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to Angola were reservists; their mobilization took away key personnel from civil aviation and civilian Communist Party cadres. While there is no reliable evidence of strong popular opposition to the Angolan undertaking, Castro hinted in a report to the Party Congress in January 1976 that some factory managers resisted the call-up of certain specialists, claiming they were indispensable to production. "It is necessary," Castro told the Congress, "to combat the occasionally exaggerated criteria as to who cannot be dispensed with in production."

Close analysis of the Cuban military press and a careful reading of Castro's speeches, says Dominguez, suggest that the Angolan operation has provoked some troop insubordination, grumbling among the Cuban people over compulsory military service, and additional strain on the already touchy relations between the Communist Party cadres and professional military officers. Cuba's military involvement in Africa, of course, has sharply increased.

The Outcasts

"The Pariah State Syndrome" by Robert E. Harkavy, in *Orbis* (Fall 1977), 3508 Market St., Philadelphia, Pa. 19104.

For various historical and ideological reasons, Israel, South Africa, Taiwan, and South Korea now share the peculiar attributes of "pariahhood" marked by extreme diplomatic isolation and "widespread, obsessive, and unrelenting global opprobrium."

As "pariah states," all four nations are militarily exposed, lack legitimacy in the eyes of much of the Third World, have weak diplomatic leverage, and must depend on precarious sources of arms. And all are opposed by important powers or blocs. In addition, says Harkavy, a Cornell Senior Research Fellow, two of them—Israel and South Africa—must seriously consider the likelihood of suffering wholesale massacres in the event of military defeat.

These conditions, the author argues, inevitably compel "pariah states" to consider acquiring a nuclear capability. Three of the four (all but South Korea) have scientific establishments that might produce an indigenous nuclear weapon (Israel is widely believed to have already produced one).

Joint nuclear efforts cannot be ruled out. The pariah states have reluctantly begun to identify themselves as a group and there is already some military collaboration (e.g., Israel's sales of missile patrol boats to South Africa and Shafir air-to-air missiles to Taiwan). The 1976 visit to Israel of South African Prime Minister John Vorster gave rise to speculation about a possible Israeli-South African nuclear axis. Israel presumably has a weapons design capability, while South Africa has vast raw uranium reserves and a procedure for the separation of U-235. Less likely, but not to be ruled out, is nuclear collaboration between Taiwan and South Korea, or between them and the other two pariahs.

The nuclear aspirations of these countries, Harkavy observes, pose some painful dilemmas for both the United States and the Soviet Un-

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ion, whose leaders currently share a mutual interest in nonproliferation. The problem for the United States, which has traditional ties to the four principal pariahs, is especially acute. Washington can threaten to withdraw essential support to forestall proliferation. But a further decline in U.S. backing, says Harkavy, "particularly in the context of growing U.S. military weakness, vacillation and isolationism, might lend greater impetus to proliferation."

The Proxy War

"Western Sahara: The Diplomatic Perspectives" by Robert A. Mortimer, in *Africa Report* (Mar.-Apr. 1978), Transaction Periodicals Consortium, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, N.J. 08903.

The battle over the desolate Western Sahara continues to escalate militarily and diplomatically, pitting Morocco and Mauritania against the Polisario—the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguiet el-Hamra and Rio de Oro.

After Spain handed Western Sahara over to Morocco and Mauritania in 1976, in defiance of United Nations calls for a UN-supervised referendum, thousands of Western Saharans fled east to Algeria while Morocco and Mauritania carved up their newly acquired, mineral-rich territory.

The Polisario guerrillas, armed by Algeria, spread the fighting into desert regions of southern Morocco and Mauritania, which was forced to call on France for military and financial aid.

But the real protagonists are Algeria and Morocco, says Mortimer, a Haverford College political scientist. The region has rich phosphate reserves, but the big stake for Morocco's King Hassan is political; he has exploited the fight to build domestic support for the monarchy and a setback would undermine his regime. To Algiers, the stakes seem equally high. A larger, more powerful Morocco, buttressed by Mauritania, would strengthen what Algeria sees as a plot "to encircle the Algerian revolution," Mortimer writes.

Here, as elsewhere, the Organization of African Unity has been stalemated by a split between moderates and radicals. Morocco and Mauritania have gained support from Senegal, Zaire, and other moder-

Polisario guerrillas challenge Morocco and Mauritania for control of Spain's mineral-rich former colony.

