

## FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE

good. But in 1973, the Arabs were willing to risk military defeat to improve their international political position. Thus, paradox 2: The more risky the attack, the less risky it really may be.

During 1967-73, Washington and Moscow moved toward détente, leading Israel to believe that the Russians favored negotiation over aggression by their Arab allies. Meanwhile, Handel notes, Israel committed an intelligence error by imputing its own strategic theory to the enemy. It assumed that Egypt and Syria would contest Israel's air superiority with jet fighters rather than negate it by effective use of new Soviet ground-to-air missiles. Paradox 3: A quiet international environment is an ideal cover for war preparations. And 4: The better the intelligence service, the greater the risk of relying on its detailed but faulty findings.

The decision to initiate war, Handel concludes, is not always dictated by a capability to win. While analysis can certainly be improved, any nation's best protection against surprise attacks, he contends, is a system of deployment that assumes "no warning time at all."

### *Let's Just Be Rivals*

"A Cooling-Off Period for U.S.-Soviet Relations" by Seyom Brown, in *Foreign Policy* (Fall 1977), 155 Allen Blvd., Farmingdale, N.Y. 11735.

U.S.-Soviet relations have cooled during the Carter administration, and the cause, to many critics, seems as obvious as the fact itself: President Carter's allegedly inexperienced, self-righteous diplomacy. Brown, director of the U.S.-Soviet relations program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, disagrees. The present difficulties, he argues, stem from widely held misconceptions about the nature of U.S.-Soviet interdependence.

Over the past decade, both Washington and Moscow have attempted to load the negotiating table with more than it could hold. On the agenda have been (1) stabilization of the political status quo in Europe, (2) a slowdown of the arms race, (3) expansion of the East-West trade, and (4) avoidance of a Soviet-American showdown in the Middle East. Not only are these questions complex in themselves, says Brown, but their final resolution is often beyond the power of both governments, even when acting in concert. In the Mideast, for example, both the United States and the U.S.S.R. are to a large degree at the mercy of local events.

A second reality is that material and nonmaterial interests can never really be separated. If, as some scholars maintain, the White House and the Kremlin share a "confluence of interest" in certain economic and strategic matters, a wide ideological chasm still exists between the two superpowers. Opposing world views, Brown believes, produce recurrent suspicions in both Washington and Moscow that détente really gives the other side an advantage. As a result, both governments are tempted to "score against each other in the persisting rivalry for global ascendancy."

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The disease may turn out to be the cure, says Brown. U.S.-Soviet relations are cooling—and rightly so. Each side must lower its expectations by agreeing to disagree on certain issues. Only such an injection of realism can sustain genuine, if modest, progress.

### *The Navy's V/STOL Plan*

"The Transition to V/STOL" by James L. Holloway III, in *Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute* (Sept. 1977), Annapolis, Md. 21402.

Without fanfare, the U.S. Navy decided in 1976 to move from reliance on conventional jet fighters taking off from big flat-tops like the *Forrestal* and the *Nimitz* to development of new "vertical or short take-off and landing" (V/STOL) jets capable of operating almost like helicopters from small carriers and other ships throughout the fleet.

However, writes Admiral Holloway, chief of naval operations, this revolutionary transition to a "pure" V/STOL force will take time. Meanwhile, the Navy's 12-carrier force, America's "margin of difference" over the growing Soviet fleet, must be maintained through the 1980s as new V/STOL aircraft replace the current generation of jet fighters.

Using V/STOL planes, like the Marines' AV-8 Harrier, will reduce both complexity and cost. No longer will aircraft carriers need powerful catapults, large angled decks, arresting mechanisms, and overhangs. But the new jets are still two decades away from full deployment. Navy designers have yet to develop V/STOL fighters with the speed, range, payload, and all-weather flying capability to match today's U.S. carrier aircraft.

### *Stemming the Arms Drain*

"Foreign Military Sales—A Potential Drain on the U.S. Defense Posture," Comptroller General's Report to Congress (Sept. 1977), General Accounting Office, 441 G St., N.W., Washington 20013.

Discussions of U.S. weapons sales to foreign governments—including the Carter administration's recent proposed cutbacks in military aid—stress the role of these sales as a tool of foreign policy. But according to the General Accounting Office (GAO), they may be creating problems for U.S. defense policy as well.

Sales of U.S. military equipment to foreign buyers have jumped by more than 1,000 percent in 7 years: from \$952 million in 1970 to over \$10 billion today. The United States now dominates the world arms market, in part because it offers high-technology weaponry, in part because American industry needs foreign business to offset slackened U.S. weapons purchases since the end of the Vietnam War. More than half of all arms transactions now involve the United States. The chief