one opponent against another, or playing the end against the middle. The classic example of this strategy is his alliance in 1937 with the class enemy (Kuomintang) against the national enemy (Japan).

It is in this light that his dealings with his own immediate colleagues—especially with Zhou and Liu—are best understood. Neither Liu nor Zhou was a serious threat to Mao's leadership. Liu Shaoqi (1898–1969) had been the urban organizer (Mao was active in the countryside) during the earliest days of Communist revolt; during the 1940s they pooled their resources to ensure a Communist government. If Liu had any doubts about Mao's position as supreme leader, Mao disarmed them with flattery and the offer of a formal post as deputy.

Zhou Enlai (1898–1976) never laid claim to the number one position. He was the only Chinese Communist leader who came from the upper classes; even his very gracefulness and good

manners were held by some to be contemptible. He was also saddled with remorse over mistakes he had made while running the party in 1934–35, when his rather conventional military campaign against the Kuomintang proved unsuccessful. After voluntarily handing over the baton during the Long March, he supported Mao faithfully for the rest of his life, always taking the second, or sometimes third, position. Yet Mao always withheld his trust from Zhou, even when his deputy lay dying in 1975–76, and he did not appear at Zhou's funeral.

Small wonder that Lin Biao, the defense minister, who attempted a coup against Mao in 1971, when he was Mao's deputy and chosen successor, once said of his master: "Do you see anyone whom he supported initially who has not finally been handed a political death sentence?" The same thought was feelingly voiced by General Xu Shiyong soon after Mao's death, when he reportedly observed that Mao had "labeled as class enemies all those in the party who had dared make suggestions to him."

In the final two or three decades of his life, Mao's theory of governing rested on his own presumed infallibility. There was reasoned discussion with associates, certainly, but if the consensus came out against him, Mao—always a bad loser—usually refused to accept the verdict and sought allies elsewhere. In his last years, Mao became obsessed with the so-called Ten Line Struggles, a sordid and often unnecessary series of internal party fights to promote his own dictatorial leadership.

Too Much, Too Soon

He was not, however, a good implementer. Indeed, after 1949, when the fighting was over and the building began, he may have become jealous of the better skills of Zhou and Liu in this regard. Time and time again, the actual organization of social change had to be left to these two, while Mao either traveled around the country interfering at the lower end, or else remained at the shoulder of his colleagues in Beijing, urging, criticizing, and complaining.

In drawing up a balance sheet, one has to consider the cost of Maoism. Millions of Chinese died in the various campaigns that Mao pursued after 1949, and millions more suffered injury or persecution. One of Mao's sympathetic streaks, of course, was his insistence on the essential corrigibility of class enemies. Endless memorandums went out from his office to the field on how much better it was to argue an opponent or a class enemy, such as a landlord, round to your own way of thinking. That way you would acquire an ally.


But few others in the Communist Party were as persuasive as Mao on this point. (A riveting orator, Mao enlivened his speeches with earthy proverbs and poetic images, few of which survived the bureaucratic editors of Mao's *Selected Works*.) And Mao was a realist. He knew the intensity of the political forces he was unleashing in Chinese society. He knew the grim logic of the kind of revolution he was engaged in and recognized that blood would be shed. The question we might now ask is: Were the results really worthwhile? This is something that the Chinese will come to a conclusion about in their own way.

Mao Zedong was a great force. In spite of his grim errors, and to some extent because of them, he will be remembered as one of the giants of our century. To the Chinese, he will remain a titanic figure. For others, he offered a unique example by de-Europeanizing Marxism: In Mao's thought, Marxist ideology and Chinese civilization met and transformed one another. At the center of that transformation stood the peasantry—ignored by Western Marxism and despised by urban China, but loved by Mao. (The evidence suggests, however, that Mao the Chinese revolutionary had originally seized upon Marxism less as a goal than as a useful—and fashionable—weapon. In his guerrilla days, he was inspired less by abstract theories of communism than by the swashbuckling adventures of the Robin Hood-like heroes of old Chinese sagas such as *Romance of the Three Kingdoms*; in the *Selected Works*, only 4 percent of literary references are to Marx and Engels, against 22 percent to Confucian sources.)


Mao began by offering his party a brilliant leadership that finally overcame all its foes and brought him to the throne of China's imperial dynasties. Then, for a few years, he presided over a regime that pursued a broadly Soviet model of communism with only minor modifications. Finally, during the last two decades, he broke out of the Soviet harness and endeavored to pull China up by its bootstraps using revolutionary techniques of unparalleled scope and scale.

But he tried to do too much, too soon, and with too little preparation and consultation. The early promise foundered on the shoals of personal insecurity and mistrust, and Mao's final two decades of leadership were tragic. If only he had known when to retire!

MAO, CHINA, AND THE WORLD, 1910-80



NOTES: Mao Zedong was born on December 26, 1893 . . . 1919: The Versailles peace conference allows the Japanese to occupy former German "concessions" in Shandong province. On May 4, a Beijing student protest sparks the anti-imperialist "May Fourth Movement," which the Communists now view as the true start of the 20th-century Chinese revolution . . . 1923-27: Communists are allowed to join the Kuomintang, in which Soviet advisers are temporarily influential. The collaboration ends when Chiang Kai-shek occupies Shanghai and massacres local Communists. In 1937, the two parties again put aside their differences, this time to form a "united front" against the Japanese invaders . . . 1930: Mao's first wife, Yang Kai-hui, is tortured and killed by the Nationalists. Mao soon legitimizes his union with Ho Tzu-chen, with whom he has been living



since 1928. But within a few years—in 1937 or 1938—Mao divorces Ho and takes Jiang Qing as his mistress, marrying her in the late 1930s or early 1940s . . . 1934–35: Denounced by senior Communist Party authorities in 1927, 1930, 1932, and 1933, Mao finally wrests control of the party from its pro-Moscow leadership during the Long March . . . 1935–47: During the “Yanan period,” Mao tightens his hold on the party as its influence spreads across north China . . . 1937: A clash outside Beijing between Japanese and Chinese troops on July 7 (“the Marco Polo Bridge incident”) leads to a full-scale Japanese war against China . . . 1971: Though formally designated Mao’s successor in 1969, Defense Minister Lin Biao allegedly leads a coup attempt in September 1971. Unsuccessful, he dies in a plane crash in Mongolia while fleeing to the Soviet Union.



DID MAO FAIL?

by Nick Eberstadt

From the Liberation in 1949 until his death in 1976, Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) directed one of the most ambitious, wide-ranging, and, some would say, inspiring programs of social engineering ever undertaken. Mao's goal was to transform a sprawling and dilapidated empire into a modern socialist state. The price was steep. If China's current leaders are to be believed, it was far too steep.

To assess the Maoist experiment, however, one must look not to official retrospection but to the condition of China's people: What do they have to show for the sacrifices they have made and the suffering they have endured in the name of bringing forth a poverty-free society?

Until recently, the information needed to answer that question was simply not available. Lately, however, the new rulers of the People's Republic, for their own reasons, and perhaps only temporarily, have lifted the statistical "curfew" clamped down after the collapse of the Great Leap Forward in 1960. Even so, one must be wary.

As late as the mid-1970s, as many as one out of three Chinese communes could not be reached by road¹—an unfavorable situation for gathering up-to-date statistics. Moreover, despite the recent "liberalization," China is still governed by a regime that does not hesitate to execute citizens for opinions expressed in private conversation; in such a society, information does not move freely or emigrate without official sanction. Finally, Deng Xiaoping and his ascendant technocrats no doubt find it expedient to exaggerate Mao's shortcomings, thereby making their own work shine more brightly. Official data always risk losing their virtue in the hands of men who may gain by molesting them.

