election shows. "Radical Islamism is a byproduct of modernization itself, arising from the loss of identity that accompanies the transition to a modern, pluralist society." Yet even without U.S. encouragement, "greater political participation by Islamist groups" is probably inevitable, and "will be the only way that the poison of radical Islamism can ultimately work its way through the body politic of Muslim communities around the world." The realists' prescription of striking deals with friendly authoritarians to keep a lid on things simply won't work anymore.

Finally, Fukuyama believes that the United States must commit itself to building effective new international organizations. He dismisses the United Nations as unreformable, saying that it lacks "both democratic legitimacy and effectiveness in dealing with serious security issues," but he also thinks that the ad hoc "coalitions of the willing" the United States has assembled in Iraq and elsewhere lack international legitimacy. Washington should instead "promote what has been emerging in any event, a 'multi-multilateral world' of overlapping and occasionally competing international institutions that are organized on regional or functional lines." NATO is an example. An East Asian counterpart might be useful.

"What is needed now," Fukuyama concludes, "are new ideas . . . for how America is to relate to the rest of the world—ideas that retain the neoconservative belief in the universality of human rights, but without its illusions about the efficacy of American power and hegemony."

POLITICS & GOVERNMENT

The Limits of Limits

THE SOURCE: "The Truth About Term Limits" by Alan Greenblatt, in ***Governing***, Jan. 2006; "The Effects of Term Limits on State Legislatures: A New Survey of the 50 States" by John M. Carey et al., in ***Legislative Studies Quarterly***, Feb. 2006.

It's been a decade since term limits began taking effect in state legislatures, and in the capitals of the dozen states where they are in force, it's apparent who the big winners have been: the governors and the executive bureaucracies. "The crumbling of legislative power is clear" in those states, one political scientist tells *Governing* staff writer Alan Greenblatt.

The legislators' inexperience and lack of relevant knowledge put them at a decided disadvantage vis-à-vis the executive branch, as does the desire of many to land top-level state jobs once their short stints as lawmakers end. Several studies in California and elsewhere have found that term-limited legislators make far fewer changes in governors' proposed budgets than their predecessors did.

One southern legislator-turned-lobbyist tells Greenblatt why he often bypasses the legislature and goes directly to agency officials. "There are some legislators who know as much as agency people do," the lobbyist explains, "but they're few and far between and they'll be gone very quickly. Agency heads . . . can outwait and outlast anyone and everyone on the playing field and they have consolidated their power."

In 1990, voters in California, Colorado, and Oklahoma made their states the first to adopt term limits for lawmakers. Eighteen other states followed suit, but their numbers were reduced by court reversals and legislative changes of heart. Twelve states now have term limits, and they are scheduled to go into effect in three others.

In the old days, legislative leaders often held sway for more than a decade, far longer than the governors usually did. Now the leaders' time at the helm is fleeting. Freshman legislators in the Florida House have taken to immediately selecting the speaker who will lead them five years hence. But those anointed are essentially lame ducks even before they take office.

A 2002 survey of state legislators by political scientist John M. Carey of Dartmouth College and three colleagues found that those in term-limited chambers were less responsive to their constituents and spent less time securing money and projects for their districts than legislators in other states. By their own accounts at least, the term-limited lawmakers paid more heed to their own consciences and to the needs of the state as a whole—an effect that Carey and his colleagues label a "Burkean shift," after the 18th-century Anglo-Irish legislator Edmund Burke, who advocated just such a stance.

Some dire predictions made when term limits were introduced have

proven off the mark. Lobbyists haven't gained the upper hand, Greenblatt notes. "Term limits have been a mixed bag for lobbyists, who must introduce themselves to a new, skeptical set of legislators every couple of years. . . . Nor is there much evidence that legislative staff have taken advantage of member turnover to impose their own views on inexperienced legislators." Staff turnover is often as great as turnover among lawmakers.

Among the legislators, staff, lobbyists, and reporters who work in the state capitals, however, the opinion is "nearly universal . . . that term limits are obstacles to careful legislation and effective oversight," reports Greenblatt. "Travel a bit farther from the capital, though, and you get a different point of view." As political scientist Alan Rosenthal, of Rutgers University, puts it: "The public voted initially for term limits because they don't like politicians and political institutions. That disfavor has continued."

POLITICS & GOVERNMENT

Partied Out

THE SOURCE: "Public Images of Political Parties: A Necessary Evil?" by Russell J. Dalton and Steven A. Weldon, in ***West European Politics***, Nov. 2005.

WHAT'S WIDELY CONSIDERED ESSENTIAL to representative democracy, yet looked upon with growing distrust in modern democracies? The political party. No one's writing its obituary yet, but the distrust has some unsettling implications, argue Russell J. Dalton, a political scientist at the University of California, Irvine, and Steven A. Weldon, a graduate student there.

The pervasive distrust is obvious in opinion polls. Respondents in 17 of 20

> In the European Union, the public judged political parties less trustworthy than corporations.

Western democracies surveyed in 2004 identified political parties as the institutions most affected by corruption. In surveys conducted between 1996 and 2000 in 13 advanced industrial democracies, only 30 percent of those polled (38 percent in the United States) said they believed that parties care what ordinary people think.

It's not only the parties that are in bad odor with the public. But in the European Union, the public judged political parties the least trustworthy of a long list of institutions in annual surveys between 1997 and 2004. They won the trust of only an average of 17 percent of the EU population. Even big corporations, with the second-lowest trust level, did much better than that, passing muster with 33 percent of those polled.

What difference does the distrust make? It reduces voter turnout, for one thing. Still, most people who are cynical about political parties continue to go to the polls. Some in Denmark and elsewhere opt for far-right "antiparty" parties. (Far-left parties seem to have much less appeal to distrustful voters except in countries where there's no far-right alternative, such as Sweden.) Most distrusters tend to hold their noses and vote for an established party, usually one that's out of power. In the 1996–2000 surveys of 13 industrial democracies, only 16 percent of the distrusters did not vote. In the United States, however, that number rose to 30 percent.

Particular national conditions and scandals explain some of what's occurring, but the spreading dissatisfaction is "a general pattern across the Western democracies," say Dalton and Weldon.

Distrust of political parties is not confined to the United States. In one survey of people in advanced democracies, only 30 percent said that the parties care what ordinary people think.