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Most journalists blamed the split on the decision of the Church's 1976 General Convention to allow the ordination of women to the priesthood. Seabury, a Berkeley political scientist and a descendant of America's first Episcopalian bishop, thinks the factional schism represents a more fundamental rift between Episcopal clergy and laity. Both bishops and ministers, he says, led the Church toward increasing secularization as they joined political and social causes in the 1960s, dispensing millions of dollars to radical movements (Black Power, migrant farm workers, Puerto Rican nationalists).

Seabury cites the actions of Bishop Paul Moore, who made available Manhattan's Cathedral of St. John the Divine for use as "a theatrical facility, for light shows, Shinto rites, Sufi workshops in dervish dancing . . . , ceremonies for striking farm workers and for Indians at Wounded Knee, . . . and political protest rallies." Moreover, soon after the Church approved the ordination of women, Bishop Moore ordained an avowed lesbian.

This "new license," says Seabury, did not directly affect the majority of practicing Episcopalians, who were free to accept or reject what the "reformers" espoused. What provoked a storm was the 1976 General Convention's controversial adoption of a new *Book of Common Prayer* intended "to make the church, its language, and its practices conform to contemporary values." All 2 million Episcopal communicants were called upon to give the new prayer book equal status with the familiar 1789 liturgical manual, as revised in 1898 and 1928, the principal bond joining the High, Middle, and Low orders of the Church. (One straw poll found the new prayer book acceptable to only 11 percent of the laity.)

To avoid further "deterioration," Seabury concludes that the clergy of the Episcopal Church need to regain a sense of their essential calling, which is not social or political but "salvific" or soul-saving.

Fairness in a Finite World

"Justice, Limits to Growth, and an Equilibrium State" by F. Patrick Hubbard, in *Philosophy and Public Affairs* (Summer 1978), Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J. 08540.

Social theorists since John Locke (1632–1704) have argued that unrestrained production and technological development would ultimately insure a minimum standard of living for all. But in *A Theory of Justice* (1971), philosopher John Rawls introduced a new concept—"the equilibrium state"—that places a ceiling on social consumption to diminish the risk of serious injury to present and future generations. (Rawls calls this "intergenerational justice.") The shift to an equilibrium or no-growth perspective, says Hubbard, who teaches at the University of South Carolina law school, would require Western societies to accept new, less libertarian democratic principles based on civic responsibility rather than on individual rights.

Rawls' approach identifies a class of goods called "luxuries," defined as that which exceeds the basic resources of living, a culturally determined "appropriate" standard of living, or those "primary goods" that

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are "things that every rational man is presumed to want." However these luxuries are defined, Rawls would allow their consumption only if there is no significant risk that succeeding generations would thereby be denied a minimum standard of living.

The Rawlsian theory of justice is "pure" or "ideal," says Hubbard. What would be more useful would be an "applied theory of justice" that uses empirical data to determine, for example, if luxuries should simply be heavily taxed or their production completely prohibited in order to maintain a "just minimum" for society's least advantaged.

There are substantial costs involved in adopting an equilibrium strategy, Hubbard writes. Authoritarian controls, including surveillance and bureaucratic intrusions, might be required to insure that proper consumption levels are not exceeded.

The implications of an equilibrium state may be offensive to many, says Hubbard, but "there is no logically necessary connection between a reduction in economic growth and a loss in political liberty." Moreover, the equilibrium perspective deserves serious consideration if only because the limits-to-growth proponents may be right in saying that the earth cannot sustain exponential growth.

The Issues in Abortion

"Religious, Moral, & Sociological Issues: Some Basic Distinctions" by Baruch Brody, and "Enacting Religious Beliefs in a Pluralistic Society" by Frederick S. Jaffe, in *The Hastings Center Report* (Aug. 1978), 360 Broadway, Hastings-on-Hudson, N.Y. 10706.

Is abortion a religious issue? No, says Brody, a philosopher at Rice University. Opposition to abortion need not be, and frequently is not, based upon any religious beliefs—any more than opposition to torture in Brazil becomes a religious position just because that opposition is led by Catholic bishops.

Moreover, even if opposition to abortion were a religious position, the question of the use of federal funds to pay for abortions need not be a religious question. "The issue is that of the use of coercively collected funds [tax revenues] to pay for abortions when many from whom the funds are collected believe that they are being forced to support what they believe is murder," writes Brody.

But Jaffe, president of the Alan Guttmacher Institute, argues that abortion is an issue between religious groups based on differences in theological beliefs concerning the morality of abortion, the circumstances (if any) in which it is permissible, and who has the right and obligation to make the moral decision. Orthodox Jews, Mormons, and some fundamentalist Protestant groups, as well as the Roman Catholic Church, oppose abortion. Other Protestant and Jewish groups teach that in some circumstances abortion may be a more moral course of action than bearing an unwanted child.

The belief that a fetus becomes a person at conception with a right to protection equal to or greater than that of the woman in whose body it