
FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE

A New Formula for U.S. Security

"A New Grand Strategy for the United States: An Essay" by Ray S. Cline, in *Comparative Strategy* (vol. 1 nos. 1 and 2, 1978), Crane, Russak & Company, 347 Madison Ave., New York, N.Y. 10017.

Having shifted from a Cold War strategy of "containment" to a search for "detente" with the Soviets, America faces the future uncertain about its proper international role. Moreover, "double talk" in U.S. foreign policy, says Cline, director of Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies, has left our traditional allies disillusioned with Washington and perplexed about what the United States is prepared to fight for.

The security of the United States and the protection of its national interests depend on the reconstruction of an effective global alliance system beyond the scope of NATO, Cline contends. This is the only way to prevent a gradual erosion of the balance of power between the Communist nations on the Eurasian land mass and the geographically scattered, comparatively open societies that represent a natural trans-oceanic trading and security system.

The "Oceans Alliance" that Cline proposes would include a core group of 10 nations: United States, Canada, West Germany, France, Britain, Italy, Israel, Japan, Republic of China/Taiwan, and Australia. To secure overwhelming power for the pursuit of common international goals, he would add 13 other important nations: Mexico, Spain, Iran, Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Singapore, South Korea, Brazil, Nigeria, South Africa, and New Zealand. Collectively, these 23



The author proposes a trans-oceanic trading and security alliance joining a core group of 10 nations (dark red) and 13 other important countries (lighter red).

Source: World Power Assessment: A Calculus of Strategic Drift by Ray S. Cline (Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, 1975).

FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE

countries contain nearly half the world's population, nearly 70 percent of the world's land surface, and most of the world's technology.

Within such an alliance, Cline argues, the United States should not try to maintain the status quo in world affairs but seek to "create an environment safe for the international exchange of economic goods and services, as well as political pluralism, orderly social change, and the nonviolent resolution of conflicts."

A Cheaper Deterrent

"A New Strategy for Military Spending"
by Philip Morrison and Paul F. Walker, in
Scientific American (Oct. 1978), 415 Madison
Ave., New York, N.Y. 10017.

Since 1945, the United States has invested more than \$2 trillion in its military establishment and, despite Soviet gains, stands today as the world's foremost military power. While pressures are mounting for the deployment of more costly weapons, Morrison, an M.I.T. physicist, and Walker, a research Fellow in Harvard's Program for Science and International Affairs, argue that the United States can guarantee its security with a defense budget 40 percent, or some \$50 billion, below the current \$126 billion.

Present U.S. military strength greatly exceeds the requirements for deterrence. Moreover, the current mix of bombers and land-based and submarine-based strategic missiles makes no sense, the authors contend. Our 1,054 land-based ICBMs are becoming obsolete because of their vulnerability to more accurate Soviet warheads. A similar fate awaits the bombers, which must fly many hours before reaching points from which they can launch their cruise missiles.

In conventional warfare, the advent of highly accurate, but relatively inexpensive, "precision-guided munitions" or "smart weapons" now promises a dramatic advantage to the defense and raises doubts about the usefulness of ever more complex and expensive ships, tanks, and planes.

Morrison and Walker would eliminate all long-range strategic bombers from the U.S. arsenal, reduce to 100 the number of land-based ICBMs, cut the number of missile-launching submarines from 41 to 31, reduce the number of aircraft carriers from 13 to 3, and the total number of Navy surface ships from 162 to 125.

With accelerated development of "smart weapons," the number of Army heavy (armored and mechanized) divisions could be reduced from 10 to 8½, the number of light divisions from 7½ to 3, and the number of Marine divisions from 3 to 1. Total military manpower could be cut a third, from 2.1 million to 1.4 million.

This force structure, the authors say, would adequately deter nuclear attack on the United States and its allies; reduce the likelihood of disastrous U.S. interventions abroad; promote diplomatic progress in arms control and disarmament; make U.S. policy more understandable and less threatening to the outside world; and release new economic resources in the United States to counter inflation.