

continues under his son. Political parties are free to vie for an electoral role so long as they don't oppose the monarchy—which makes for authoritarianism of a comparatively mild sort. Howe is especially acute in her assessment of the multiple groups contending for political legitimacy in the name of Islam.

Though she has only limited knowledge of the daily lives of ordinary Moroccans, Howe recognizes the difficulties they face. A fifth of the population lives below the poverty line; half the population is illiterate (schools are cherished but sparse); four million people live in slums; the unemployment rate is 10 percent nationwide and closer to 20 percent in some cities; and the gap between rich and poor continues to widen. At the same time, the policies of the Bush administration give Moroccans repeated opportunities to mount anti-American protests that are often, in actuality, vehicles for critiques of their own system. The king may find his ability to maintain order tested by events such as the Casablanca bombing of 2003, which killed 45 people.

Yet Morocco has significant strengths as well, including a diverse economic base, substantial remittances from Moroccans working abroad, and the harrowing example of Algeria next door, as well as a close-knit society and generally responsive institutions. All of this gives many Moroccans a sense of optimism that can mystify outsiders—but not Howe, who cautiously shares their hope.

As she notes, King Hassan used to say that “Moroccans are not a people of excess.” But he also spoke of Morocco as a lion tethered to him: Sometimes it pulled him, and sometimes he had to jerk the chain and try to lead it. With many Arab states backing away from their modest promises of liberalization, and with many of their citizens more concerned about peace and order than individual liberties, the Moroccan lion and its keeper will continue to lurch onward. But who will be doing the pulling remains uncertain.

—Lawrence Rosen

## Beyond Humanitarianism

WITH A FEW NOTABLE EXCEPTIONS—Chester Crocker in the Reagan administration, Herman Cohen under the first President Bush, and Princeton Lyman in the Clinton administration—Africa specialists in the U.S. government take an

almost perverse pride in the idiosyncratic nature of their portfolios. Although poverty, disease, and conflict are hardly strangers to many areas of the globe, only with respect to Africa do these scourges frame American policy. Africa is needy—and nothing else. In his contribution to *Africa-U.S. Relations*, Lyman blames this myopia partly on the news media, which call our attention to Africa only when catastrophe strikes: “drought and famine in Ethiopia, brutal amputations in Sierra Leone, land mines claiming the lives of children in Angola and Mozambique, and racial and ethnic cleansing in Darfur.”

After a natural or human disaster, the United States may pump hundreds of millions of dollars into relief efforts. Many advocates for Africa no doubt derive satisfaction from the fact that their work is driven by humanitarian and moral concerns untainted by geopolitical or economic interests. However, the continent-in-need approach essentially pushes Africa to the bottom of the U.S. foreign-policy agenda, a fact underscored by the scant time and resources that both Democratic and Republican administrations devote to it in comparison with other regions of the world.

Noble as it is, the humanitarian impulse simply doesn't have the sustainability of national interest and other traditional elements of state-

### AFRICA-U.S. RELATIONS: Strategic Encounters.

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craft. Consequently, the American government has made few long-term investments in Africa, especially post-Cold War, now that there's no danger of dominoes falling to the Soviets. Further, the trauma of American casualties during the 1992-94 humanitarian mission to Somalia—especially the deaths of 18 soldiers during the episode made famous by Mark Bowden's *Black Hawk Down* (1999) and its movie adaptation—eliminated any possibility that the Clinton administration would move beyond the usual neglect. Campaigning to succeed Clinton, George W. Bush went so far as to declare Africa strategically insignificant to the United States.

However, several factors have shifted the geostrategic calculus since Bush took office: growing hydrocarbon production in West Africa, the availability of ports and airfields along the littoral of East Africa, and, post-9/11, concern about transnational terrorist networks penetrating southward from North Africa. In this book, Donald Rothchild and Edmond J. Keller, political scientists at, respectively, the University of California, Davis, and the University of California, Los Angeles, bring together American and African scholars to consider a new model for American relations with Africa. Essays in the book focus on security issues, such as terrorism and ethnic conflict; social problems, such as HIV/AIDS and the environment; and economic troubles, such as trade policy and debt. While many of the authors continue to regard the continent as an object of humanitarian and moral solicitude—as does President Bush on some issues, most notably HIV/AIDS—they also recognize the connection between America's strategic concerns and Africa's needs in terms of human security. As Keller writes, "The United States has a vital interest in strengthening the military and intelligence capacities of poor countries like the ones we find in Africa. For their part, African countries could measurably improve their ability to solve problems of peace and security with the aid of the United States." Such efforts are already under way. Since 2002, for example, the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa has

worked with the governments of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen to keep the peace and enhance security.

To be sure, many experts still see pursuing self-interest and alleviating suffering as mutually exclusive, and their linkage as ethically suspect or, at the very least, unrealistic. Even some of the authors here come across as hesitant in their efforts to balance mundane national interests (both African and American) with more idealistic visions of humanitarianism. Change will be gradual, but solid works like this one may hasten it.

—J. Peter Pham

## HISTORY

### Champion of Liberalism

THE PASSING OF RICHARD Hofstadter, felled by leukemia at 54, was a sad loss for American scholarship. His masterly studies of American political thinking—including *The American Political Tradition and the Men Who Made It* (1948), *The Age of Reform* (1955), and *Anti-Intellectualism in American Life* (1963)—constitute an enduring legacy, as does the work of the talented and prolific successors he trained at Columbia University, such as Robert Dallek, Lawrence W. Levine, and the late Christopher Lasch. All the more tragic, then, that when he died, Hofstadter had barely begun what was to be his masterwork, a three-volume history of America's political culture from 1750 onward.

Hofstadter (1916-70) made his reputation in the 1950s by attacking the Progressive historians, notably Frederick Jackson Turner, Charles Beard, and Vernon Parrington, for imagining an America riven by class conflict. Shocked by the emergence of the "radical right," he exposed its hyperpatriotism as a populist expression of "status anxiety." Ironically, though, he found his work under attack from the New Left in the late 1960s. Younger historians, drawn to the neglected

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An Intellectual  
Biography.

By David S. Brown. Univ.  
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291 pp. \$27.50