

**FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE**

warfare in Europe and Scotland and put this to good use in the American colonies.

When General Braddock led his 2,200-man army into the Ohio Valley in mid-1755 in an attempt to dislodge the French from Fort Duquesne (Pittsburgh), he had little trouble with hostile Indians and Canadian woodsmen. His camps were heavily guarded and, while on the march, one-third of his force was deployed in flanking parties. Moreover, Braddock had recruited Indians as scouts, but to cut payroll costs, he let go all but eight of them. Led by Captain Daniel de Beaujeu, the French repeatedly tried to ambush Braddock's forces during June but found the advancing British troops too alert. Then, on July 9, 1755, the British vanguard, a compact column of regulars with a few scouts out in front, encountered a force of Frenchmen, Canadians, and Indians head on. The latter reacted faster, quickly deploying along both flanks of the British column and seizing a strategic height.

The British vanguard withdrew under fire and collided with Braddock's main force and its baggage train, causing panic and confusion. The French forces fired into the mass of redcoats from concealed positions and a British counterattack failed. After several hours, the British retreated in disorder across the Monongahela River.

In general, says Russell, Braddock employed tactics that were well conceived and well executed. Unfortunately, one fatal lapse gave the British Army its "reputation for ineptitude under frontier conditions."

### *Exploiting East-West Trade*

"Trade, Technology, and Leverage: Economic Diplomacy" by Samuel P. Huntington, "The Limits of Pressure" by Franklyn Holzman and Richard Portes, and "What Gap? Which Gap?" by John W. Kiser, in *Foreign Policy* (Fall 1978), P.O. Box 984, Farmingdale, N.Y. 11737.

Between 1965 and 1973, the Soviet Union imported from the West some \$18 billion worth of machinery and equipment, of which 30 to 40 percent could be considered advanced technology.

Given the Soviet dependence on imported technology, says Huntington, professor of government at Harvard, the United States should develop an economic policy of "linkage" to secure political concessions. This policy would have four essential ingredients. First, management of East-West economic relations should be given to the White House's National Security Council to avoid the conflicts that arise from the present dispersal of such authority among government agencies (e.g., State, Commerce, Agriculture). Second, all sales of goods for which the Soviets have a critical need that can only be satisfied by the United States (e.g., sophisticated computers) should require an export license regardless of their military significance. Third, U.S. government credits to help finance U.S. exports to Russia should be granted with greater flexibility, subject to general congressional limits. Finally, U.S. economic policy should be better coordinated with our allies.

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However, economists Holzman, of Tufts University, and Portes, of the University of London, contend that Soviet dependence on Western technology is grossly exaggerated and that consequently no "linkage" policy can be successful. Imported technology represents only a small fraction of total Soviet investment, they say, and its acquisition, at best, can only be delayed by U.S. tactics.

Kiser, a research consultant in Soviet affairs, attacks the basic premise of Huntington's linkage proposal—the presumed U.S. technological superiority over the Russians. (U.S. engineering firms, he says, have been buying Soviet pipe welding technology superior to anything in the West.) Russia's technological "unevenness," he says, needs to be better understood if the "technology gap" is to be more than a self-deceiving U.S. political slogan.

### *The Politics of Sport*

"The Thrill of Victory and the Agony of Defeat: Sport and International Politics" by Andrew Strenk, in *Orbis* (Summer 1978), 3508 Market St., Philadelphia, Pa. 19104.

Sports are becoming increasingly politicized in the international arena as athletic contests become another form of highly publicized diplomacy. "As much as purists bemoan the fact, it is ever more evident that sports and politics cannot be separated," says Strenk, a historian at the University of Southern California and a former U.S. Olympic swimmer.

Sports have become a tool of diplomatic recognition or nonrecognition. For example, the United States and the Peoples Republic of China used "ping-pong" diplomacy in 1971 to help break years of diplomatic silence. And, in the 1960s, East Germany invested great sums of money and became so good in so many sports that it became difficult to ignore them or avoid competing with them.

The image of sports as a means of furthering international understanding and peace has been promoted by the International Olympic Committee, but ideological and political tensions can still create conflict. In 1962, when India protested Indonesia's refusal to admit Israel and Taiwan to the Fourth Asian Games, Indonesia broke off trade relations with India, and rioters destroyed the Indian embassy in Djakarta.

Sports can be used to register "protests," as with the "black power" gestures of black American athletes at the 1968 Olympics in Mexico City, and threats by various countries to boycott international sporting events that included South African teams. International sports have also been used as a propaganda vehicle to advertise a particular political system (e.g., the 1936 Olympic Games in Berlin) and to gain international prestige and publicity (e.g., Japan's lavish investment of \$1.5 billion in facilities for the 1964 Olympics.)

The United States is now at a crossroads. Others invest ever greater funds in national sports programs. But the United States adheres to a "voluntary, privately subsidized, inefficient" system, which means that "many American no longer have a sporting chance in international competition" and U.S. prestige suffers as a result.