Richville, eight of 100 residents would be of Asian descent, compared with five of 100 in Averagetown. About 13 percent of the households would be headed by somebody born in another country, compared with 14 percent for all communities. Nearly 70 percent of adults would have college degrees, compared with 26 percent overall.

Not too many full-time coupon clippers would live in these rarified reaches. Men in these census tracts would be more likely to be working than their counterparts in areas lower on the income ladder; women less likely. But most affluent households—70 percent—do report "unearned" income from interest, dividends, and rents, the authors write. Lee and Marlay were unable to squeeze out precise information on overall wealth—the oceanfront vacation home or the odd private jet—from the data available. But they did find that long before the current housing downturn, the top two percent of houses cost nearly $400,000, compared with just over $100,000 in the average sample census tract. The richest neighborhoods are not likely to be gated communities. Such developments are more often home to people some notches down the wealth ladder and worried about crime.

With a grand total of 74 wealthy census tracts, the Washington metropolitan area tops the list in terms of quantity. Metropolitan New York City is second with 54. Nationwide, there are 764 wealthy neighborhoods as defined by Lee and Marlay's criteria. Interested though most of us are in how the other half lives, the authors note that the evidence produced by their statistical analysis is "rather predictable." But the "modest surprises" offered by the authors' research are somewhat comforting: Even the rich in America tend to hold down jobs, and a substantial number of them are first-generation immigrants.

SOCIETY

New York, Immigration 101

THE SOURCE: "How Exceptional Is New York? Migration and Multiculturalism in the Empire City" by Nancy Foner, in ***Ethnic and Racial Studies***, Nov. 2007.

To understand how New York differs from other cities in the way it deals with immigration, look no further than street parking. New York matter-of-factly bows to its infinite variety of ethnic groups by suspending alternate-side parking restrictions on no fewer than 34 legal and religious holidays, including the Hindu celebration of Diwali, the Muslim holiday of Eid al-Adha, the Catholic feast of the Assumption, the Jewish holiday of Purim, and the Asian Lunar New Year.

A "particular New York way" of absorbing vast numbers of new immigrants has taken root in the city, writes Nancy Foner, a sociologist at Hunter College, in part because New Yorkers have had so much practice in accommodation.

> New Yorkers pride themselves on a tradition of successfully absorbing immigrants, even if the story is not always quite true.

For much of the 20th century, one in five New York residents was foreign born. That figure reached 41 percent in the 1910 census, a level it's again approaching, at 36 percent in the last census. Those New Yorkers who weren't born in a foreign country themselves are likely to have a relative who was, Foner writes.

As a magnet for immigrants, New York may be fortunate that its three million newcomers are not dominated by one group that can gang up on the others. The top three groups—Dominicans, Chinese, and Jamaicans—made up less than 30 percent of all foreign-born people in the five boroughs in 2000. Many immigrants still come from Europe. The countries of the former Soviet Union are the fourth-largest source. Even among blacks—a group often counted as if it were a monolith—there is tremendous diversity. More than a quarter of the city's two million non-Hispanic black residents were born abroad.

New York also has historical advantages, Foner writes. Migration into the boroughs has been steady and diverse for more than a century, unlike some cities that have been surprised by a large recent influx after generations of little change. New York's low-skilled immigrants have been balanced by an equal number of highly skilled newcomers. The city's 51 city council seats, 65 state assembly positions, 25 state senate slots, and 59 community boards—with up to 50 members

each—offer abundant opportunities for ethnic representation.

New Yorkers pride themselves on a tradition of successfully absorbing immigrants, Foner notes, even if the story is not always quite true. They are proud of their innumerable ethnic festivals and parades, their settlement houses, the huge City University of New York, and their ethnic politics. If, as some say, the Italians are yesterday's newcomers and today's establishment, maybe recent immigrants from Latin America and Asia are the "new Italians." And with much of the country's media industry based in New York City, what happens in New York may not stay in New York, but be subtly broadcast throughout the country.

FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE

Time for Plan B

THE SOURCE: "The Case for Restraint" by Barry R. Posen, in ***American Interest***, Nov.–Dec. 2007.

The bickering over the Iraq war has obscured the bigger truth about U.S. foreign policy, writes Barry R. Posen, a political scientist at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Since the end of the Cold War the foreign-policy establishment, though differing over details, has stood solidly behind a "grand strategy" of international activism. Now the results are in: The experiment has failed.

For nearly two decades, Democrats and Republicans alike have supported a policy of maintaining America's overwhelming military superiority, using force under a range of circumstances, employing extraordinary measures to prevent countries from laying their hands on nuclear weapons, and trying to spread democracy.

The nation's vast wealth and technical know-how have tempted policymakers to take action in each of these areas almost simultaneously, even as the costs have escalated. The Pentagon has strained to pacify Iraq, population 27 million. But other potential trouble spots are of a different order of magnitude: Iran has 65 million people; Pakistan, 165 million. Even with the U.S. military confronting weak forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Bush administration has been unable to muster public support to finance its foreign policy; it has largely used the national credit card.

> Since the end of the Cold War, the foreign-policy establishment has stood solidly behind international activism, but the experiment has failed.

And America's enemies have proliferated. No longer faced with one giant military adversary, the United States has been fighting costly battles against minuscule groups—Somalis, Serbs, Al Qaeda—and losing equipment and soldiers at a rate that is unsustainable.

Globalization complicates American foreign policy because it seems to have exacerbated the insecurities of modern capitalism. When industrial capitalism swept across the West in the late 19th century, it created an urbanized citizenry whose members were vulnerable to nationalist, communist, and fascist appeals, Posen says. Similarly, today's globalization is likely to increase the supply of those who might be susceptible to new troubadours of extremism. The consensus policy of weighing in on everything, everywhere, cannot be maintained.

Posen proposes instead a "grand strategy of restraint." The United States should abandon its permanent land bases in Arab countries while relentlessly pursuing Al Qaeda, using its intelligence services rather than the military. It should be a genuine "good guy" internationally, using its great power to help—even more than it has in the past—in disaster relief and other humanitarian interventions under careful guidelines.

American leaders need to develop a more measured view of the risks of nuclear proliferation, Posen writes. "Without