


**OTHER NATIONS**



epidemic took 18,000 lives, one-third of the island's population at that time. Famine and disease in the aftermath of volcanic eruptions in 1783-84 claimed 9,936, or about one-fifth of the total. Unusually precise records reveal that 190,488 sheep (82 percent of the total) died of starvation because of damage to grasslands during that time.

Thanks to a long-standing tolerance of illegitimacy (some two-thirds of all first-borns are illegitimate), a high birth rate, and a rapid drop in mortality rates, the Icelandic population is expected to increase sharply in the years ahead. Barring some new calamity, it should grow by at least 40 percent, to more than 300,000, by the year 2000.

*Cuba's Taste  
for Adventure*

"The Cuban Operation in Angola: Costs and Benefits for the Armed Forces" by Jorge I. Dominguez, in *Cuban Studies* (Jan. 1978), Center for Latin American Studies, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pa. 15260.

Cuba's victorious intervention on the pro-Soviet side in Angola's 1975-76 civil war bolstered Fidel Castro's prestige in much of Africa. The venture also had a significant impact on Cuba's military establishment, writes Dominguez, Research Fellow at Harvard's Center for International Affairs.

The African expedition gave an important new mission to Cuba's Soviet-equipped, 180,000-man armed forces—readiness to engage in combat overseas. Internal order, contributions to economic production, and deterrence of (unlikely) U.S. attack are no longer the only justifications for a big military budget. Since Angola, the Cuban military has a special stake in the continuation of Castro's activist policy in Africa.

Reliable casualty figures are not available, but the Angolan war imposed a variety of direct costs on Cuba. Over half the 10,000 troops sent

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to Angola were reservists; their mobilization took away key personnel from civil aviation and civilian Communist Party cadres. While there is no reliable evidence of strong popular opposition to the Angolan undertaking, Castro hinted in a report to the Party Congress in January 1976 that some factory managers resisted the call-up of certain specialists, claiming they were indispensable to production. "It is necessary," Castro told the Congress, "to combat the occasionally exaggerated criteria as to who cannot be dispensed with in production."

Close analysis of the Cuban military press and a careful reading of Castro's speeches, says Dominguez, suggest that the Angolan operation has provoked some troop insubordination, grumbling among the Cuban people over compulsory military service, and additional strain on the already touchy relations between the Communist Party cadres and professional military officers. Cuba's military involvement in Africa, of course, has sharply increased.

*The Outcasts*

"The Pariah State Syndrome" by Robert E. Harkavy, in *Orbis* (Fall 1977), 3508 Market St., Philadelphia, Pa. 19104.

For various historical and ideological reasons, Israel, South Africa, Taiwan, and South Korea now share the peculiar attributes of "pariahhood" marked by extreme diplomatic isolation and "widespread, obsessive, and unrelenting global opprobrium."

As "pariah states," all four nations are militarily exposed, lack legitimacy in the eyes of much of the Third World, have weak diplomatic leverage, and must depend on precarious sources of arms. And all are opposed by important powers or blocs. In addition, says Harkavy, a Cornell Senior Research Fellow, two of them—Israel and South Africa—must seriously consider the likelihood of suffering wholesale massacres in the event of military defeat.

These conditions, the author argues, inevitably compel "pariah states" to consider acquiring a nuclear capability. Three of the four (all but South Korea) have scientific establishments that might produce an indigenous nuclear weapon (Israel is widely believed to have already produced one).

Joint nuclear efforts cannot be ruled out. The pariah states have reluctantly begun to identify themselves as a group and there is already some military collaboration (e.g., Israel's sales of missile patrol boats to South Africa and Shafir air-to-air missiles to Taiwan). The 1976 visit to Israel of South African Prime Minister John Vorster gave rise to speculation about a possible Israeli-South African nuclear axis. Israel presumably has a weapons design capability, while South Africa has vast raw uranium reserves and a procedure for the separation of U-235. Less likely, but not to be ruled out, is nuclear collaboration between Taiwan and South Korea, or between them and the other two pariahs.

The nuclear aspirations of these countries, Harkavy observes, pose some painful dilemmas for both the United States and the Soviet Un-