

**THE OFFICIAL
MILITARY ATLAS OF
THE CIVIL WAR**

by Major George B. Davis
et al.

Arno/Crown, 1979

178 double-spread pp. \$60

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The Civil War changed the course not only of American history but of American historiography, as well. For the first time, the U.S. government entered the field of the historian, compiling military documents from both Confederate and Union sources. Begun in 1864 under Army auspices, the project gained momentum in the 1870s and took until 1895 to complete. The result was the 128-volume *War of Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*. Arno/Crown has reprinted the 35 folios of maps and engravings that accompanied the *Records* in one full-color volume. (The originals long ago entered the lost or stolen category in even the best libraries.) Included in the 178 plates are 821 maps, 106 engravings, and 209 drawings, most of them prepared during the war by engineers, draftsmen, officers, and, occasionally, generals. The maps, of major battles as well as skirmishes, show geographical and topographical features and troop movements. The Battle of Gettysburg (July 1-3, 1863), for example, is represented by seven maps (three Union, two Confederate, two drawn after the war). The engravings are chiefly of fortifications, many shown from various angles; drawings depict weapons, logistical equipment, uniforms, and unit flags. This oversized, 10-pound volume will be welcomed by professional historians and Civil War buffs alike.

Contemporary Affairs

**JAPAN AS NUMBER ONE:
Lessons for America**

by Ezra F. Vogel

Harvard, 1979

272 pp. \$12.50

L of C 78-24059

ISBN 0-674-47215-2

Japan has learned from the West, so why not the reverse? Asserting postwar Japan's general superiority over the United States, Vogel, a Harvard sociologist, explains why the Japanese have been so successful in managing their society. The Japanese bureaucracy is small and effective—in part because the government makes private companies and citizen groups (e.g., the *shingikai*, or “deliberative councils,” composed of well-known private citizens) responsible for formulating and implementing much policy relating to the environment, taxation, health care, and

welfare. The Japanese legal system emphasizes problem-solving rather than adversary proceedings between lawyers. Social pressures reduce crime; in 1973, "there were approximately four-and-a-half times as many murders per person in the United States, five times as many rapes, and 105 times as many robberies" as there were in Japan. Lacking abundant natural resources, the island nation could not permit the waste that accompanied U.S. growth. Now that the United States faces scarcities of fuel and other commodities, Vogel believes it could learn from the Japanese experience. Yet he does not ignore Japan's unhappy trends: the stifling of individual rights and creativity due to overregimentation in the work place, the resurgence of national chauvinism, and a high suicide rate among its youth. And he concedes that not all Japanese solutions suit U.S. problems, if only because of America's size, heterogeneous population, and focus on the individual.

**EUROPE BETWEEN THE
SUPERPOWERS: The
Enduring Balance**

by A. W. DePorte
Yale, 1979
256 pp. \$18.50
L of C 78-8123
ISBN 0-300-02229-8

Until World War I, the European system of states, which had emerged at the end of the Middle Ages, remained essentially stable despite frequent wars. By 1913-14, however, Germany was leading Europe in arms expenditures (\$554 million compared to Britain's \$384 million and France's \$287 million) and industrial output (producing three times as much pig iron and ferro alloys as France). American and Russian involvement in both World Wars was necessary to prevent German hegemony. Since 1945, the rivalry between the United States and the USSR has meant relative peace, independence, and prosperity for Western Europe, according to DePorte, a member of the State Department's policy planning staff. At least, the superpower standoff in Europe has been better than the possible alternatives: Soviet control of all of Europe, or Germany's reunification by force, with a revival of German aggression. DePorte argues that the most important development in Europe since 1962 (the year of the Cuban Missile Crisis) has been the successful U.S.-