
an account of the unearthing of an ancient capital of the Yin-Shang dynasty dating back to the second millennium B.C. The 1937 Japanese invasion halted Li Chi's work, but not before royal tombs, ritual vessels, chariot burials, stone carvings, weapons, and thousands of the inscribed tortoise shells were uncovered. The Yin-Shang culture, based on grain growing and the domestication of cattle, was highly religious. The Anyang excavations produced evidence of "some kind of sacrificial ritual that had to be performed every day of the year." Many tombs contained human bones and skulls that suggested ceremonial mutilation. Others held the skeletons of horses, elephants, dogs, even birds.

**AMERICAN SOCIALISM
AND BLACK AMERICANS:
From the Age of Jackson to
World War II**

by Philip S. Foner
Greenwood, 1977
462 pp. \$22.95
L of C 77-71858
ISBN 0-8371-9545-4

Few American historians have studied the relationship between white leftist radicals and blacks. And for good reason. American socialists of various stripes shared certain racist attitudes with their more conservative countrymen, a condition that resulted in a wavering and evasive policy toward "the Negro question." While granting that the Socialist Party often duped blacks, Foner rounds out the story with his focus on black socialists, especially West Indian-born New Yorkers W. A. Domingo, Otto Huiswood, and Cyril Briggs. In passing, he also touches upon many neglected and half-hidden political relationships among white radicals, such as the link between America's Fourier utopians of the 1840s and the abolitionists. Coming next from Foner: a volume on black Americans and the communists.


**A SAVAGE WAR OF
PEACE: Algeria 1954-1962**

by Alistair Horne
Viking, 1978, 640 pp. \$19.95
L of C 77-21518
ISBN 0-670-61964-7

The Moslem nationalist rebellion against *Algérie Française* shook apart the French Fourth Republic, brought Charles De Gaulle back to power in Paris, and, finally, at heavy cost, ended 132 years of French colonial rule. The 500,000-man French Army in Algeria won militarily, but France could not win politically. Horne, a British historian, provides the first comprehensive chronicle of the war in English. Vividly describing the long, cruel

**GOLOMBEK'S ENCYCLO-
PEDIA OF CHESS**

by Harry Golombek
 Crown, 1978, 360 pp. \$14.95
 L of C 77-7635
 ISBN 0-517-53146-1



Mediterranean drama with all its betrayals, blunders, and illusions, he conveys the intensity of the protagonists' passions without sharing them or holding them up to scorn.

"Chess is a lake in which a gnat may bathe and an elephant may drown." The Indian proverb applies to encyclopedias as well. But in this one, British chess master Harry Golombek swims gracefully through rules, tournaments, history, and biography. His tales of battling giants like Russia's Tigran Petrosian and America's Bobby Fischer convey an almost epic sense of the game. He acknowledges its Walter Mitty aspects: In Budapest in 1960, blindfolded Hungarian János Flesch played 52 players simultaneously; he won 31 games, lost 3, and drew the rest. Golombek is at his best explaining the classic problems. Here, for example, is a problem (mate in five) composed by Sam Loyd in 1858 to confound a boastful player. Loyd bet the man a dinner that he could not say which White piece (opposite) would *not* give the mate.

Hint: The man selected QNP as the most unlikely—and paid for the dinner. To find out why, see page 192.

**SOLDIERS, STATESMEN,
AND COLD WAR CRISES**

by Richard K. Betts
 Harvard, 1977, 292 pp. \$15
 L of C 77-8068
 ISBN 0-674-81741-9

Do the U.S. military brass always urge a more aggressive policy than the President's top civilian advisers? No, says Richard K. Betts of Brookings in this eye-opening scholarly study. He examines the advisory role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and lesser military men during each of some 20 Cold War crises, ranging from the Korean War and the 1961 Berlin crisis to Vietnam and the North Korean seizure of the *Pueblo* in 1968. Each service chief's views were shaped in part by his own service's organization and doctrine. But by and large the military were no *more* eager to intervene in crises abroad than the top civilians, and were sometimes *less* eager, as in the case of Laos in 1961. Once U.S. troops were in battle, however, the military tended to urge