
FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE

*A Tar-Baby
Foreign Policy*

"Congress in Foreign Policy: Who Needs It?" by Douglas J. Bennet, Jr., in *Foreign Affairs* (Fall 1978), 428 East Preston St., Baltimore, Md. 21202.

The U.S. Congress is now intimately involved in foreign policy and likely to remain so, whether it likes it or not, says Bennet, Assistant Secretary of State for congressional relations. "Presidents and Congresses of the future will find themselves thrust together in a tar-baby embrace on the central international issues of their times, each unable to abdicate its responsibilities to the other, each compelled to justify itself to an impatient public, and each constrained to seek the other's support."

This symbiotic relationship can be a good thing, says Bennet. Public debate is likely to produce more workable policy with greater popular support, and thus provide greater stability in American foreign affairs.

But can an anarchic, overburdened Congress make a coherent contribution? Yes, says Bennet, if some obvious requirements are met. Congress needs reliable, objective information and must be involved by the executive branch in the decision-making process as early as possible. The Congress should get itself out of the management of foreign policy (e.g., imposing a patchwork of restrictions on various forms of foreign aid) and spend more time reaching a consensus on U.S. global objectives.

Congressional participation in foreign affairs puts real limitations on the kinds of things the United States tries to do in the world, says Bennet. It makes intervention by U.S. troops abroad less likely, inhibits extralegal and covert activities, and curbs bold White House initiatives. The country's adjustment to the realities of global interdependence, including the demands of the Third World, must be geared to public understanding and support—and for this, says Bennet, "We need Congress to refine, to legitimate and to help sell effective international policies."

*Braddock's
'Fatal Lapse'*

"Redcoats in the Wilderness: British Officers and Irregular Warfare in Europe and America, 1740 to 1760" by Peter E. Russell, in *The William and Mary Quarterly* (Oct. 1978), P.O. Box 220, Williamsburg, Va. 23185.

The famous defeat of General Edward Braddock and his army by the French, Canadians, and Indians in 1755 is often cited as proof that the British redcoats rigidly adhered to European military tactics on the American frontier and therefore were no match for foes who were experts at concealment and surprise.

Nonsense, says Russell, a University of Michigan historian. The British officers who led the Anglo-American armies in the French and Indian War (1754–63) had considerable prior experience with guerrilla

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warfare in Europe and Scotland and put this to good use in the American colonies.

When General Braddock led his 2,200-man army into the Ohio Valley in mid-1755 in an attempt to dislodge the French from Fort Duquesne (Pittsburgh), he had little trouble with hostile Indians and Canadian woodsmen. His camps were heavily guarded and, while on the march, one-third of his force was deployed in flanking parties. Moreover, Braddock had recruited Indians as scouts, but to cut payroll costs, he let go all but eight of them. Led by Captain Daniel de Beaujeu, the French repeatedly tried to ambush Braddock's forces during June but found the advancing British troops too alert. Then, on July 9, 1755, the British vanguard, a compact column of regulars with a few scouts out in front, encountered a force of Frenchmen, Canadians, and Indians head on. The latter reacted faster, quickly deploying along both flanks of the British column and seizing a strategic height.

The British vanguard withdrew under fire and collided with Braddock's main force and its baggage train, causing panic and confusion. The French forces fired into the mass of redcoats from concealed positions and a British counterattack failed. After several hours, the British retreated in disorder across the Monongahela River.

In general, says Russell, Braddock employed tactics that were well conceived and well executed. Unfortunately, one fatal lapse gave the British Army its "reputation for ineptitude under frontier conditions."

Exploiting East-West Trade

"Trade, Technology, and Leverage: Economic Diplomacy" by Samuel P. Huntington, "The Limits of Pressure" by Franklyn Holzman and Richard Portes, and "What Gap? Which Gap?" by John W. Kiser, in *Foreign Policy* (Fall 1978), P.O. Box 984, Farmingdale, N.Y. 11737.

Between 1965 and 1973, the Soviet Union imported from the West some \$18 billion worth of machinery and equipment, of which 30 to 40 percent could be considered advanced technology.

Given the Soviet dependence on imported technology, says Huntington, professor of government at Harvard, the United States should develop an economic policy of "linkage" to secure political concessions. This policy would have four essential ingredients. First, management of East-West economic relations should be given to the White House's National Security Council to avoid the conflicts that arise from the present dispersal of such authority among government agencies (e.g., State, Commerce, Agriculture). Second, all sales of goods for which the Soviets have a critical need that can only be satisfied by the United States (e.g., sophisticated computers) should require an export license regardless of their military significance. Third, U.S. government credits to help finance U.S. exports to Russia should be granted with greater flexibility, subject to general congressional limits. Finally, U.S. economic policy should be better coordinated with our allies.