



FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE



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Smaller than the Soviet SS-19 but as accurate as the Minuteman III, the proposed MX intercontinental ballistic missile would be launched from a hardened shelter (left) or a hardened trench (right).

U.S. strategic "triad." (The other two "legs" are submarine-launched missiles and land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles.) However, without the B-1 to deliver it, the cruise missile will need a range of 3,500 kilometers if it is to provide credible deterrence. Reports of a SALT proposal to limit the missile's range to 2,500 kilometers have alarmed the Department of Defense and its congressional allies.

So have SALT proposals concerning the MX missile (a nearly "kill-proof," medium-sized ICBM) program. The Pentagon breathed new life into the MX program last October despite the administration's earlier slowdown.

The tentative MX design calls for a 190,000-pound missile at least as accurate as the Minuteman III, but with four times its throw-weight and substantially more MIRVs (independently targetable warheads). The MX could be launched from a "hardened" trench or shelter. But once again, says Ulsamer, SALT curbs—in particular, restrictions on testing and deployment—may undercut the MX program.

Cutting Fat in Foggy Bottom

"Creeping Irrelevance at Foggy Bottom"
by Robert Pringle, in *Foreign Policy* (Winter 1977-78), 155 Allen Blvd., Farmingdale, N.Y. 11735.

A recent British commission concluded that Her Majesty's diplomatic service was irrelevant and should be disbanded. The U.S. State Department has also had its share of problems, including chronic bad relations with Congress and insecurity dating back to the McCarthy era. These traditional ills, writes Pringle, a foreign service officer, are now being aggravated by numerous others, including an acute "malaise" among middle- and upper-level State officials.

The State Department is a "bureaucratic midget" with a 1976 budget of a mere \$1 billion (compared to \$128 billion for the Department of

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Health, Education, and Welfare). Like other federal departments, it is plagued by weak internal management, a rigid personnel system, and a lack of long-range planning. At least 65 studies since 1951 have identified these shortcomings, but no corrective action has been taken. Promotion panels still tend to penalize those who seek experience "outside the stagnant mainstream."

The oversupply of senior officials will increase in the months ahead as a result of a recent Supreme Court decision raising the mandatory retirement age from 60 to 70. This development, combined with affirmative action programs that threaten to "force-feed a large dose" of minority applicants into the already clogged personnel system, has made State Department service unattractive to many young college graduates.

Pringle cites the most recent study of the State Department, conducted by the late Ambassador Robert Murphy in 1975, which urges a redefinition of the Department's role. With domestic issues so closely linked to international interests, the Murphy Commission argues, the Department is no longer qualified to oversee all aspects of foreign policy. Agriculture and energy issues, for example, may best be left to their respective departments, with the President handling coordination.

What role is left for State? Articulating the "broader national interest." In short, says Pringle, Foggy Bottom should concentrate on "what it can realistically do, then do it well."

ECONOMICS, LABOR & BUSINESS

*U.S.-Cuba Trade:
Great Expectations*

"The Prospects for U.S.-Cuba Trade" by Andrew Zimbalist, in *Challenge* (Jan.-Feb. 1978), 901 No. Broadway, White Plains, N.Y. 10603.

As Cuba and the United States contemplate normalized diplomatic relations, U.S. businessmen are trying to anticipate the scope of future trade between the two nations. According to Zimbalist, an economist at Smith College, the magnitude of U.S.-Cuban trade will "not approach pre-Revolutionary levels [the United States accounted for 71 percent of Cuba's exports in 1958], but it could be sizeable nonetheless."

Foreign policy issues aside, there are several barriers to a resumption of commercial ties. First, the terms of Cuba's trade agreements with the Soviet Union discourage large-scale economic deals with the industrial nations. The Soviets pay Cuba three times the market price for sugar, 25 percent more for nickel. Thus, Cuba can afford to sell only a small share of its commodities on the open market.

A second obstacle involves the \$1.8 billion in American assets Cuba expropriated in the early 1960s. Without a claims settlement, Cuban