Bearing in mind, then, the limits of the available information, the best gauge of Mao's economic performance is, I believe, his record in the areas of health, hunger, and material equality. The question of psychological poverty—that is, the effect of totalitarianism on the human spirit—is another issue, but one which nevertheless should be remembered when judging Mao's long reign.

Before Liberation, few places on Earth had health levels as low as China's. During the 1930s, even before the Japanese invasion, life expectancy was not appreciably higher than it had been during the Stone Age. One child in three died of hunger or disease before his first birthday.²

How much better are things today?

While the American press has lavished its attention on acupuncture and the rural "barefoot doctor" system, the most reliable measure of a nation's health is average life expectancy. Before 1949, the average Chinese could not expect to reach the age of 40. Today, Beijing (Peking) officially estimates life expectancy to be about 68. That is an implausibly high figure, inconsistent even with the regime's own statistics on birth and death rates. Until the results of the 1981 Chinese census are in, the best estimates are those calculated separately by the U.S. Census Bureau's John Aird and the Library of Congress's Leo Orleans. Both reckon China's life expectancy at the time of Mao's death to have been somewhere in the low 60s—say, 60 to 64. That is still a considerable improvement over pre-Communist years.

Sri Lanka Does Better

China has outpaced Africa (where life expectancy is now only in the mid-40s) and Latin America (which 30 years ago was far ahead of China in life expectancy yet today is roughly equal).³ But Mao's achievements do not seem such triumphs when set against the record of some of his Asian neighbors. True, the average life span in China is about a decade longer than it is in any of the other large poor countries of Asia. (See chart on page 127.) Yet East Asia's smaller developing nations—Sri Lanka, South Korea, and, ironically, Taiwan—all show significantly greater average life spans. The modernizing efforts of the colonizers of Taiwan and Sri Lanka may have given those countries something of a head start. Yet Sri Lanka is probably *still* poorer economically than the People's Republic.

Why have these nations done better than China?

It could be that their respective development strategies are inherently superior. A better answer is that their populations, and so their health problems, were much smaller. The problems of administering a nation of close to 1 billion citizens dwarf those facing any other government; and in health, as in other matters, this fact must be remembered in any fair judgment of China's performance.

In a poor country, health and hunger are almost the same problem: Well-fed bodies can fend off illnesses that would finish

off undernourished ones. If health is improving, it is a sure bet that malnutrition is subsiding. China's apparent leap forward in life expectancy over the past generation almost certainly means that a larger proportion of the population is eating regular (if modest) meals. This gain may be credited in large measure to Mao. Throughout its pre-1949 history, China was a land of recurrent regional famine, brought on by a steady cycle of droughts and floods that played havoc with the countryside, now striking Anhui, now Fujian, now Guangdong. Death from starvation visited thousands, even millions, every year.

Nevertheless, we must dismiss as nonsense the claim, made during the early 1970s by many of Mao's admirers in the West, that hunger and famine are afflictions of the past.

Counting Calories

Recent studies by more dispassionate scholars—relying in part on unpublished but widely circulated Chinese data—suggest that starvation is still very much present in China. Conditions in 1961 were as bad as at any time in China's entire history, according to Princeton economist Gregory Chow. Chinese officials now concede that Sichuan (Szechwan), the southwestern "rice bowl" with a population of some 100 million, was wracked by famine in 1976. The situation was so desperate that even a hardened veteran like Deng Xiaoping (at that time an exile in Sichuan, his native province) is reported to have burst into tears while discussing the problem before a Party gathering.⁴ Sichuan was reportedly stricken again in 1977 and 1978, along with Hubei and Nei Monggol (Inner Mongolia). And last year, the government of Yunnan, the mountainous province bordering on Vietnam, Laos, and Burma, warned local officials to prepare to deal with mass starvation.⁵

One might wonder why this still happens. In many poor nations, Mao's strategy—land reform, rationing, stockpiling of grains, and expansion of rural employment—might reasonably have been expected to eliminate food shortages. In fact, there is no mystery. Despite Mao's reforms—or possibly because of them—China has failed to increase its *per capita* production of food.

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Li Hua's "Refugees," portraying the ravages of World War II in China.

If one compares the figures for food availability in 1949 and in the late 1970s, as some analysts have done, it is easy to massage the numbers and come up with a happy story. But to use the year of Liberation as a benchmark is misleading. In 1949, China was prostrate, its economy battered by nearly 20 years of war and political chaos. If, instead, one employs as a base for comparison a post-Liberation period of relative tranquility, a very different picture emerges. Matched against the 1957 figures, for example, the China of 1977 is rather disappointing. (See chart on page 128.) Although the *total* annual grain harvest increased by about one-third, *per capita* production has remained at about 290 kilograms. Fish, fruit, oils, and, possibly, vegetables actually became scarcer.⁶ Thus, during these 20 years, the Chinese diet declined in quality, and quite conceivably in quantity as well.

This means that at the end of Mao's reign there was slightly less food for each citizen than there was back in the 1930s, when per capita grain availability was in excess of 300 kilograms.⁷

While Mao was Chairman, China crept along with the *slowest* rate of increase in total food production of any region in the world.⁸ In recent years, the daily calories available per person have been probably about 2,000—a figure lower than the averages for India, for Pakistan, and for Bangladesh, presumed

to be the world's "basket case." (It is, in fact, about what the late Dr. Herman Tarnower's quick weight-loss "Scarsdale Medical Diet" allows the American male.)*

China's food problem is not due to circumstances beyond its control; it has not run up against some "Malthusian limit." With much the same soil and climate, Taiwan's privately owned farms produce a "caloric availability" about 50 percent greater than China's. The problem in the People's Republic is sheer inefficiency. China, alone among the nations of the world, seems to be getting less of a return on its expenditure on agriculture today than it did during the 1950s.⁹

This waste—for that is what it is—is largely the result of the socialist organization of its farms. (China's collectivized agricultural system is plagued by problems of centralization and worker motivation, as is Russia's—which explains why the 5 percent of China's farmland in private hands produces some 20 percent of the nation's food.) Hence, Beijing's panicky push (since the early 1970s) for population control: If supply does not increase, demand must be reduced. Aiming for zero population growth by the turn of the century, the Chinese government now distributes free contraceptives, encourages postponement of marriage to at least age 26, and severely restricts the food rations of couples producing more than two children. Cutting back on births no doubt strikes Chinese policymakers as preferable to the alternative—abandoning socialism.

How Equal?

Some would argue that so-so health and meager harvests are as much the result of fate as of man's doings. Not so equality of income, which is entirely a social artifact and as such a good test of Mao's economic doctrine and performance.

China is poor. It is widely believed outside China, however, that the burden of poverty is borne more or less equally by all of its citizens. That at least has been the image of the Communist regime. Under Mao, there was *some* change in the distribution of wealth. During the Nationalist era, the richest fifth of Chinese society probably had incomes more than 1,000 percent greater than those earned by the poorest fifth.¹⁰ Those days are over.

But China is far from total egalitarianism. As under other totalitarian regimes, the ruling elite, of course, only allots to the

* China's situation is all the more disturbing because its per capita caloric needs are rising. This is because the proportion of children in the PRC is falling. China is becoming more "adult," and adults need more food.

CHINA'S POPULATION DISTRIBUTION


Source: Central Intelligence Agency.

