
OTHER NATIONS

*Hawks and Doves
in Argentina*

"Argentine 1977: anarchie militaire ou Etat terroriste?" [Argentina 1977: Military anarchy or terrorist state?] by Alain Rouquié, in *Etudes* (Oct. 1977), 15 Rue Monsieur, 75007 Paris, France.

When the military government of General Jorge Rafael Videla seized power in 1976 from President Isabel Peron, Argentinians faced both unbridled terrorism and an annual inflation rate as high as 480 percent. Videla moved quickly to crack down on terrorism. But according to Rouquié, the terrorist threat is now being used chiefly as an excuse for continued civil repression.

Since the late 1960s, when the current wave of terrorism began, some 2,000 Argentinians have been killed; another 5,000 are missing. The government has mounted raids against terrorists—but it has also clamped down on protests by labor, the clergy, and the universities. According to Rouquié, the declining threat posed by the People's Revolutionary Army (a Marxist-Leninist guerrilla group) and by the Monteneros (self-proclaimed heirs to the Peronist movement) does not justify the continuing government crackdown. These groups have been reduced to sporadic bomb attacks.

The real source of the regime's antidemocratic posture is the radicalization of Argentine political life in general. As inflation continues, students and workers have become more vocal, with the army divided over how to respond. The moderates, led by Videla, seek an eventual return to civilian government and have taken pains to preserve Argentina's political parties. But a hard-line faction distrusts political parties and wants the army to play a more decisive role in creating a conservative, rural-oriented "new order."

According to Rouquié, the hard-liners may be in the ascendent: Argentina's economic program now emphasizes aid to the healthy agricultural sector at the expense of the nation's ailing industrial base.

*Will Europe Be
'Finlandized'?*

"Europe: The Specter of Finlandization" by Walter Laqueur, in *Commentary* (Nov. 1977), 165 E. 56th St., New York, N.Y. 10022.

Some foreign policy analysts have suggested that Western Europe, in the face of mounting pressures from the Soviet Union, may eventually become "Finlandized." That is, democratic European governments may be forced to move from a "pro-Western" to a Soviet-leaning "neutral" stance, while at the same time sacrificing a measure of autonomy.

Laqueur, chairman of the research council at Georgetown Univer-

OTHER NATIONS

sity's Center for Strategic and International Studies, notes that discussions of "Finlandization" are usually conducted with little knowledge of political life inside Finland. There is no systematic Western press reporting from Helsinki, and, as a result of Finland's own Russian-inspired practice of "self-censorship," American scholars have access to little detailed information.

Although Finland, unlike Estonia and Latvia, escaped outright annexation by the U.S.S.R. in 1945, there was a price: diminished sovereignty. As a result, the Finns have officially supported the Kremlin's invasion of Hungary in 1956 and of Czechoslovakia in 1968. The nation's current status, says Laqueur, is "neither satellite nor neutral."

In many ways, Finland remains a free country. There are 10 political parties, regular elections, and no political prisoners or arbitrary arrests. Most of the Finnish economy, including agriculture, is not state-run. But in all areas of public life, the Finns are sensitive to Soviet proximity; and the Kremlin exercises a de facto veto over Finland's foreign policy and domestic politics.

Albania on Its Own

"Albania in the 1970s" by Nicholas C. Pano, in *Problems of Communism* (Nov.-Dec. 1977), Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Continued rule by a strict Stalinist regime threatens to split the little Balkan state of Albania (pop. 2.1 million) from its only ally, the People's Republic of China. According to Pano, a historian at Western Illinois University, party leader Enver Hoxha hopes to solidify his 32-year rule by blindly maintaining rigid Communist positions that the Chinese have apparently abandoned.

Created after the pre-World War I Balkan Wars to deny Serbia access to the Adriatic Sea, Albania faces chronic poverty and tremendous problems of internal cohesion. Hoxha's Albanian Party of Labor, which came to power after World War II, created a pro-Soviet police state—until Soviet Premier Khrushchev's "revisionism" prompted Hoxha to sever ties with Moscow and throw his support to Mao Tse-tung in the late 1950s; the Albanian representative long served as China's spokesman in the United Nations.

During the 1970s, however, ideological disputes strained the country's relations with Peking. Albania criticized Chinese rapprochement with the United States and endorsed the Chinese radical "gang-of-four" in their unsuccessful bid to supplant Peking's "pragmatists" led by Party Chairman Hua Kuo-feng. But the Chinese, says Pano, have not been deterred in the least by Albania's actions.

Although Hoxha has contemplated an ideological break with China, writes Pano, diplomatic and economic ties will probably be maintained. Albania desperately needs Chinese aid (\$458 million between 1971 and 1975); moreover, domestic morale would plummet if Albanians, already isolated from most of the world, found themselves suddenly orphans in the Communist movement as well.