

the remaining Marxist-Leninist rulers. Only America's renunciation of its political-economic system and culture can rectify the situation, the radicals say.

Unitary grand explanations for anti-Americanism are futile, Katzenstein and Keohane contend. The phenomenon is too broad and diverse, reflecting the attitudes of America-haters as much as the America they hate. The most puzzling thing about it is why Americans care so much. Americans had an insatiable need for praise in 1835, said Alexis de Tocqueville, and apparently they have not yet had enough. Perhaps, the authors conclude, it is because they lack self-confidence and are uncertain themselves about whether the nation should be a source of pride or dismay. "Anti-Americanism is important for what it tells us about United States foreign policy and America's impact on the world," they write. "It is also important for what it tells us about ourselves."

FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE

The Bad New Era

THE SOURCE: "The New Middle East" by Richard N. Haass, in *Foreign Affairs*, Nov.-Dec. 2006.

THE SUN HAS SET ON THE brief American era in the Middle East, writes Richard N. Haass, president of the Council on Foreign Relations. A modern, Europe-style region marked by democracy, prosperity, and peace will not arise. Instead, the emerging Middle East is far more likely to cause harm to itself, the United States, and the world.

Napoleon's entry into Ottoman Egypt in 1798 with archaeologists,

linguists, and poets in tow opened the region's modern era. The collapse of the Ottoman caliphate at the end of World War I began a second new era of colonial rule, followed by Cold War competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. With the demise of the Soviets, the United States enjoyed unprecedented influence and freedom in the region. But after less than two decades the American period is over, according to Haass.

The principal reason, he writes, is America's decision to attack Iraq. The war stripped power from the Sunni religious minority in Baghdad, which had kept Shi'ite Iran in check, and propelled Iran into position as one of the two strongest countries in the region. Israel, the other strong power, is weakened by its military involvement in Lebanon and will be further weakened if Iran matches Israel's nuclear arsenal.

Haass says America will have more influence in the region than any other country, but its position will be increasingly undermined by competing foreign interests of Europe, China, and Russia. No viable peace process seems likely. "The United States has lost much of its standing as a credible and honest broker," he concludes.

Iraq, at best, will remain a divided society with a weak central government and regular violence. At worst, a civil war will overwhelm Iraq and draw in its neighbors. The price of oil will remain high. Militias will be emboldened by their role in Iraq and the survival of Hezbollah in Lebanon. "Islam will increasingly fill the political and intellectual vacuum in the Arab world," he predicts. Arab regimes will "remain authoritarian

and become more religiously intolerant and anti-American."

The new Middle East will threaten America, but its dangers can be turned up or down by U.S. policies, Haass writes. Relying on military force to remove threatening governments or nuclear installations would make things worse. Counting on democracy to produce friendly regimes is wishful thinking in the short run. Talking to Iran and Syria, reviving diplomacy in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, shoring up America's defenses against terrorism, and reducing dependency on Middle Eastern oil are numbingly familiar ideas and slow to bear fruit. "It is all enough to make one nostalgic for the old Middle East," Haass says.

FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE

Give Peace a Pass

THE SOURCE: "Cowboy Nation" by Robert Kagan, in *The New Republic*, Oct. 23, 2006.

THROUGHOUT THE IDEOLOGICAL vicissitudes of the Clinton and two Bush administrations, the United States deployed troops to or bombed Panama, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq, averaging a new military adventure every 19 months. A new direction? Surprisingly, no. "Americans stand almost alone in believing in the utility and even necessity of war as a means of obtaining justice," writes Robert Kagan, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and author of *Dangerous Nation: America's Place in the World From Its Earliest Days to*

the Dawn of the Twentieth Century (2006).

Kagan's portrait of America is precisely the opposite of its self-perception. "The United States, as the world knows, will never start a war," said President John F. Kennedy at the height of the Cold War. "The United States is a peaceful nation." Indeed, as America struggles militarily in Iraq and Afghanistan, Kagan says, there is a sense that the nation has gone astray, becoming too militaristic, too idealistic, and too arrogant. It has become an empire rather than the reluctant good neighbor that seeks only peace and stability.

From its march down the *Mayflower* gangplank to its toppling of the Saddam Hussein statue, Amer-

ica has been a revolutionary power, consistently expanding its participation and influence in the world, Kagan argues. From the 1740s through the 1820s, Americans pressed westward from the Alleghenies to the Pacific, southward to Florida and Mexico, and northward to Canada, eventually subduing the native Indians as well as pushing France, Spain, and Russia off the continent. Only Great Britain managed to hang on, clinging to the northern latitudes.

This did not happen by accident. Thomas Jefferson saw a vast "empire of liberty." Secretary of State William Seward predicted that America would become the world's dominant power, "greater than any that has ever existed." Dean Acheson called the

United States "the locomotive at the head of mankind," and Madeleine Albright said it was the world's "indispensable nation."

Americans decry war. They are uncomfortable with using war to achieve their objectives, suspicious of power (even their own), uneasy with using influence to deprive others of freedom, and disapproving of ambition. So they compose comforting narratives of their imagined innocent past.

"It is easier than facing the hard truth," writes Kagan. "America's expansiveness, intrusiveness, and tendency toward political, economic, and strategic dominance are not some aberration from our true nature. That *is* our nature."

POLITICS & GOVERNMENT

The Stealth Amendment

THE SOURCE: "Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict, and Constitutional Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA" by Reva B. Siegel, in *California Law Review*, Oct. 2006.

IN 1982, AS TIME RAN OUT ON the drive to ratify the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA), supporters fought desperately to win over the necessary last three states. They appealed to the Supreme Court, sued in state courts, organized marches, sponsored boycotts, sought extensions, and fended off efforts to rescind state ratifications. And when their efforts finally fell short, they reintroduced the legislation. All for naught.

Except that some scholars now believe that America has a de facto ERA, according to Reva B. Siegel, a Yale law professor. The unsuccessful fight to pass and ratify a constitutional amendment to prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex so changed the "constitutional culture" of the country that courts, and even conservative judges, began interpreting the existing Fourteenth Amendment as if it did forbid such discrimination.

"There is no practical difference between what has evolved and the ERA," Siegel writes, quoting Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg from a newspaper article. "As a result of

dramatic post-1970s changes in judicial interpretation of the equal protection clause," University of Chicago law professor Cass Sunstein wrote in *The Second Bill of Rights* (2004), "the American constitution now has something very much like a constitutional ban on sex discrimination."

In the first century after the 1868 ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, which guarantees equal protection under the law, "no court interpreted the Constitution to prohibit state action favoring men over women," Siegel writes. Governments could—and did—bar women from practicing law, exclude women from juries, and prohibit women from working in the same occupations as men. Without exception, courts found the prohibitions to be perfectly reasonable exercises of public power.