

people consider themselves middle class, no matter what their income. But political scientists have identified a distinct new demographic group perched geographically and economically apart from the hoi polloi. Made up of individuals with the means and inclination to influence the outcomes of congressional races far afield, this small group of wealthy, highly educated urban and suburban residents constitutes the growing donor class.

Today's typical congressional candidate now receives more than two-thirds of all individual donations from people outside the contested district, write James G. Gimpel, Frances E. Lee, and Shanna Pearson-Merkowitz, professor, associate professor, and graduate student in political science, respectively, at the University of Maryland. In fully 18 percent of all congressional districts, candidates receive almost all of their personal checks from beyond the boundaries of the area they are seeking to represent.

The wealthy segregate themselves even more than the poor, and the donor class is concentrated in a few places, including Los Angeles; New York City; suburban Miami-Dade and Broward counties, Florida; Lake County, Illinois; Montgomery County, Maryland; and Bergen County, New Jersey, the authors say. The flow of funds doesn't go from rich to poor or urban to rural, but from the donor class to competitive races wherever they may be.

While political action commit-

tees have been shown to donate to gain access to members of Congress, the new class gives to "make a difference" in party alignment, Gimpel and his colleagues write. The donor class typically ignores primaries. "Distant nonresidents respond unambiguously only to two-party competition," they say. Republican-leaning and Democratic-leaning enclaves are both well represented in the donor class. As the level of competitiveness increases, so do the checks.

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Reformers have expressed concern that the increasing role of nonresident donors obligates members of Congress to favor the priorities of distant givers over the locals they represent. But because of the crucial role of the party in identifying close races and mobilizing tried-and-true contributors, lawmakers are more indebted to the party than to individual donors. Large individual donations from distant locales are, functionally speaking, not individual at all, say the authors. "They are instead extensions of the modern parties' organizations into the electorate."

POLITICS & GOVERNMENT

New Directions in Pork

THE SOURCE: "The Presidential Pork Barrel and the Conditioning Effect of Term" by Andrew J. Taylor, in *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, March 2008.

IF YOU'RE A STATE GOVERNOR with a hankering for a bigger slice of the federal procurement pie, a recent study may point the way.

First, make sure your state is big. "Bigger states get discernibly more procurement per capita," says Andrew J. Taylor, a North Carolina State University political scientist who analyzed procurement contracts from 1984 to 2004. Bigger states have more votes in the Electoral College, electoral votes help presidents get elected (or reelected), and, Taylor points out, "the president and his administration can influence the distribution of procurement contracts greatly." Most of these contracts "are undertaken with the Department of Defense," he adds.

Second, get your people onto a congressional committee. You will see a modest return even if it's just in the House of Representatives, but, Taylor says, "adding a senator to a state's delegation on Appropriations is worth about \$42 per capita in procurement spending; to Armed Services it is worth about \$77." That's no small change if your state has as many people as, say, California. Bonus bucks if your legislator is a member of the party in power.

Third, and this may be the

POLITICS & GOVERNMENT

The Daughters Vote

THE SOURCE: "Female Socialization: How Daughters Affect Their Legislator Fathers' Voting on Women's Issues" by Ebonya L. Washington, in *American Economic Review*, March 2008.

POLITICAL SCIENTISTS HAVE spent decades weighing the factors that sway individual votes in the U.S. House of Representatives: party affiliation, constituent preferences, and a legislator's personal opinions and characteristics. Ebonya L. Washington, an economist at Yale University, has identified another influence: daughters. Each female child a member of the House has, Washington found, significantly increases the likelihood that the legislator will cast a liberal vote, particularly on reproductive rights issues.

Washington used the voting scorecards compiled by the American Association of University Women, the National Organization for Women (NOW), and the National Right to

Life Coalition to gauge the impact of having a female child on votes related to women's issues. All but a few of the legislators were men. Among House members with two children, those with one daughter earned an average score from NOW nine points higher than that of lawmakers with two sons (out of 100 total points). Members with two daughters and no sons scored 18 points more than those with just one daughter. Washington found a similar effect among both Democrats and Republicans, regardless of which organization's scorecard and which Congress she examined. All of the scores were from the 1997–2004 period.

When looking at a legislator's entire voting record, Washington found that having female children was correlated with a propensity to take the liberal side, and the strongest effect was always on legislation concerning reproductive rights. She speculates that legislators think about how their votes will affect people they know personally, so it's not too surprising that people who call them Daddy have a powerful influence.

trickiest to pull off, convince your constituents to vote *against* the sitting president's reelection. Though it may seem counterintuitive, Taylor reports that "states that gave the president less of their popular vote in his reelection received significantly more procurement dollars per capita in his second term." Why? Stressing that his theory is "highly speculative," Taylor thinks the answer may have to do with the peculiar nature of lame-duck politics. Second-term presidents may steer federal dollars toward particular states to "buy legislative votes—rather than popular ones—in support of their agenda." Legislators from states that didn't support the president are "predisposed to oppose the administration," which may make them all the more receptive to procurement pressure. They will support the president—in return for those lucrative contracts—and still reap all the credit from the voters they represent. More pork, anyone?

FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE

Unmasking the Surge

THE SOURCE: "The Price of the Surge" by Steven Simon, in *Foreign Affairs*, May–June 2008.

EVEN THE MOST PARTISAN Democrats in Washington acknowledge that last summer's "surge" of

troops has reduced the killing in Iraq, and some Republicans say the strategy has finally cleared the way for victory. But the tactics that have made Iraqis safer in the short run may have the opposite effect over time, says Steven

Simon, senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.

The surge has lessened the violence only in tandem with home-grown developments, such as the "grim successes" of ethnic cleansing that have driven warring Sunni and Shiite Muslims from mixed neighborhoods and villages, Simon writes. The troop buildup also coincided with a breakdown in the alliance between Sunni tribes and Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia. In the months