

---

**FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE**


---

(from 10,000 troops in 1972 to about 1,000 today), the United States might someday find itself in the awkward position of having a commitment to Taiwan without the means to meet it.

### *Pro and Con on NATO Arms*

"NATO Arms Standardization: Two Views" by Dewey F. Bartlett and James H. Polk, in *AEI Defense Review* (no. 6, 1977), American Enterprise Institute, 1150 17th Street N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

Standardization of military hardware, long an operational goal of the 13-nation Atlantic alliance, is the "key" to NATO's survival as an effective deterrent, according to Senator Bartlett (R.-Okla.). But General Polk, former commander in chief of the U.S. Army in Europe and the Seventh Army, believes that standardization is generally not worth the time, effort, or money required.

Lack of standardized weapons and parts in the NATO force, says Bartlett, creates a "domino-like chain of inefficiency." The Senate Armed Services Committee, on which Bartlett serves, estimates that NATO has lost 30 to 40 percent of its effectiveness because of its confused mix of weapons systems. The alliance now fields 31 different antitank weapons (with 18 more under development), 7 different tanks, 8 armored personnel carriers, 24 families of combat aircraft, 100 kinds of tactical missiles, and 50 varieties of ammunition. With NATO nations plagued by rising manpower costs and faltering economies, distribution of common equipment, Bartlett argues, could save \$10-15 billion a year.

But Polk questions Bartlett's estimates of potential savings. He sees a greater need for cooperation in battle rather than for peacetime economies. Standardizing spare parts, he argues, is "impractical, costly, and idealistic." Efforts to standardize should be confined to "essential" items, such as fuel and ammunition. As for other duplication, Polk concludes, "the best policy is to forget it."

### *Bomb the Ban*

"Candor, Compromise, and the Comprehensive Test Ban" by Donald R. Westervelt, in *Strategic Review* (Fall 1977), U.S. Strategic Institute, 1204 K St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006.

For two decades, the United States has sought to negotiate a treaty with the Soviet Union to eliminate underground testing of nuclear weapons. But according to Westervelt, a staff member of the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, the problems inherent in such a "comprehensive" test ban (current treaties cover only above-ground testing) could eventually result in a shift of the strategic balance in favor of the Soviets. He believes that only with a "limited" test-ban treaty—or none at all—can the United States maintain its technological edge over the U.S.S.R.