

ploying 114,126 workers at the time of the attacks, those that went out of business employed only 4,511 workers. Nearly 88 percent of the employees—100,226 in all—worked for firms

that relocated within Manhattan. New Jersey absorbed 4,680 of the workers; counties north of New York City, 2,758; the rest of the United States, 1,804; and foreign countries, 146.

Rose and economist S. Brock Blomberg of Claremont McKenna College say that the results underscore the ability of the U.S. economy to bounce back under pressure.

FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE

War and Warming

THE SOURCES: “Environmental Security Heats Up,” in *Environmental Change and Security Program Report*, Issue 13, 2008–09, “Avoid Hyperbole, Oversimplification When Climate and Security Meet,” in *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Aug. 24, 2009, and “Planning for Climate Change: The Security Community’s Precautionary Principle,” in *Climatic Change*, Sept. 2009, all by Geoffrey D. Dabelko.

THERE ARE CRITICS WHO STILL dismiss climate change as the obsession of polar bear fetishizers and SUV hatemongers, but a significant group has begun to take it seriously: high-level military, diplomatic, and intelligence professionals in the United States and abroad. Their interest may get governments off high center and signals “the dawning of a new era,” writes Geoffrey D. Dabelko, director of the Environmental Change and Security Program at the Woodrow Wilson Center.

“Since I began working in the environmental security field 19 years ago, climate change has never drawn this much attention from the security community,” he writes in the *Environmental Change and Security Program Report*. “We are flooded with

reports from foreign-policy think tanks, military strategists, and scientists around the world on climate.” In an assessment earlier this year, director of U.S. national intelligence Dennis Blair warned, “The intelligence community judges global climate change will have important and extensive implications for U.S. national security interests over the next 20 years.” UN secretary-general Ban Ki-moon has cited climate change, desertification, and conflicts between pastoralists and agriculturalists as underlying causes of the genocide in Darfur.

Top of mind in the security community are rising sea levels, increasingly frequent and severe weather events, shifting disease vectors, and smaller crop yields.

The security community has a worried eye on rising sea levels, more frequent severe weather events, and lower crop yields as possible sources of future conflict.

Climate change may also have important indirect effects—for example, changes in human migration patterns as people follow resources or seek to escape environmental degradation. Other threats include shifts in natural resource patterns (as when rivers dry up) and access to searoutes. Reductions in Arctic sea ice, for instance, have opened new waters to navigation and increased tensions among Canada, Russia, the United States, and other nations with Arctic interests.

For security professionals, the fact that climate change isn’t thoroughly understood is no barrier to action. Military strategists and planners must make decisions all the time based on partial information, and they are well versed in planning for worst-case scenarios. Still, Dabelko points out, they are accustomed to problems that involve borders, the use of force, and a zero-sum mentality, and may have to adjust their thinking to plan for climate threats.

While the new attention to climate change may be the answer to some environmentalists’ prayers, it also opens the door to exaggeration and hyperbole. Terms such as “climate wars” shouldn’t have much place in the discussion, Dabelko writes. Climate change may exacerbate conflicts, but the mainsprings

of wars are still politics and economics. In fact, localized fighting erupts because of environmental factors far more often than cross-border conflicts do. Sloppy thinking about the effects of climate change could also serve to excuse the actions of violent regimes, as in Darfur. And heated rhetoric distracts attention from long-existing natural resource problems and conflicts, especially in poor and developing countries. Finally, Dabelko says, the West's fear of mass migrations from distressed developing countries is likely overblown. Research suggests that most movement will be South-to-South and within countries, following established country-to-city pathways.

Climate mitigation efforts carry their own hazards, as when, for example, soaring demand for corn-based biofuels led to painfully high food prices that sparked riots in Mexico. Act, Dabelko cautions, but don't overreact.

FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE

L. Paul Bremer, Scapegoat

THE SOURCE: "Occupying Iraq: A Short History of the CPA" by James Dobbins, in *Survival*, June–July 2009.

LESS THAN TWO MONTHS after the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, L. Paul Bremer arrived in Baghdad as a modern potentate. As administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), which governed Iraq at the time, he wielded full legislative, executive, and judicial



Surrounded by security forces, L. Paul Bremer arrives at an Iraqi civil defense training camp in 2004.

authority. He lasted 13 months, leaving Iraq on June 28, 2004, after transferring limited sovereignty to an Iraqi interim prime minister. A good word has rarely been spoken about him since.

The rap is unfair, writes James Dobbins, head of the International Security and Defense Policy Center at the RAND Corporation, after reviewing nearly 100,000 documents from the CPA archives and interviewing many of the coalition officials. He contends that Bremer restored Iraq's essential public services to almost pre-war levels or in some cases improved them, reformed the court and penal systems, slashed inflation, boosted economic growth, took steps to curb corruption, began to improve the civil service, promoted the development of the most liberal constitution in the Middle East, and set the stage for free elections.

Bremer performed "credibly," according to Dobbins, and his senior staff was "generally competent," contrary to the popular impression that

they were mostly naive and inexperienced political appointees. Some of his staff showed up late in Iraq and resigned early. Washington was never able to fill more than half of the midlevel and junior positions in the CPA, and seldom for more than six months at a time. But of those who served, almost everyone worked 80-hour weeks. Bremer was "restrained and judicious" in the use of his extraordinary powers. He followed the best management practices to have emerged from nation-building efforts over previous decades. He did all this largely with Iraqi funds and a staff of perhaps 1,000 in the country at any given time.

Even so, the CPA has come off as a failure in a series of books and articles published since 2004, in large part because it was unable to halt Iraq's descent into civil war. But that task was always beyond Bremer's ability and resources, Dobbins says. He didn't have authority over security; rather, principal responsibility for the dismal U.S. security