mobilization for the Korean War and cited "national security" in an attempt to take over the steel industry threatened by a strike in 1952. The Supreme Court overturned the action (in *Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer*) on the grounds that Truman acted without required congressional sanction. Later, President Nixon declared national emergencies to thwart a postal strike in 1970 and to impose import quotas during a 1971 "international monetary crisis."

Roused by administration mismanagement of the Vietnam War and by Watergate, Congress sought to regain some of its lost authority in 1973. A Senate subcommittee was shocked to find that, technically, the country had been in a state of emergency since March 4, 1933; since that date, 470 laws had been enacted giving the President various emergency powers—to seize property and certain commodities, mobilize industry, restrict travel, regulate private capital, control transportation and communication. In 1973, Congress passed (over Nixon's veto) the War Powers Act limiting the emergency commitment of U.S. military forces to combat, in the absence of congressional approval, to 60 days. Finally, the National Emergencies Act of 1976 empowered Congress to end any declaration of emergency unilaterally. This act, Klieman observes, marked the "resumption of institutional checking and balancing."

Misplaced Fears

"Campaign Financing and the 'Special' Interests'" by Michael J. Malbin, in *The Public Interest* (Summer 1979), P.O. Box 542, Old Chelsea, New York, N.Y. 10011.

Spurred by revelations of illegal corporate contributions to the 1972 Nixon presidential campaign, Congress enacted legislation in 1974 to control business donations to federal office-seekers. Now liberals are worried that corporate "special interest" money can buy favors on Capitol Hill. Malbin, a Resident Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, says such fears are misplaced.

The Federal Elections Campaign Amendments of 1974 (drafted by the "citizens' lobby," Common Cause) allowed corporations and others to establish committees, funded by voluntary contributions from employees, to distribute money to federal candidates—presidential and congressional. Called "political action committees" (PACs), they are required to register with the Federal Elections Commission and are limited to gifts of $5,000 to each candidate they support. The reformers hoped that the $5,000 ceiling would curb the influence of corporate political action committees. But they didn't count on the corporations' eagerness to engage in politics. There were 89 corporate PACs in 1974; by 1978, there were 646.

Despite their popularity, Malbin observes, PACs do not really spend enough money to "buy" congressional favors. In the 1978 campaign, for example, 17 of the 25 largest American businesses (as rated by *Fortune*)

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John Gardner, chairman of Common Cause, which drafted the law that imposed limits on campaign contributions.

gave an average of only $505 per candidate. Today, only 254 of the top 1,000 U.S. corporations operate political action committees. Corporate PACs, Malbin writes, like those of most labor unions and strongly ideological organizations, tend to give small amounts to a number of candidates. The real "special interests," he says, are single-industry businesses and unions (e.g. in shipping), which traditionally support only incumbent Congressmen whose committees have jurisdiction over their activities. But even their contributions, Malbin says, rarely equal 10 percent of a candidate's campaign chest.

Limiting PAC contributions further, Malbin concludes, creates risks: Candidates, particularly political newcomers, will have to depend more on direct-mail fundraisers (such as Richard Viguerie on the Right) who play on "polarizing emotions" to attract individual donations.

Nixon and the Civil Service

"Presidential Control of the Senior Civil Service: Assessing the Strategies of the Nixon Years" by Richard L. Cole and David A. Caputo, in *The American Political Science Review* (June 1979), 1527 New Hampshire Ave. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

Richard Nixon, more than any other recent U.S. President, tried to strengthen White House influence over the federal bureaucracy by manipulating Civil Service hiring and firing practices.

When a Democratic Congress balked at Nixon's "new federalism" programs—e.g., general revenue sharing and welfare reform—during his first term (1969–73), the White House devised another strategy. Policy changes would be achieved "through bureaucratic decision-