Most of the PRC's nearly 1 billion people live in the east. Arid western China contains only 5 percent of the country's population. In the vast rural triangle bounded by Xi'an, Shanghai, and Beijing, population density is 520 or more persons per square mile, about 10 times the U.S. average.

masses those freedoms and opportunities that suit its purposes. The most obvious *material* inequality is the disparity between the privileged life of city folk (one-sixth of the population) and the harsh, often miserable, existence led by everyone else. The amenities of Beijing, such as they are, might seem austere, even grim, to Americans, but they so entice the Chinese that officials do not even bother to control the movement of the capital's citizens: It is simply inconceivable that anyone fortunate enough to dwell in Beijing would choose to return to a rural commune.

Housing, education, health care, and even food rations are, in the cities, both more abundant and of better quality. Urban residents work at less backbreaking jobs. They live longer. Their

incomes are, on average, three times higher than those of their rural counterparts.¹¹ The differential is even greater for specific sectors of the urban economy: In 1978, skilled industrial workers, on the average, pocketed earnings nearly nine times greater than those of peasants.

The urban-rural gap is not so wide in China as it is in most African or Latin American nations, but it is wider than what one finds in a number of societies not normally associated with equal distribution of wealth: Greece, Guyana, South Korea, and, once again, Taiwan, to name only a few.¹² The most surprising fact about urban-rural inequality is that it seems to have *increased* since the 1930s. During that era of greedy merchants and impoverished peasants, urban incomes were only double the rural average.¹³

Bringing Up the Bottom

Owing partly to urbanization, average income in China also varies widely from province to province. As always, the wealth of China is located along the heavily populated coastal rim extending from Guangzhou (Canton) up to Manchuria; as one moves inland the standard of living plummets. If we had comprehensive figures for all sources of income (private as well as collective) in all provinces, we might well find an interprovincial variance of 300 percent. By contrast, the difference in personal after-tax purchasing power between Connecticut and Mississippi, respectively the United States' richest and poorest states, is about 45 percentage points.


The truest test of economic equality is what happens *within* a given area, to people living and working side by side. Although information is spotty, it seems that redistribution of land, the confiscation of other property income, and the attempt to provide universal employment have diminished local differences. But even here the range remains formidably wide. A professor, for example, usually makes ¥350 a month (1 Yuan equals about U.S. \$0.65) to the assistant professor's ¥100 — a gap greater than that found in most American universities. Similarly, a chief engineer can take home ¥230, while the wages of the lowliest apprentice in his team might be less than ¥30.

How wide are *overall* wage differences in the new China? I can only guess: At the time of Mao's death, the income ratio of the wealthiest fifth of the population to the poorest fifth might have been about 7 to 1 — that is, roughly the same as it was during the mid-1950s.

A 7-to-1 ratio makes China more egalitarian than any of the

HOW EGALITARIAN IS CHINA?

This chart compares 1975 household earnings for the top and bottom fifths of the population in 10 nations. The red center line would denote a ratio of 1:1—that is, an absolutely equal distribution of income. The longer the bar, the wider the income gap.



Source: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development; International Labor Office.

HOW CHINA COMPARES

	Population	GNP per capita (1977)	Life expectancy	Literacy	Calorie availability per capita	Cement production per capita	Steel production per capita
China	949,000,000	\$410	60-64	60-70%	1950-2100	25 kg	58 kg
Taiwan	17,136,000	1,180	70-72	85-90	2750-2850	602 kg	155 kg
India	625,818,000	160	52-55	35-40	2000-2100	31 kg	16 kg
Bangladesh	82,713,000	80	45-49	20-25	2000-2100	4 kg	1 kg
Indonesia	143,282,000	320	48-50	60-65	2100-2200	20 kg	1 kg
Mexico	64,594,000	1,160	64-67	75-80	2600-2700	206 kg	86 kg
South Korea	34,697,000	980	65-67	90-95	2700-2800	409 kg	79 kg
USSR	258,932,000	3,330	67-69	95-98	3400-3500	490 kg	566 kg
U.S.A.	216,817,000	8,750	73-74	99	3400-3500	335 kg	524 kg

Note: 1 kilogram (kg) = 2.2046 pounds.

Source: Data on the United States (except on caloric availability): U.S. Department of Commerce; International Bank for Reconstruction and Development; *World Almanac*, 1980. Data on cement and steel production (except for Taiwan and Indonesia): United Nations *Statistical Yearbook*, 1978. All other data compiled by Nick Eberstadt with information from the United Nations; International Bank for Reconstruction and Development; People's Republic of China; Republic of China; Ruth Leger Sivard, *World Military and Social Expenditures*, Leesburg, Va.: World Priorities, 1979.

MAO'S ECONOMY: A SCORECARD

SOCIAL INDICATORS	Before Mao 1930s	Liberation 1949	Under Mao 1957	After Mao 1977
Life expectancy (in years)	<40	<40	40-50	60-64
Literacy rate	20-30%	20-30%	35-45%	60-70%
Urban unemployment	20%	N.A.	20%*	20%*
Grain availability (kg per capita)	300-340	206	293	293
Fraction of population in extreme poverty	>½	>¾	>½	¼

INDUSTRIAL INDICATORS

Steel production (kg per capita)	<1	<0.3	8	25
Cement production (kg per capita)	<3	1*	11	58
Electric power (kwh per capita)	6*	8*	30	242
Machine tool production units (per million population)	N.A.	3*	53	>200
Gross domestic capital formation (of GNP)	5-7%	N.A.	>20%	36%**

* estimate > means "greater than";
 ** 1978 estimate < means "less than"

Source: Data compiled by Nick Eberstadt, adjusted from Central Intelligence Agency, Asia Society, and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development information.

According to Stalinist development doctrine, "bread is an intermediate product; steel is the final good." That maxim is aptly illustrated by the PRC's economic record. The lot of China's consumers has improved only modestly in the past 30 years, while heavy industry, nourished by the regime's allocation of resources, has prospered.


other large, poor countries, but not by as much as one might have thought. (See chart on page 127.) In any event, the surprise is that the People's Republic has shown no improvement here in two decades.

To those who had wished better for China—and I count myself among them—I can only offer the thought that the top-to-bottom measure may not be the best way of evaluating Mao's revolution. Such ratios only capture *relative* differences, and, in a desperately poor country, it is *absolute* differences that tell the most important story, that of survival. In the old China, the greatest differences were not between capitalists and workers, or landlords and peasants, but between families that ate and families that did not, between mothers who sold their babies and mothers who watched their children grow up healthy and strong. It is to Mao's credit that his redistribution strategy, whatever its costs, raised the bottom half of society from desperation to subsistence—at least when the harvest did not fail.

Can China Enlarge the Pie?

Perhaps the best way to judge China's 30-year struggle is to personalize the idea of poverty. If you had to be born poor in one of the world's poor countries, which would you choose? You would not want to be desperately poor, and China's attraction is that it has gone a long way toward eliminating that kind of desperation. In none of the countries would your odds of leading a minimally comfortable life be terribly good. I would suggest, however, that only a handful of poor countries—Singapore, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, South Korea, Taiwan, Cuba, Argentina, Costa Rica, and a few of the Arab emirates—offer chances distinctly better than China's. Remember, though, that the populations of those few nations add up to only 3 percent of the world's poor. From this perspective, giant China's epic struggle against poverty looks much better.

Unfortunately for China's poor, the strategy that has helped them over the past 30 years is now exhausted. Mao's tactics were essentially redistributive: land reform, confiscation and expropriation, make-work programs, rationing, and the like. That road only goes so far, and Mao had come to the end of it by the late 1950s. Try as he might with the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, he could not push his people into a continual redistribution of income. The Chinese also hit some logistical limits: Given today's low average availability of food, for example, it is unlikely that hunger would be much further reduced by a more perfect division of the pie.



