stiffen the "exhaustion" requirement in the state courts. Thus, he observes, when a case reached federal court for review, it would already have been refined and analyzed—facilitating the work of the federal judge.

## What Money Can't Buy

"The Model Cities Program: A Sobering Scorecard" by Charles Longstreet Weltner, in *Policy Review* (Fall 1977), 513 C St. N.E., Washington, D.C. 20002.

President Carter signed a \$14.7 billion housing measure last October, calling it a "giant step forward" for the nation's cities. But the evidence is growing, says Weltner, a federal judge and former congressman, that "throwing federal dollars" at urban problems may be next to useless. As a case in point, he cites his hometown of Atlanta, Ga. (pop. 1.7 million).

Weltner was an early proponent of Lyndon Johnson's Model Cities effort and the only Georgian in Congress to vote for it in 1966. Atlanta was one of the 10 original target communities. With its progressive tradition and active black leadership, the city seemed an ideal municipality to direct a mix of federal aid and other help focused on a single blighted neighborhood. Hopes ran high as federal officials tried to translate the "precepts of liberalism" into reality.

In six years, Atlanta received more than \$173 million in aid from a dozen local, state, and federal agencies. At program's end, the inner city was left with some capital improvements—but one-third fewer people. The percentage of substandard housing remained virtually the same. Unemployment ran at 20 percent, up from 8.6 percent when the program began. Education and health services showed moderate improvement, but crime increased dramatically, from 34.3 "serious crimes" (homicide, rape, robbery, and assault) per 1,000 people in 1968 to 94.6 in 1974. What was the net benefit of the Model Cities effort in Atlanta? "Very little," Weltner concludes.

Banki Dannykh "Banki dannykh: nastuplenie na grazhdanskie prava v SShA" [Data banks: The attack on civil liberties in the USA] by M. Iu. Dykhovichnaia and G. B. Kochetkov, in *Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Pravo* (no. 6, 1977), 121019, Moscow, G-19, ul. Frunze, d.10.

The growth and refinement of computerized "data banks" (banki dannykh) pose a severe threat to American civil liberties, write two Russian specialists on the United States. The federal government alone, they say, operates 850 data banks on American citizens and organizations, containing 1.25 billion pieces of information. (The Senate Judiciary Committee estimates that something about every U.S. citizen is on file somewhere.) In addition, credit bureaus keep dossiers on 105 million

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Americans; tax archives have 205 million entries more; and the U.S. Army has computerized files on every active political group in the United States.

Taking their information entirely from U.S. sources, the Soviet authors observe that the United States regulates little of this data bank activity. There is no precise definition of what kinds of information must legally be considered absolutely private. Worse, charge the Soviet analysts, U.S. data-collecting agencies ignore those few regulations that do exist.

Meanwhile, the Senate has been wrestling with the most important question of all: Should the existing pyramid of public and private data banks be capped by a *national* data bank? If it is, the Soviet authors contend, the American "bourgeois state" will be able to plug into the telephone conversations, credit ratings, and political affiliations of all Americans. The result would be an "authoritarian state" that would repress "bourgeois law and order," constitutional rights, and liberal elements.

Apparently, say the authors, the only political force "consistently and on principle" opposing Big Brother in America is the Communist Party of the United States.

John Smith's Tall Tales "Captain John Smith and Romania" by Radu Florescu, in *East European Quarterly* (vol. 11, no. 4, 1977), Regent Hall, University of Colorado, Boulder, Colo. 80302.

Historians have long questioned the veracity of Captain John Smith's personal account of his role in the establishment of the Jamestown colony in Virginia in 1607. That being so, says Florescu, a historian at Boston College, it is not surprising that Smith's earlier exploits in Romania—recounted in his *The True Travels, Adventures, and Observations* (1630)—have also raised scholarly eyebrows. Nevertheless, contends Florescu, Smith's tall tales ring true.

Smith claimed that, in the heat of battle in Eastern Europe, he had slain three Turkish military commanders in quick succession. Later, in 1602, he wrote, he was sold in captivity to Lady Charatza Tragbigzanda, a Greek living in Istanbul. When Smith explored the coast of Virginia and New England, he named what is now the Cape Ann peninsula "Cape Tragbigzanda"—in honor "of the woman who perhaps had loved him." Likewise, three islands off Cape Cod were christened "The Three Turks' Heads."

Smith badly wanted "to be the hero and darling of the gentle sex," Florescu concedes. But to assume that, while Smith was making his New World discoveries and struggling to found his Virginia colony, he was at the same time scheming to publish imaginary exploits, seems far-fetched. *The True Travels* may contain gross inaccuracies. But his major exploits "fit marvellously well within the context of Elizabethan adventurism."