
FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE

*A Tar-Baby
Foreign Policy*

"Congress in Foreign Policy: Who Needs It?" by Douglas J. Bennet, Jr., in *Foreign Affairs* (Fall 1978), 428 East Preston St., Baltimore, Md. 21202.

The U.S. Congress is now intimately involved in foreign policy and likely to remain so, whether it likes it or not, says Bennet, Assistant Secretary of State for congressional relations. "Presidents and Congresses of the future will find themselves thrust together in a tar-baby embrace on the central international issues of their times, each unable to abdicate its responsibilities to the other, each compelled to justify itself to an impatient public, and each constrained to seek the other's support."

This symbiotic relationship can be a good thing, says Bennet. Public debate is likely to produce more workable policy with greater popular support, and thus provide greater stability in American foreign affairs.

But can an anarchic, overburdened Congress make a coherent contribution? Yes, says Bennet, if some obvious requirements are met. Congress needs reliable, objective information and must be involved by the executive branch in the decision-making process as early as possible. The Congress should get itself out of the management of foreign policy (e.g., imposing a patchwork of restrictions on various forms of foreign aid) and spend more time reaching a consensus on U.S. global objectives.

Congressional participation in foreign affairs puts real limitations on the kinds of things the United States tries to do in the world, says Bennet. It makes intervention by U.S. troops abroad less likely, inhibits extralegal and covert activities, and curbs bold White House initiatives. The country's adjustment to the realities of global interdependence, including the demands of the Third World, must be geared to public understanding and support—and for this, says Bennet, "We need Congress to refine, to legitimate and to help sell effective international policies."

*Braddock's
'Fatal Lapse'*

"Redcoats in the Wilderness: British Officers and Irregular Warfare in Europe and America, 1740 to 1760" by Peter E. Russell, in *The William and Mary Quarterly* (Oct. 1978), P.O. Box 220, Williamsburg, Va. 23185.

The famous defeat of General Edward Braddock and his army by the French, Canadians, and Indians in 1755 is often cited as proof that the British redcoats rigidly adhered to European military tactics on the American frontier and therefore were no match for foes who were experts at concealment and surprise.

Nonsense, says Russell, a University of Michigan historian. The British officers who led the Anglo-American armies in the French and Indian War (1754–63) had considerable prior experience with guerrilla