"Electricity is the Top Priority," by Feng Chung-tieh. Despite three decades of helter-skelter industrialization, China remains an overwhelmingly agricultural nation.

For two decades, essentially, underneath all the slogans and shouting, the welfare of Mao's people did not advance, and may even have declined slightly. The message is unmistakable: The People's Republic must move from redistribution to *production*, particularly in agriculture.

Reorienting China's economy will be a tremendous task. Few doubt that the Chinese people are equal to it. They clearly have the talent. The accomplishments of the Chinese in Hong Kong, Taiwan, Thailand, Singapore, and the United States testify to what they can do when given a chance. The question is whether Beijing will risk giving them that chance. The social, economic, and political liberalization that must accompany any transition to a more productive economy would inevitably threaten the regime. Deng Xiaoping has already run into internal criticism of the tentative steps he has taken toward "rationalizing" the post-Mao economy. Faced with the choice of perpetuating poverty or losing its grip on the people, the Politburo might not bow out gracefully. China has the potential to become (in the words of General Sir John Hackett) "a Swedish version of Japan," but it is within the capacity of the present regime to create instead a Soviet version of India, or worse.

There is a disturbing pattern to Chinese history. This great civilization has brought into the world no end of remarkable innovations: The printing press, the sailing ship, commercial banking, and civil administration are but a few that come to mind. Yet, when the Chinese put these things to use, it is con-

sistently in a fashion that fritters away their head start, as when they invented gunpowder only to use it primarily in fireworks; they did not develop a cannon. In 1949, the Chinese under Mao began once more to run up an early lead over the rest of the Third World—in this case, they pioneered the eradication of extreme poverty. If China's political leaders prove too inflexible to follow through, to move on toward productivity, they will be responsible for a tragedy of truly enormous proportions.

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REAPPRAISING THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION

by Harry Harding

The changes in Chinese politics in the four years since the death of Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) have been breathtaking. But none has been more significant than China's repudiation of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, the tumultuous movement that dominated Chinese life for a decade, and that Mao's associates once described as their country's greatest contribution to Marxist theory.

The Cultural Revolution, as one American scholar has described it, was "one of the most extraordinary and puzzling events of the twentieth century."¹ It was the attempt of an aging Mao to shake up the Chinese Communist Party, reshape its policies, and ensure that his vision of continuing revolution for China would survive his own death.

Mao's efforts met determined resistance from many of his colleagues on the 17-man Party Politburo, most notably the party's vice-chairman, Liu Shaoqi, and its secretary-general, Deng Xiaoping. Mao sought to bend the party to his will by inciting the youth of China's cities—the Red Guards—to protest against officials straying from the Maoist course. On August 5, 1966, Mao affixed a wall poster outside the offices of the Central Committee urging China's youth to "bombard the headquarters" of local party chiefs. The official press and radio picked up the Chairman's call and sent it throughout China.

Heeding Mao's summons, millions of young Chinese took to the streets of the country's major cities in the fall of 1966. They ripped down the old signs on shops and avenues, replacing them with such "revolutionary" names as "East Is Red Store" and "Anti-Revisionism Street." They proposed that traffic lights be reversed so that red would mean "go." They invaded the houses of "class enemies"—those who had been capitalists before 1949—and smashed all that smacked of the foreign, the "bourgeois," the old. They burned Western embassies, ransacked government offices, beat schoolteachers, and humiliated party officials at mass rallies. Chaos enveloped China's cities; in many places, the Army had to step in to prevent civil war.



"Destroy the Four Olds!" This poster was part of the campaign to eradicate "old ideas, old cultures, old customs, and old habits" that marked the start of the Cultural Revolution in August 1966.

After three years of "struggle and criticism" that saw large numbers of "revisionists" dismissed from the government and the party, the leaders of the Cultural Revolution set to overhauling China's social programs, economic policies, and political institutions to make them match Mao's egalitarian and populist ideals.

These efforts, led by the "Gang of Four," continued despite growing opposition until the Chairman's death in September 1976.* The ultraleftists had achieved some fundamental changes: the partial decentralization of the economy, the selection of college students on the basis of political purity rather than academic credentials, the training of "barefoot doctors" to tend the peasants of the vast Chinese countryside, the dispatching of millions of high school graduates and bureaucrats to rural

*The "Gang of Four"—Politburo radicals Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, and Jiang Qing (Mao's wife)—were arrested on October 6, 1976, less than a month after Mao's death.

areas for physical labor and ideological indoctrination, the appointment of popular representatives to serve on "revolutionary committees" at almost all levels of government.

Mao and his associates characterized the Cultural Revolution as the way to "expose and smash the renegades, enemy agents, and capitalist roaders" holding positions in the party. It would, they maintained, prevent the kind of "capitalist restoration" with which Nikita Khrushchev had allegedly defiled the Soviet Union in the late 1950s.²

What is more, they described the Cultural Revolution as the first of many such episodes. As late as August 1977, Hua Guofeng, Mao's successor as Party Chairman, endorsed the Cultural Revolution as "a momentous innovation which will shine with increasing splendor with the passage of time," promising his countrymen that more such revolutions would take place "many times in the future."³ Repeated turmoil, it was believed, would act as the purgatory required for China's ultimate entry into the socialist utopia.

Rose-Colored Glasses

What is so striking in retrospect is the degree to which the Chinese leadership's justification of the Cultural Revolution was accepted by academics in the West, and particularly in the United States. From Harvard to the University of Chicago to Berkeley, American scholars produced an enormous body of literature on the new movement in China. They never reached complete consensus, but the prevailing interpretation, at least after the first year or so, was highly favorable.

Three themes dominated their analyses.

The first was that the Cultural Revolution was a movement that deserved a fair hearing, even if it appeared to the casual observer to be irrational or even bizarre. A 1971 collection of scholarly essays on the Cultural Revolution, for example, concluded with the earnest admonition that "it is our present duty to try to understand what is occurring in the Chinese People's Republic. To do so, we must start by examining our own assumptions and perspectives."⁴

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Following this line of investigation, many analysts held that the Cultural Revolution was motivated not by fanaticism but by Mao's distinctive vision of a fair and just society. As one younger American China specialist then at Stanford put it, the Cultural Revolution was not a wrongheaded assault on the institutions and policies necessary for modernization but rather a reflection of Mao's belief that "bureaucracy and industrialization do not necessarily lead to an improved quality of life."⁵ Or, in the words of a more senior scholar at the University of Chicago, "In making the Cultural Revolution, Mao has been motivated by a noble vision. It is a vision of society in which the division involving domination and subjection will be blurred, the leaders will be less distinguishable from the led in status and privileges, and the led will take part more directly in the policy-making process."⁶

A second theme was that the reforms adopted during the latter stages of the Cultural Revolution were both equitable and effective.* The innovations that Radio Beijing called "new born things" were variously praised in America as ways of "breaking down elitism," of "bridging the gap between the people and their leaders," and of preventing China from "ossifying in the morass of bureaucratism and statism."⁷ One political scientist depicted the organizational changes of the Cultural Revolution as an attempt to fashion "flexible institutions which are responsive to popular interests, encourage direct mass participation, and are capable of controlling development on the basis of values meaningfully determined by the people."⁸

Third, most American scholars believed that the costs of the Cultural Revolution were tolerable, even necessary. One could not make an omelet without breaking eggs. They acknowledged the Cultural Revolution's violence but downplayed it, usually portraying the bloodshed as "sporadic" and "limited." Many analysts took pains to point out that the victims of the Cultural Revolution were seldom executed or imprisoned *en masse* as the victims of Stalin's great purges had been; they suggested that being sent to the countryside for "re-education" was not really so very unpleasant.

