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making." A 1972 White House Personnel Manual outlined purge tactics that included transfers of some unsympathetic senior bureaucrats and suggestions to others that they retire. White House nominees were urged upon Civil Service personnel officers to fill the vacancies.

Did the strategy work? To a degree, say the authors, political scientists at George Washington and Purdue universities, respectively: "Republican career executives were about 3 times as likely to be promoted to senior positions in the social service agencies" (e.g., the Departments of Housing and Urban Development and of Health, Education and Welfare, which were prime White House targets) than were Democrats. They were "more than 1.5 times as likely to be promoted" in all other agencies.

Yet, say Cole and Caputo, White House efforts were "doomed to insignificance." Only 15 percent of all top career posts ever became vacant during the Nixon years. By 1976, the proportion of high-level civil servants listing themselves as Republican was only 16 percent—with self-styled Democrats at 38 percent and Independents at 46 percent.

Nonetheless, in that year, a majority (60 percent) of all top federal managers surveyed favored the administration's New Federalism philosophy. "A considerable reservoir of potential presidential support," the authors conclude, exists among "independent" civil servants who are generally willing to accommodate themselves to the goals of the administration in power.

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Soviet Dilemma

"The Soviet Energy Dilemma" by Tyrus W. Cobb, in *Orbis* (Summer 1979), 3508 Market St., Philadelphia, Pa. 19104.

Future Soviet-American relations may hinge on Russian oil supplies, says Cobb, assistant professor of social science at West Point.

Currently the world's third largest exporter of crude oil (after Saudi Arabia and Iran), the Soviet Union may have to start *importing* 2 million barrels of oil a day in 1990. The reason: 75 percent of the country's people and 80 percent of its industry are concentrated in "the European part of the USSR"; yet 80 percent of its remaining oil and gas is in Siberia. The Soviets, Cobb says, do not have the technology to extract oil and gas in frozen, remote regions and then transport them thousands of miles to major cities.

As total Soviet oil production drops, Moscow may have to reduce some industrial activities. And the Soviet Union may have to sacrifice some of its economic control over Eastern European bloc nations, traditionally dependent on Moscow for cheap energy. The Russians will also lose major sources of foreign "hard" currency (from oil exports to

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West Germany and Italy, for example) needed to finance purchases of Western grain and technology.

Where will the Soviet Union get more oil? (Neighboring Iran already ships natural gas to southern Soviet Republics.) "At a minimum," Cobb writes, "Moscow hopes for a 'Finlandized' Iran," free of military ties with the United States and ready to provide oil to Western Russia. And if leftist rebel movements in other pro-West oil states (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates) seek Moscow's help, "Soviet and Cuban troops are stationed in [Southern] Yemen and Ethiopia in sufficient numbers to render assistance."

Providing the technology recently sought by Moscow to drill for Siberian oil could prove a thankless task for the United States, says Cobb. Americans should not place too much faith in the Kremlin's promises of future oil in return. Yet, he observes, U.S. "economic influence" in the form of technical aid for Russian energy programs could yield diplomatic advantages. Washington should resist the temptation to apply economic leverage blatantly (e.g., freedom for Jewish dissidents in exchange for oil drills). But economic pressure applied "subtly," he says, may inspire Soviet leaders to greater prudence in their broad strategic calculations.

A Future for Bombers

"A Post B-1 Look at the Manned Strategic Bomber" by Lt. Col. John J. Kohout III, in *Air University Review* (July-Aug. 1979), U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

President Jimmy Carter's July 1977 decision to halt production of the B-1 strategic bomber was the latest development in a 20-year struggle to choose a successor to the nation's fleet of aging B-52s.

At the dawn of the atomic age in 1945, the manned bomber was pre-eminent; it was the only way to transport nuclear bombs to enemy targets, writes Kohout, an Air Force Pentagon staff officer. The payloads of the early bombers, the B-29 and B-50, reflected almost exactly the size of the nuclear weapons of the day. Their range "defined the strategic 'reach' the United States could claim."

The new generation of jet bombers, including the B-47 and the B-52 (the first of which was delivered in 1955), was designed to fly high and fast to avoid improved Russian fighters. By the late 1950s, however, the advent of Soviet ground-to-air missiles and sophisticated radar demanded radical new tactics. The pilots of the U.S. B-47s and B-52s were trained to fly as low as possible to confuse enemy radar and to make interception by Russian missiles and fighters more difficult.

Yet performance standards have not changed quickly enough, observes Kohout. Bombers continue to be designed for speed and high altitudes—despite the fact that these today add little or nothing to an aircraft's strategic capabilities. The B-1's "excessive capabilities" (it