of Japan's potential nuclear capacity.

The new findings also call into question the arguments of historians who contend that dropping a second bomb on Nagasaki in August 1945 was unnecessary. In their view, the earlier Hiroshima bomb had broken the Japanese will to fight. But, according to Shapley, after the Hiroshima bomb was exploded, physicist Nishina was summoned to Tokyo and asked first whether the bomb had been atomic, then "whether Japan could have one in six months."

Back to Basics

"The Navy's Clouded Amphibious Mission" by Vice Adm. Robert S. Salzer (Ret.), in *Proceedings* (Feb. 1978), U.S. Naval Institute, Annapolis, Md. 21402.

During World War II and the Korean conflict, the U.S. Navy repeatedly carried out major Marine amphibious landings against stiff opposition ashore. This capability has all but disappeared; instead, the Navy has deployed small "amphibious ready groups" (four to five ships, 2,000 Marines) in the Far East and the Mediterranean to show the flag and deter would-be troublemakers.

However, writes Salzer, the deterrent value of such small "gunboat diplomacy" units is now questionable. Even Third World nations have jets, antihelicopter and antiship missiles, and well-armed ground forces. The Navy's 30,000-man total amphibious force is costly and its few big helicopter-carrying assault ships, like the *Tarawa*, are highly sophisticated; but the fleet cannot now provide enough sealift and supporting gunpower to duplicate, say, the Marines' famed Inchon landing of 1950.

Back to basics is Salzer's plea—with reliance on the merchant marine, and enough sealift for a Marine division (of 20,000 men) in each ocean. The Navy, he says, still needs to be able to "hold, occupy, or if need be wrest from unfriendly hands the bases from which critical ocean areas could be dominated."


Will the MX	"U.S. Strategic Deterrence at the Cross- roads" by Edgar Ulsamer, in <i>Air Force</i>
Missile Fly?	(Dec. 1977), 1750 Pennsylvania Ave. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006.

The Carter administration's record on defense issues—including reportedly "lopsided" concessions at SALT and cancellation or deferral of several strategic weapons systems—has created confusion and uncertainty in U.S. strategic planning, argues Ulsamer, an *Air Force* senior editor.

The "zigzag" decision to cancel funding for the manned B-1 bomber, Ulsamer writes, has renewed congressional doubts about the wisdom of recent Carter administration changes in U.S. defenses. The administration contends that deployment of the low-altitude, air-launched "cruise" missile will be sufficient to uphold the "air power" leg of the

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Smaller than the Soviet SS-19 but as accurate as the Minuteman III, the proposed MX intercontinental ballistic missile would be launched from a hardened shelter (left) or a hardened trench (right).

U.S. strategic "triad." (The other two "legs" are submarine-launched missiles and land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles.) However, without the B-1 to deliver it, the cruise missile will need a range of 3,500 kilometers if it is to provide credible deterrence. Reports of a SALT proposal to limit the missile's range to 2,500 kilometers have alarmed the Department of Defense and its congressional allies.

So have SALT proposals concerning the MX missile (a nearly "killproof," medium-sized ICBM) program. The Pentagon breathed new life into the MX program last October despite the administration's earlier slowdown.

The tentative MX design calls for a 190,000-pound missile at least as accurate as the Minuteman III, but with four times its throw-weight and substantially more MIRVs (independently targetable warheads). The MX could be launched from a "hardened" trench or shelter. But once again, says Ulsamer, SALT curbs—in particular, restrictions on testing and deployment—may undercut the MX program.

Cutting Fat in	"Creeping Irrelevance at Foggy Bottom" by Robert Pringle, in <i>Foreign Policy</i> (Win-
Foggy Bottom	ter 1977–78), 155 Allen Blvd., Far- mingdale, N.Y. 11735.

A recent British commission concluded that Her Majesty's diplomatic service was irrelevant and should be disbanded. The U.S. State Department has also had its share of problems, including chronic bad relations with Congress and insecurity dating back to the McCarthy era. These traditional ills, writes Pringle, a foreign service officer, are now being aggravated by numerous others, including an acute "malaise" among middle- and upper-level State officials.

The State Department is a "bureaucratic midget" with a 1976 budget of a mere \$1 billion (compared to \$128 billion for the Department of

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