

in the politics of developing countries, can they still claim to be disinterested representatives of humanity, or are they, as a growing number of critics in those countries claim, merely part of an effort to impose Western values on the world?

Humanitarianism, in other words, doesn't seem to be wearing a snow-white hat anymore.

FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE

A 'Realistic Wilsonianism'

THE SOURCE: "After Neoconservatism" by Francis Fukuyama, in *The New York Times Magazine*, Feb. 19, 2006.

WHEN THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION ends three years from now, so, in all likelihood, will the effective life of neo-

conservatism, the ideology that inspired the war in Iraq. Francis Fukuyama, the onetime neoconservative oracle, writes that neoconservatism "has evolved into something I can no longer support." But it would be "a huge tragedy" if, in reaction to neoconservative overreaching in Iraq, America retreats from the Wilsonian ideals of democracy and human rights that the movement embodied and embraces instead either isolationism or "narrow and cynical" Kissingerian foreign-policy "realism."

"The problem with neoconservatism's agenda lies not in its ends, which are as American as apple pie, but rather in the overmilitarized means by which it has sought to accomplish them," Fukuyama argues.

The "war against terrorism," for example, is the wrong name and the

wrong concept for what must be a long-term struggle for the "hearts and minds of ordinary Muslims around the world." Contrary to what many "realists" argue, it is in America's interest to continue to promote good governance abroad:

Democracy, the rule of law, and economic development are "critical to a host of outcomes we desire, from alleviating poverty to dealing with pandemics to controlling violent conflicts." Yet the United States shouldn't imagine that it can impose democracy where it is not wanted; it can only cultivate favorable conditions.

Contrary to neoconservative hopes, democracy and modernization in the Middle East will not solve the problem of jihadist terrorism. In the short run, they will likely exacerbate tensions, as Hamas's victory in the recent Palestinian

EXCERPT

The Shame of Darfur

During the Holocaust, the world looked the other way. Allied leaders turned down repeated pleas to bomb the Nazi extermination camps or the rail lines leading to them, and the slaughter attracted little attention. My newspaper, The New York Times, provided meticulous coverage of World War II, but of 24,000 front-page stories published in that period only six referred on page one directly to the Nazi assault on the Jewish population of Europe. Only afterward did many people mourn the death of Anne Frank, construct Holocaust museums, and vow: Never Again.

The same paralysis occurred as Rwandans were being slaughtered in 1994. Officials from Europe to the U.S. to the UN headquarters all responded by temporizing and then, at most, by holding meetings. The only thing President Clinton did for Rwandan genocide victims was issue a magnificent apology after they were dead.

Much the same has been true of the Western response to the Armenian genocide of 1915, the Cambodian genocide of the 1970s, and the Bosnian massacres of the 1990s. In each case, we have wrung our hands afterward and offered the lame excuse that it all happened too fast, or that we didn't fully comprehend the carnage when it was still under way.

And now the same tragedy is unfolding in Darfur, but this time we don't even have any sort of excuse. In Darfur genocide is taking place in slow motion, and there is vast documentary proof of the atrocities. . . .

In my years as a journalist, I thought I had seen a full kaleidoscope of horrors, from babies dying of malaria to Chinese troops shooting students to Indonesian mobs beheading people. But nothing prepared me for Darfur, where systematic murder, rape, and mutilation are taking place on a vast scale, based simply on the tribe of the victim. What I saw reminded me why people say that genocide is the worst evil of which human beings are capable.

—NICHOLAS KRISTOF, columnist for *The New York Times*, in *The New York Review of Books* (Feb. 9, 2006)

election shows. “Radical Islamism is a byproduct of modernization itself, arising from the loss of identity that accompanies the transition to a modern, pluralist society.” Yet even without U.S. encouragement, “greater political participation by Islamist groups” is probably inevitable, and “will be the only way that the poison of radical Islamism can ultimately work its way through the body politic of Muslim communities around the world.” The realists’ prescription of striking deals with friendly authoritarians to keep a lid on

things simply won’t work anymore.

Finally, Fukuyama believes that the United States must commit itself to building effective new international organizations. He dismisses the United Nations as unreformable, saying that it lacks “both democratic legitimacy and effectiveness in dealing with serious security issues,” but he also thinks that the ad hoc “coalitions of the willing” the United States has assembled in Iraq and elsewhere lack international legitimacy. Washington should instead “promote what has been emerging in any

event, a ‘multi-multilateral world’ of overlapping and occasionally competing international institutions that are organized on regional or functional lines.” NATO is an example. An East Asian counterpart might be useful.

“What is needed now,” Fukuyama concludes, “are new ideas . . . for how America is to relate to the rest of the world—ideas that retain the neoconservative belief in the universality of human rights, but without its illusions about the efficacy of American power and hegemony.”

POLITICS & GOVERNMENT

The Limits of Limits

THE SOURCE: “The Truth About Term Limits” by Alan Greenblatt, in *Governing*, Jan. 2006; “The Effects of Term Limits on State Legislatures: A New Survey of the 50 States” by John M. Carey et al., in *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, Feb. 2006.

IT’S BEEN A DECADE SINCE TERM limits began taking effect in state legislatures, and in the capitals of the dozen states where they are in force, it’s apparent who the big winners have been: the governors and the executive bureaucracies. “The crumbling of legislative power is clear” in those states, one political scientist tells *Governing* staff writer Alan Greenblatt.

The legislators’ inexperience and lack of relevant knowledge put them at a decided disadvantage vis-à-vis the executive branch, as does the desire of many to land top-level state jobs once their short stints as lawmakers end. Several studies in California and elsewhere have found that term-limited

legislators make far fewer changes in governors’ proposed budgets than their predecessors did.

One southern legislator-turned-lobbyist tells Greenblatt why he often bypasses the legislature and goes directly to agency officials. “There are some legislators who know as much as agency people do,” the lobbyist explains, “but they’re few and far between and they’ll be gone very quickly. Agency heads . . . can outwait and outlast anyone and everyone on the playing field and they have consolidated their power.”

In 1990, voters in California, Colorado, and Oklahoma made their states the first to adopt term limits for lawmakers. Eighteen other states followed suit, but their numbers were reduced by court reversals and legislative changes of heart. Twelve states now have term limits, and they are scheduled to go into effect in three others.

In the old days, legislative leaders often held sway for more than a decade, far longer than the governors usually did. Now the leaders’ time at the helm is fleeting. Freshman legislators in the Florida House have taken to immediately selecting the speaker who will lead them five years hence. But those anointed are essentially lame ducks even before they take office.

A 2002 survey of state legislators by political scientist John M. Carey of Dartmouth College and three colleagues found that those in term-limited chambers were less responsive to their constituents and spent less time securing money and projects for their districts than legislators in other states. By their own accounts at least, the term-limited lawmakers paid more heed to their own consciences and to the needs of the state as a whole—an effect that Carey and his colleagues label a “Burkean shift,” after the 18th-century Anglo-Irish legislator Edmund Burke, who advocated just such a stance.

Some dire predictions made when term limits were introduced have