As these scholars saw it, the chief shortcoming of the Cultural Revolution was that it had not fully achieved its original high purposes. Its "promise was aborted," one specialist com-

*Indeed, China's Cultural Revolution was considered so promising that the American Academy of Political Science held a three-day conference in New York in October 1972, attended by some of the country's leading Sinologists, to consider (among other things) whether the Chinese experience might help the United States and other Western societies solve some of their own economic and social problems.

CHINA'S FRIENDS

Like Vietnam, the Soviet Union, and other communist countries, China has posed special problems of intellectual integrity for visiting Western newsmen and scholars. As Sinologist Orville Schell noted recently in the New York Times, let the reader beware:

Just as the Chinese have analyzed their own society, dividing it into class categories (peasant, landlord, intellectual, etc.), they have also sought to categorize their [American] guests, to glean out the "friends of China" and give them special treatment and assistance.

Such "friends" have often had a long-standing relationship with the Peking government, first expressed in the early years of Senator McCarthy and John Foster Dulles, when pro-Chinese sentiments took a measure of courage. At the same time, they were often rewarded by being allowed to visit the People's Republic while others were barred. In later years, as tours became commonplace, these "friends" were rewarded with permission to stay longer and to visit parts of China (such as Tibet and Xinjiang) not normally open to visitors.

Needless to say, along with these perquisites came certain unspoken obligations. A "friend of China" felt constrained from disappointing his host by writing anything critical or unflattering. Indeed, there was something about the presumption of this "friendship" (which was repeatedly toasted and extolled) that tended to draw a writer into what can only be described as a Chinese magnetic field. The constant incantation of the word "friendship" had a numbing effect on one's ability to see clearly and think independently. All the special treatment and effort extended on one's behalf seemed to require repayment. And the only kind of repayment that the Chinese would accept in return for their hospitality was ideological agreement.

The "friends" felt some fear of endangering Chinese acquaintances.

But one fear above all predominated: the fear that if one uttered or wrote "incorrect" thoughts, one would never again be allowed back. And to one degree or another, I think most of us who have written about China did capitulate to this fear.

[The Chinese] particularly capitalized on the eagerness of people on the Left to believe in the healing powers of "the revolution." And when the wreckage of the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution, and the Gang of Four was finally cleared away [in 1977] many "friends of China" were left with a somewhat embarrassing bibliography of works supporting leaders who had been shed from the back of China like last year's skin from a reptile.

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plained in 1977, when its leaders were forced by rivals to compromise and retreat from principles.⁹ But a sweeping indictment of the whole movement did not necessarily follow. As another analyst argued, "Mao's assault did not succeed in totally eliminating privatism, self-interest, and elitism from Chinese society. . . . But should Mao be condemned for trying?"¹⁰

Since the Chairman's death in 1976, however, the Chinese themselves have done precisely that, to the silent consternation of many academics in America and the West. The Chinese leaders now say that their country was never in danger of "capitalist restoration," that Mao's view of the situation in China at the time "ran counter to reality," and that the "new born things" of the Cultural Revolution were impractical and utopian. The Red Guards were led by "careerists, adventurists, opportunists, political degenerates, and the hooligan dregs of society." The fullest official account, issued in October 1979, concludes that the Cultural Revolution not only was unnecessary, but also was a "calamity" for China, an "appalling catastrophe suffered by all our people."¹¹

Hearing from "Ghosts and Monsters"

The new Chinese leadership has also disclosed the startling human costs of the Cultural Revolution. In an interview with Yugoslav journalists early last July, Party Secretary-General Hu Yaobang estimated that 100 million Chinese — more than 10 percent of the country's population—suffered "unjustly" during the movement. The governor of Guangdong (Kwangtung) has charged that in his province alone, some 40,000 people died an "unnatural death" during the Cultural Revolution decade. The post-Mao leadership claims to have "rehabilitated" almost 3 million victims of the movement, but for many, such as former Party Vice Chairman Liu Shaoqi, who died in prison in 1969, rehabilitation has occurred posthumously.

China's official repudiation of the Cultural Revolution invites another look. This time, however, we should be skeptical. The Chinese who today preach a new gospel condemning the Cultural Revolution are its principal surviving victims, the "ghosts and monsters" so often beaten, dunced, and denounced by the Red Guards. If we simply translate the revised authorized version into English, we will be repeating the mistakes we made in the late 1960s, when we took the official rationale for the Cultural Revolution at face value.

A sober re-evaluation, following neither the old nor the new Chinese line, would probably include the following conclusions:

China was clearly not on the verge of a capitalist restoration in 1966, but Mao still had much to worry about. Across China, as memories of revolution faded, party cadres were becoming arrogant mandarins, state bureaucracies were ossified and inefficient, and economic inequalities were increasing.

But Mao exaggerated the problem. Although his motives were almost certainly sincere, his vision was clouded. Old, ill, and suspicious, he magnified the threat to "revolutionary" values and placed his faith in an unreliable, uncontrollable mass movement.

Once Mao launched the Cultural Revolution, different groups acted from different motives. Contrary to the 1980 official line, many Chinese did, in fact, respond enthusiastically to the movement's initial stages. But many city youths joined the Cultural Revolution mostly because it suddenly gave them a license to exercise power, an opportunity to stay out of school, and an invitation to barnstorm the major cities of the country at state expense. And, not surprisingly in a gerontocracy like China's, many younger officials seized the chance to purge older men who blocked the way to promotion. No image of the late 1960s in China is more erroneous than that of the spontaneous uprising of the masses, striking boldly and unselfishly to combat injustice and bureaucratic insensitivity.

Mobilizing Hatred

In some matters, especially science, technology, and the arts, the effect of the Cultural Revolution was devastating; and China lost nearly a decade because of the anti-intellectual obscurantism of the movement's leaders. In other areas, however, such as university admissions and public health, the Cultural Revolution clearly recorded some egalitarian gains. The economic policies of the Cultural Revolution—particularly the goal of a "small but complete" economic system in every province, and the disparagement of material incentives—certainly produced some inefficiencies. But it is difficult to argue, as the current leadership does, that the economy grew more slowly during most of the Cultural Revolution decade than it did during the years just preceding it.

In fact, the dramatic recent changes in socioeconomic policy are less a repudiation of the Cultural Revolution, as Deng and his colleagues would have us believe, than a re-evaluation of some of the basic assumptions underlying Chinese economic planning since the early 1950s.

Officials now emphasize, variously in word and deed, pro-



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"Well, I can tell you this—something's burning!" was the caption of this 1967 cartoon by Pat Oliphant. China's Cultural Revolution baffled Western newspaper readers and fascinated scholars.

ductivity bonuses, the role of the market, expansion of light industry, production of consumer goods, and the opportunity for China's manufacturing enterprises to deal directly with one another rather than via the state bureaucracy. All this marks a significant departure from Mao's 1950s proposition that socialist development, in China as in the Soviet Union, required a centralized planned economy, an emphasis on heavy industry, and austerity in consumer goods.

Above all, an assessment of the Cultural Revolution would have to emphasize the enormous human costs of the movement. The most tragic of these now lie in the past: the cases of torture, imprisonment, persecution, and death that number in the tens of millions. But other costs continue, particularly the cynicism and disillusionment of a generation of young people whose idealism was first fostered and then suppressed, and the demoralization of many rank-and-file party and government officials.

