

**OTHER NATIONS**

Neither Moscow nor Peking has resolved the minority question, says Tillet, though they have employed similar tactics: development of minority cadres, periodic purges of local leaders, and forced assimilation through resettlement. (Russian Kazakhs now constitute only 43 percent of the population of the Kazakh Republic; Chinese Mongols, less than 10 percent of Inner Mongolia's inhabitants.)

Recurrent ethnic nationalism may encourage the two communist rivals to use the nationalities to provoke border clashes under the guise of "liberation" and "ethnic unity." Yet these ethnic groups could also have a "damping effect": In the event of war, Russia and China would have to divert troops to control independence-minded minorities. Neither side, Tillet adds, has forgotten ethnic collaboration (by Ukrainians and Mongols, among others) with German and Japanese invaders during World War II.

### *Beirut's Road to Recovery*

"An Appraisal of Lebanon's Postwar Economic Development and a Look to the Future" by Samir A. Makdisi, in *The Middle East Journal* (vol. 31, no. 3, 1977), 1761 N St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

The long-range economic setback suffered by Lebanon during its 1975-76 civil war can only be estimated, but the magnitude of the devastation is clear. Damage to factories, businesses, and other physical assets totaled at least \$16 billion; national income dropped from \$18 billion in 1974 to \$7 billion in 1976; transportation, trade, and banking were severely disrupted. The challenge now facing Lebanese officials, writes Makdisi, an economist at the American University of Beirut, is to begin the social and economic reforms the country has needed since World War II.

From 1950 to 1974, Lebanon achieved remarkable economic expansion. Nonrestrictive foreign trade policies, a flexible exchange rate for the Lebanese pound, and political stability attracted foreign capital and fostered Beirut's role as an international commercial and banking center.

But little attention was paid to income redistribution. (Less than 18 percent of the Lebanese earned more than the national average in the 1960s, compared to 35-40 percent in the United States, Denmark, and even Italy.) Only 8 percent of public investment from 1964 to 1971 went for such needs as inexpensive health care, low-cost housing, and education. Although increased attention to these concerns was evident in the government's Six-Year Plan (1972-77), war broke out before its goals could be achieved.

A "special duality," says Makdisi, has long marred Lebanon's economic development: coexistence of a vigorous private sector and a lagging public sector. But he cautions that attempts to readjust the balance must preserve the "enterprising elements" on which Lebanon's prosperity depends.