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West Germany and Italy, for example) needed to finance purchases of Western grain and technology.

Where will the Soviet Union get more oil? (Neighboring Iran already ships natural gas to southern Soviet Republics.) "At a minimum," Cobb writes, "Moscow hopes for a 'Finlandized' Iran," free of military ties with the United States and ready to provide oil to Western Russia. And if leftist rebel movements in other pro-West oil states (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates) seek Moscow's help, "Soviet and Cuban troops are stationed in [Southern] Yemen and Ethiopia in sufficient numbers to render assistance."

Providing the technology recently sought by Moscow to drill for Siberian oil could prove a thankless task for the United States, says Cobb. Americans should not place too much faith in the Kremlin's promises of future oil in return. Yet, he observes, U.S. "economic influence" in the form of technical aid for Russian energy programs could yield diplomatic advantages. Washington should resist the temptation to apply economic leverage blatantly (e.g., freedom for Jewish dissidents in exchange for oil drills). But economic pressure applied "subtly," he says, may inspire Soviet leaders to greater prudence in their broad strategic calculations.

A Future for Bombers

"A Post B-1 Look at the Manned Strategic Bomber" by Lt. Col. John J. Kohout III, in *Air University Review* (July-Aug. 1979), U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.


President Jimmy Carter's July 1977 decision to halt production of the B-1 strategic bomber was the latest development in a 20-year struggle to choose a successor to the nation's fleet of aging B-52s.

At the dawn of the atomic age in 1945, the manned bomber was pre-eminent; it was the only way to transport nuclear bombs to enemy targets, writes Kohout, an Air Force Pentagon staff officer. The payloads of the early bombers, the B-29 and B-50, reflected almost exactly the size of the nuclear weapons of the day. Their range "defined the strategic 'reach' the United States could claim."

The new generation of jet bombers, including the B-47 and the B-52 (the first of which was delivered in 1955), was designed to fly high and fast to avoid improved Russian fighters. By the late 1950s, however, the advent of Soviet ground-to-air missiles and sophisticated radar demanded radical new tactics. The pilots of the U.S. B-47s and B-52s were trained to fly as low as possible to confuse enemy radar and to make interception by Russian missiles and fighters more difficult.

Yet performance standards have not changed quickly enough, observes Kohout. Bombers continue to be designed for speed and high altitudes—despite the fact that these today add little or nothing to an aircraft's strategic capabilities. The B-1's "excessive capabilities" (it

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The B-1 strategic bomber, criticized for its "excessive capabilities."

was equipped to cruise at supersonic speeds) and unprecedented price tag (\$88 million each), Kohout writes, made it "uniquely vulnerable to its domestic critics." The United States needs a new reasonably priced bomber, he says, that has "generous range, payload, and inherent growth potential, and the ability to employ a variety of munitions and tactics."

Now part of a strategic "Triad," with intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), the manned bomber's most valuable attribute is its flexibility. Once airborne and safe from surprise attack, bombers can launch the new cruise missiles and then hang back, striking targets selectively (with short-range missiles) after the ICBMs, SLBMs, and cruise missiles have damaged enemy defenses. They can be deployed as a show of force (a missile cannot), and they are the only existing strategic vehicles that can be modified for nonnuclear warfare.

Technical Aid for China?

"Dilemmas for America in China's Modernization" by Lucian W. Pye, in *International Security* (Summer 1979), The MIT Press (Journals), 28 Carleton St., Cambridge, Mass. 02142.

Since their break with Moscow in the early 1960s, the communist Chinese have been practicing "Chicken Little" diplomacy, writes Pye, a political scientist at MIT.

They have issued shrill warnings regarding Soviet intentions, charging, in effect, "that NATO is about to be tested and is likely to be found wanting, that Japan should prepare more earnestly for war in Asia, and that the Vietnamese are now the 'Cubans of the East.'" Yet the Chinese have allowed their own military power to steadily decline in relation to the Soviet Union's ever-modernizing forces.