Even more important, these costs were the predictable result of the methods employed in the Cultural Revolution—the consequences of the deliberate mobilization of hatred against ill-defined "class enemies."

In sum, a fair re-evaluation of the Cultural Revolution boils down to two points: It was a movement whose ostensibly noble

purposes were distorted by the passions and personal ambitions of its activists; and its costs far outweighed the benefits of any of its reforms. As we have seen, this judgment sharply contrasts with the benign assessments offered by most Western academics and journalists during the late 1960s and early '70s. The remaining question, of course, is why this should be.

There are several explanations:

First, there was the assumption of many China specialists that there was a clear rationale behind the Maoist rhetoric that deserved sympathetic understanding. Yet sympathy often led American academics dangerously close to making apologies for the entire movement.

To complicate matters, Americans were barred from China during the Cultural Revolution's heyday. They got only limited glimpses of Chinese life, via strictly guided tours, once China began to open its doors to the West during the early 1970s. Thus, those who sought to understand the Cultural Revolution from afar had to rely on official Chinese information, Red Guard documents smuggled to Hong Kong, and wall posters translated by a few Japanese journalists in Beijing. All too often, American academics accepted the official line. Conversely, sources (such as refugee accounts) that exposed the darker side of the Cultural Revolution were usually dismissed as unreliable.

Rejecting Old Dreams

Last but not least, the Cultural Revolution in China coincided with another "cultural revolution," of sorts, in the United States. Those years brought the maturation of the post-war Baby Boom, the growth of the civil-rights movement, war in Vietnam, and considerable social upheaval and political turmoil. All this affected academic perceptions of China. The late 1960s saw the emergence of a contingent of young, often radical, Asia specialists in the universities who, like so many earlier generations of Americans, often projected their own dreams and aspirations onto China. It is difficult to forget the fervent (if somewhat hypocritical) applause with which one student audience at Stanford in the mid-1970s greeted the claim by a two-week visitor to China that there was no rape and little premarital sex in the PRC, supposedly because its young people "sublimated their sexual energies toward more exalted goals."

Today, we need a broad, sober reassessment of the Cultural Revolution by American academics, not only because the current Chinese leaders are revising official history, but because our earlier accounts were distorted and unrealistic. For China

scholars (as for other area specialists), the general lesson is plain: A sympathetic understanding of trends in foreign countries is no substitute for tough-minded analysis. As China embarks on its new course of "modernization," and as American contacts with Beijing multiply, our ability to see clearly the world's most populous nation in all its contradictions and complexity will become even more important.

NOTES

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THE PEOPLE SPEAK

by B. Michael Frolic

In 1971, as part of a research project on the gap between the city and countryside in China, B. Michael Frolic, a Canadian political scientist and former diplomat, began to interview refugees living in the British colony of Hong Kong. Intrigued by the richness of their stories, he soon decided to collect firsthand accounts of daily life in China. Three themes emerged: the insistent grip of totalitarian politics; the humor of the Chinese; and the ways in which old customs have been adapted to the new ideology. Several hundred thousand former citizens of Mao's China live in Hong Kong; between 1972 and 1976, Frolic questioned 250 of them. To protect his subjects, Frolic kept their exact identities confidential. Here we present selections from six of his interviews.

The Backdoor

An intellectual from the southeastern coastal city of Fuzhou discusses the paradox of privilege in the People's Republic:

Chairman Mao tells us, "To know the taste of a pear, you must eat the pear." He means that you cannot understand life from the outside, by just sitting around thinking. Not all our pears are sweet to eat; some are rotten and others have never ripened, so the China I present to you will not be one-sided, but it is a fair picture, at least to one who has lived there. That means it is also a view of China that some people may not want to hear. There is not always glory in the everyday routine of ordinary men.

How is it that, despite Chairman Mao and despite the Cultural Revolution, the privileged few still manage to scoop away the extra rice from our bowls and take it for themselves? Those at the bottom seem destined to stay there, while those at the top

gorge themselves on the fruits of Revolution. I am not bitter, only puzzled at how this came about.

Everybody in China knows about the backdoor. It means using your personal connections to bribe people with money or material goods so you can get something you can't obtain through normal ways, through the "front door." Using the backdoor has been a common practice in China, but it really flourished during the chaos of the Cultural Revolution. Now it is a major part of our life. When you have scarcities and a privileged group, then you have a society full of backdoors. The backdoor can be found at the top, in government organs, in the Party, the Army, through the entire system right down to the very bottom. The general gets his marble bathtub through the backdoor, and the ordinary worker his "Flying Pigeon" bicycle the same way. People take the backdoor for granted and do not regard it as something disgraceful or "antisocialist." On the contrary, those who know how to use the backdoor are regarded as clever people, whereas those who don't are considered stupid.

A Borrowed Enemy

What to do when "class enemies" cannot be found for public criticism sessions? A Shanghai housewife describes how her neighborhood political committee solved a predicament reminiscent of Orwell's 1984:

At the start of the Cultural Revolution, we had a few genuine "landlord/Kuomintang" types, but they had either died, moved away, or were too sick. Efforts to find a genuine class enemy in our midst were not too successful. We had one fellow in mind—he wasn't really a class enemy, and as a matter of fact his father had been a worker and he himself had been a sailor. But he had become mentally unbalanced and used to go around talking about all the foreign places he'd visited in his younger days and how he'd like to go again. He used to sing "Sailing the Seas Depends on the Great Helmsman" all day long, and he'd change the verses around so that he and Chairman Mao were sailing around the world together, making revolution in all the foreign ports he'd once visited. At first the residents' committee decided to make him our choice to be struggled, but then we had second thoughts because he was too old and silly for something like that. What if he had a heart attack in the middle of the event? Or if he started singing and wouldn't stop?

We decided to find someone else but didn't have a suitable candidate. Finally, the chairman of our committee said, "Why

not borrow a class enemy from the adjoining neighborhood? It doesn't really matter if he lives here or not, just as long as he's a genuine class enemy. We can have a first-rate struggle session, everybody can participate, and the leadership will be pleased."

So we "borrowed" a class enemy from next door and had our struggle session. He was a veteran of such struggle sessions, about 50 years old, a known collaborator with the Kuomintang. We built a platform, assembled the masses, denounced him for his crimes, and shouted revolutionary slogans for most of a Sunday afternoon. Then we returned our borrowed class enemy, none the worse for the wear (we had promised we would avoid any physical violence and would return him unharmed), and everybody was satisfied.

The Study Session

A former Beijing (Peking) office worker describes a political study group:

Political study sessions took place on two afternoons and two evenings every week. They were presided over by my section leader, Old Zhou, at least until the Cultural Revolution.

It went like this. A bell would ring at 2:00, and after the bell had sounded you picked up your chair and tea cup and went to a larger office and sat down. Then, when everyone in the section was assembled, Old Zhou would begin the meeting. Let's say the meeting was called to discuss the New Year's editorial that had just appeared in *People's Daily*. He would say, "All right, today, as you know, we are going to discuss the New Year's editorial. Let's reread the editorial, and then we'll have a discussion. Now let's start reading." At this point, each of us volunteered to read the editorial out loud. The idea uppermost in everyone's minds was that if you read it out loud first, then you wouldn't be called on later to analyze it. One lucky person was chosen, and he read it out, loudly.

Then Zhou would proclaim, "Fine, now let's start the discussion!" The room suddenly became silent because nobody

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wanted to be the first to risk saying the wrong thing. Zhou glared at us, pleaded, and finally became angry. "Come, come, speak up. Don't hold back!" Finally, one who knew how to talk well under any circumstances, and had a good political sense, spoke a few carefully chosen words. He would start somewhat timorously, and then the rest of us relaxed our tensed muscles. He invariably went on for about half an hour, cautiously repeating and embellishing but never straying from the editorial's meaning. The tenseness went out of the room. It became routine. Five or six began to doze in their chairs. The rest of us picked out a few choice phrases to repeat out loud if called upon later. The room was too hot; the voices droned on; cigarette smoke hung heavy in the air.

Wu was a bachelor in his mid-thirties. He loved to play pranks and make jokes. Once I remember attending an important political meeting of our section. A girl in another office was there, and it was always easy to make her laugh. So, in the middle of the most serious political discussion on dialectical materialism, Wu deliberately caught her attention and then slowly opened his mouth to smile at her. He had wrapped his teeth in silver cigarette paper, and the effect was startling. He looked like one of those Soviet experts with their silver teeth. She started to giggle uncontrollably and quickly disrupted the whole meeting. Another time, he was sitting at a meeting and suddenly asked loudly, "Who is Feng Zixiu? I always hear comrades criticizing this person, but I have never heard of him."

(*Feng*, *zi*, and *xiu* are the Chinese characters that stand for feudalism, capitalism, and revisionism, not for anyone's name.) There was a stunned silence, and then the meeting burst into laughter. The section leader was trapped. He had to keep a straight face and could do nothing.

City Life

A former economist-planner describes his days in Beijing:

Living in Beijing is a privilege for most Chinese. We all try to get a permit to live in the city, because it's the center of everything.

When other parts of China had food shortages, we were better off in Beijing, probably because the Party wanted Beijing to be well stocked to show foreigners that all was well. Also, many high-level cadres live in the city, and they always demand special privileges. We had the best cultural events, and I went to any performance that was playing. I probably saw every film shown in Beijing. I remember seeing lots of foreign films, especially Soviet, but also English, French, and Japanese. Some of them I saw six or seven times just because they were different to see and do. On days off, I walked a lot, did some shopping, or rode my bicycle.

I never had a serious girlfriend. I was an outsider, a southerner, with a broken career and a bad class background.

Arranging a Marriage

Despite a half-century of Communist Party calls for the emancipation of women, the custom of arranging marriages lives on in the Chinese countryside. The story told by this woman of Guangdong province suggests that the hierarchy of status has been turned upside-down, but class background remains a paramount consideration.

The matchmaker found a family of good class background with a strong, healthy, and attractive daughter. Both parents agreed upon the bride price, dowry, and wedding arrangements, and Little Brother seemed to like her when they met. But the daughter was aloof and resisted the marriage. It turned out that she fancied another young man and wanted to marry him, but he had a bad class background and her parents objected. When Little Brother found out that she had a boyfriend, he didn't want to marry her.

The matchmaker was on the spot because she had failed and

our family had lost face. It was rare to find an eligible bride who openly resisted a match because she had someone else in mind.

Drawing on all the resources she had at her disposal, the matchmaker combed the surrounding area, visited teahouses, and finally came up with a candidate, the daughter of a peasant family in a neighboring commune. The bride's family wasn't rich, but their political status was excellent. Her eldest brother was a brigade cadre, her father a respected peasant. Because they were classified as "lower-middle peasants," the bride's family wouldn't demand too high a bride price. On the other hand, because our class status was inferior to theirs—we were "middle peasants"—they used that to their advantage in bargaining over the arrangements, saying, "Once our daughter enters your household, she will have suffered a loss in status. These days you know how valuable it is to be lower-middle peasant; middle isn't bad, but lower-middle is better."

Life on the Re-Education Farm

In 1968, the Chinese government set up "May 7 Cadres Schools" across the countryside. Their purpose: "re-education" of the bureaucracy through farm work. As is revealed in this tale narrated by a former Beijing bureaucrat, the "schools," which were at first symbols of the Cultural Revolution's antielitism, soon took on the atmosphere of summer camps.

We decided to buy the pig after the head of the military control commission visited our school and was appalled by the condition of our pigs. He had heard the local gossip: "Those city slickers at the May 7 Cadres School are so dumb they can't even raise pigs." We were a local embarrassment. Surrounded by sleek, fat, pink peasant pigs, our scrawny pigs had lost face.

We had an emergency meeting to discuss the situation. Director Lin said, "We have poorly applied Chairman Mao's Thought to our work. Skinny pigs are proof of that." The Party secretary then asked the question, "How do we apply Chairman Mao's Thought to get fat pigs?"

Squad Leader Ho (who knew the most about pigs) replied that, according to Chairman Mao, one must investigate the problem fully from all sides and then integrate practice and theory. Ho concluded that the reason for our skinny pigs had to be found in one of three areas: the relationship between the pigs and their natural environment; the relationship between the cadres and the pigs; and the relationship among the pigs themselves. He went on to say: "I've investigated each of these three relationships. The principal contradiction is the relationship

among the animals themselves. Our pigs are skinny because their ancestors were skinny pigs. In the case of our present pigs, the internal factor (the pig itself) is the main contradiction, and external factors (the food they eat, the way we care for them) are only a secondary aspect."

After Ho sat down, both the party secretary and Director Lin congratulated him for his brilliant application of Chairman Mao's theory of contradictions to the concrete problem of pigs. "In taking Chairman Mao's teaching to heart," said Director Lin, "you have clarified the problem for us. We need better pigs in order to produce better pigs. How many do we need?" Squad Leader Ho replied that in his opinion only one would be necessary but that it must be outstanding.

A pig is then purchased at more than three times the usual price.

The Thousand-Dollar Pig arrived six weeks later, in a wooden crate on the back of a truck. Sitting beside him was the expert. Neither pig nor expert impressed us at first glance. The Thousand-Dollar Pig didn't look much different than any of the fatter local varieties. His piggish red eyes peered sullenly out at the cadres who came to look at him. He lay around weakly flicking at the flies crawling all over him. The expert stuttered and had a difficult accent. Half the time, we couldn't understand what he was saying.

Like all long stories, there isn't much of an ending to this one. I guess the Thousand-Dollar Pig was a success. But was it worth the overall cost? The pig did upgrade the quality of our pork production, although nowhere the grandiose level we had originally envisaged. We could never repay the investment. Eventually, the peasants came out of curiosity to see the great pig. Of course, they knew the whole story—all the details—and they used to laugh uproariously at Beijing's folly in bringing a pig so many kilometers for so much money.

The pig became a celebrity at our school because he outlived several sets of cadres over a number of years. Eventually, back in Beijing, when we were assigning cadres on rotation to go to Henan, we didn't say they were going to the Henan May 7 Cadres School, but that they were being assigned "to the Land of the Thousand-Dollar Pig."



BACKGROUND BOOKS

MAO'S CHINA

Mao and his colleagues were not the first to feel the weight of the 4,000 years of recorded Chinese history. Every leader since Sun Yat-sen (1866-1925) has sought to restore China to its 11th-century imperial eminence, when it was, according to historian Charles Hucker, "the most populous, prosperous, and cultured nation on earth."

In **China's Imperial Past: An Introduction to Chinese History and Culture** (Stanford, 1975), Hucker sees the 11th century as marking the end of China's adolescence. It was followed, he notes, by nine centuries of "chastened, sober, often grim and drab maturity."

The causes of that languid decline are set forth by Mark Elvin, an Oxford economic historian, in **The Pattern of the Chinese Past** (Stanford, 1973). Like the United States at the end of the 19th century, China began to "fill up" with people. But rather than look to foreign outlets for its expanded economy as the Americans did, the xenophobic Chinese turned inward, reducing their overseas trade and contacts.

Ironically, China's economy was revived by European and Japanese imperialism. Opening the country to the world market in the middle of the 19th century, according to Elvin, led to rapid commercial and industrial growth.

Seeing little of value in European civilization and dismayed by Western encroachments on Chinese sovereignty, the Chinese government tried to contain the movement and influence of Westerners. Their efforts, observes Berkeley historian

Frederic Wakeman, Jr. in **The Fall of Imperial China** (Free Press, 1975, cloth; 1977, paper), culminated in 1900 with the "Boxer Rebellion," the doomed attempt of a dying empire to expel all foreigners. Hostilities ended when the troops of Britain, the United States, France, Austria, Russia, and Japan occupied Beijing (Peking). The weakened Ching dynasty was then battered by a string of revolts and fell in 1911.

The infant Republic of China, founded in 1912, was as shaky as the dynasty it replaced. For two decades, hundreds of "warlords" — commanders of small personal armies controlling at most a province or two — divided up a beleaguered China. The dozen years after 1916 saw the formation and dissolution of 25 governments, notes Northwestern historian James E. Sheridan in **China in Disintegration: The Republican Era in Chinese History, 1912-1949** (Free Press, 1977, cloth & paper).

The "warlord era" ended in 1928 when Chiang Kai-shek unified China and established his capital in Nanjing (Nanking). Yet Chiang, says Sheridan, was never more than the nominal ruler of a fragmented nation.

Though hit by natural disasters (in 1931, flooding of the Chang, or Yangtze, River displaced 25 million people) and plagued by the warlords, the Communists, and the Japanese, the Nationalist government was hurt most by its own corruption. In 1931-32, barely half of the taxes assessed by the government actually arrived at the national treasury, according to Lloyd Eastman, a Univer-

sity of Illinois historian.

Yet, Eastman argues in **The Abortive Revolution: China under Nationalist Rule, 1927-1937** (Harvard, 1974), under Chiang, China became a modern nation: Law codes were promulgated; the old exploitative treaties with foreign powers were abrogated; school enrollment nearly doubled.

The 1937 Japanese invasion changed all that. Chiang retreated to Chongqing (Chungking) in southwestern China, leaving most cities to the invaders and much of the northern countryside to the Communists.

The invasion also brought American war correspondents. Fresh out of Harvard, Theodore White was counted among the best of them. Written with Annalee Jacoby, White's **Thunder Out of China** (William Sloane, 1946; Da Capo reprint, 1975) provides a vivid account of a famine in Henan province. After watching the starving citizens of Zhengzhou literally eat dirt, White was served "one of the finest and most sickening banquets I ever ate" by the city fathers.

While White covered the Nationalists, his fellow journalist Edgar Snow followed the Communists into the countryside. In 1936, Snow caught up with them in Yanan (Yenan). His glowing observations are preserved in **Red Star Over China** (Random, 1938; Grove, rev. ed., 1968, cloth & paper; Bantam, 1978, paper). Snow found the then 43-year-old Mao Zedong "rather Lincoln-esque," a "plain-speaking and plain-living" man who had a potential for greatness. Mao reciprocated by telling Snow the story of his life.

Four years after World War II, Chiang fled to Taiwan and Mao ruled the mainland. In **Civil War in China: The Political Struggle, 1945-1949**

(Univ. of Calif., 1978), Suzanne Pepper argues that Mao's popular appeal resulted from his success in bringing about land reform and from Chiang's failure to stop hyperinflation (prices increased by 2,000 percent between 1937 and 1945).

In **China: Tradition and Transformation** (Houghton, 1978), John King Fairbank and Edwin O. Reischauer, two of America's most distinguished Asia scholars, describe China's traditional dynastic cycle: "a heroic founding, a period of great power, then a long decline, and finally total collapse."

From the day he proclaimed the People's Republic in 1949, Mao tried to postpone that cyclical decline by constantly re-creating the Communist revolution. Maurice Meisner, a University of Wisconsin historian, observes in **Mao's China: A History of the People's Republic** (Free Press, 1977, cloth & paper) that Mao began his efforts with broad land reform and agricultural collectivization. The late 1950s brought the Hundred Flowers movement and the Great Leap Forward. Finally, in 1966, Mao launched the Cultural Revolution.

The emblem of China in the 1960s remains **Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung** (China Books, 1967), the "little red book." More complete is **The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung** (Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1960-77; Pergamon, 1977, cloth & paper). These five volumes contain the official, sanitized version of Mao's pre-1958 work.

During the Cultural Revolution, China became "a nation of spies," avers the narrator of one of the entries in Chen Jo-hsi's **The Execution of Mayor Yin and Other Stories from the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution** (Ind. Univ., 1978). Chen's fiction makes it clear that the revolu-

tion touched every aspect of life: Parents worry about their kindergarten-age child's political record; a political pariah who commits suicide is said to have "terminated his ties with the Party and the people."

The height of the Cultural Revolution also saw the nadir of the PRC's image abroad. So notes newsman turned academic A. Doak Barnett in his lucid **China and the Major Powers in East Asia** (Brookings, 1977, cloth & paper). Since 1949, Beijing has tried to balance its dealings with Moscow, Tokyo, and Washington, observes Barnett. Always at odds with one or another of those powers, the PRC was, during the whirlwind era of the Cultural Revolution, on unusually bad terms with all three. For a time, it had only one foreign ambassador, stationed in Cairo.

China's relations with the United States have been especially volatile. Within a year of the establishment of the People's Republic, Mao sent 200,000 "volunteers" to fight the Americans and their allies in neighboring Korea. In 1971, however, diplomatic reconciliation began even as the United States battled the Communist North Vietnamese on China's southeastern border. The history of Sino-American difficulties is recounted in detail in *Congressional Quarterly's China: U.S. Policy Since 1945* (Congressional Quarterly, 1980, paper only).

Some Americans assume that Bei-

jing's renewal of diplomatic ties with Washington somehow implied the liberalization of China's economy, politics, and art. The thaw that came in the wake of Mao's death in 1976 seemed at first to support that belief. For a time, a few Chinese felt free to speak their minds. It did not last. The fiction, poetry, and essays in **Literature of the People's Republic of China** (Ind. Univ., 1980), edited by Kai-yu Hsu, a scholar at San Francisco State University, offer few surprises. "Steel is refined in the struggle of production," writes a People's Liberation Army poet, "and poetry should also be refined and honed in class struggle."

Such orthodoxy provoked Belgian Sinologist Pierre Ryckmans to write **Chinese Shadows** (Viking, 1977, cloth; Penguin, 1978, paper) under the pseudonym "Simon Leys." Ryckmans details 20 years of Maoist mayhem, scholars' suicides, and cultural destruction.

When the original French edition was published in 1974, the People's Republic was commonly portrayed in the Western press as a nation with few noticeable blemishes. Today, however, Ryckman's criticisms seem an eerie anticipation of the downgrading of Mao and Maoism by China's present rulers. Ryckman's conclusion might give those men pause: The Chinese people, he asserts, "have buried 20 dynasties, they will also bury this one."

EDITOR'S NOTE: *Harry Harding and Ingrid Larsen, an administrative assistant of the Wilson Center's East Asia Program, suggested some of the titles mentioned in this essay.*