

Vietnam as History

This spring, 10 years after the diplomats from Hanoi and Washington first began peace talks in Paris and three years after North Vietnamese tanks rolled triumphantly into Saigon, there seems to be a tentative willingness among many Americans to take another look at the Vietnam War.

A half-dozen movie makers are gambling that the passions of the Johnson-Nixon era have waned sufficiently to make Vietnam, or at least a Hollywood version of it, good box office. In recent months, front-page reviews have greeted such non-polemics as C. D. B. Bryan's sober *Friendly Fire*, Michael Herr's surrealistic *Dispatches*, Philip Caputo's confessional *A Rumor of War*, and Frank Snepp's allegations of U.S. bungling during the fall of Saigon, in *Decent Interval*. At the University of North Carolina and elsewhere, the war is being taught as "history"; those who now study it as undergraduates were in grade school in March 1968 when Lyndon Johnson announced on TV that he would not seek re-election as President and ordered a partial halt to the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam.

For the benefit of students, teachers, and the general reader, we present here a survey of scholarly works-in-progress on the war, then a New Look at the existing Vietnam literature, focusing on those few books which either break new ground or seem to have survived the cruel test of time.

by Peter Braestrup

Were our Presidents right or wrong in involving the United States in Vietnam? Did our leaders adopt the best strategy for fighting the war? Were they genuinely seeking a compromise peace?

The answers to these big ques-

tions—and others—remain elusive, subject to debate likely to be renewed with each generation of historians, as after other U.S. wars.

From the vast literature dealing with Vietnam, only a few dozen books covering the origins, conduct,

and outcome of the war remain useful. We describe them below. But first we consider the current crop of scholarly work, which is buttressed by newly available documentation and fresh perspectives on our direct intervention in 1965-73.

Perhaps the most important academic work-in-progress is *The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked* by Leslie Gelb with Richard Betts of the Brookings Institution. It is slated for publication later this year by Brookings. A decade ago, Gelb directed the famed "Pentagon Papers" study of U.S. Vietnam decision-making, 1946-67. *Irony* draws heavily on the Papers' mother lode and other archives in examining the same subject.

Gelb and Betts dig at the "whats and whys"; they note that the historical evidence is "still alive, being shaped by bitterness and bewilderment, reassurances and new testimony." Old Vietnam hands may challenge some of the brief Gelb-Betts interpretations of events in Saigon and on the battlefield. But when it focuses on Washington, *Irony* torpedoed many an assumption long cherished by either hawks or doves. It does *not* show, for example, that Lyndon Johnson, while running against Barry Goldwater in 1964, secretly decided to escalate the war, while saying the opposite in his campaign speeches. Rather, the book tends to confirm that whenever crisis loomed in Vietnam, LBJ, like his predecessors, usually did only what then seemed necessary to stave off a Communist takeover. Even as he escalated the war in 1965-67, Johnson glumly chose the "middle course," say Gelb and Betts, without any real strategy except "to persevere."

Political scientist Guenter Lewy of the University of Massachusetts has

completed, for publication in September, *America in Vietnam*, an omnibus 1965-73 war history, using newly available military archives. He researched and wrote the book, Lewy said, in part because his television-reared students had such foggy notions of how and why the war was fought.

Anthropologist Gerald Hickey, former Wilson Center Fellow and author of the classic *Village in Vietnam* (1964), has completed his mammoth history of Vietnam's embattled Montagnards, or mountain tribesmen. An analysis of U.S. intervention in Saigon politics by George Kahin, director of Cornell's Southeast Asia program, is under way. Lawrence Lichty, now a Wilson Center Fellow, is compiling a detailed history of the television coverage of the war.

Neil Sheehan, former *New York Times* man in Saigon, is preparing a major biography of Colonel John Paul Vann, the archetypal U.S. adviser. And the Associated Press's prize-winning Peter Arnett, whose Vietnam experience spans the entire 1962-75 period, is writing a reporter's memoir.

These efforts and a half dozen newly published studies, cited below, should not be interpreted as a full-blown renaissance.

Long after the United States first landed troops in Vietnam in 1965, many a professor rushed into print with analyses of the conflict and proposals to end it. But serious academic research devoted to Vietnam then, or earlier, was meager, and it is meager today.*

*According to Allan E. Goodman, in *Freedom at Issue* (Sept.-Oct. 1973, p. 19), out of 7,615 Ph.D. dissertations produced at U.S. universities in 1954-68 in the fields of modern history, international relations, and political science, only 22 were on Vietnam.

At Harvard, for example, there is now no Indochina specialist on the faculty and none at Princeton, Berkeley, or Yale. Most students and faculty associated with Cornell's small Southeast Asia Center are devoting themselves to matters other than the Vietnam War.

At low ebb is the Vietnam Center of the University of Southern Illinois, set up in 1969 with a five-year \$1 million federal grant—which has not been renewed. Its current director, Nguyen Dinh Hoa, survived early attacks by antiwar radicals, built up graduate studies and a major Vietnam archive, but now runs what is largely a language program. The Japanese Foreign Ministry sends young diplomats, destined for embassy posts in Hanoi, to Dr. Hoa for language training; one alumnus is already on duty in the capital of the New Vietnam.

The Gold Is There

Neither the major foundations nor the major universities have encouraged scholarly research on the war and its effects, even as the military and such institutions as the Lyndon Johnson Library make more material available. Parts of the record, particularly for the Nixon-Ford era, remain classified. But as Gelb, Lewy, and others have demonstrated, much gold is there, waiting to be mined. In effect, the academics are leaving most of the mining to others, notably the historians of the military services.

As after past wars, each military service has begun multivolume

chronicles of its experience. In 1976 the Navy published its first volume, *The Setting of the Stage to 1959*, dealing with the early "advisory" period prior to major U.S. troop involvement. The Marine Corps has already published *U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1954-64*, with volumes for 1965 and 1966 due out this summer. Also published (1974) is an illustrated anthology, *The Marines in Vietnam, 1954-73*. The Air Force has produced some slender monographs, including one on the battle for Khesanh (in which 100,000 tons of bombs, equal in explosive power to "five Hiroshimas," rained down on the North Vietnamese regiments besieging the Marine base in early 1968). A former Air Force commander in Vietnam, General William Momyer, is compiling *his* official account of the air war. Senior Army generals, at the request of General William C. Westmoreland, have since 1972 produced a series, highly uneven in quality, of some 20 specialized studies, ranging from the role of the Green Berets to airmobile tactics and logistics. Almost out of print is *Report on the War in Vietnam* (1969) by Admiral U. S. Grant Sharp and General Westmoreland, covering U.S. ground and air activity from mid-1964 to mid-1968.

Many of these efforts provide revealing data and documentation, but they suffer from the flaws inherent in "official" history: parochialism, heavy reliance on official papers, blandness, and a reluctance to explore error, command failure, or confusion.

More than its counterparts, the

Peter Braestrup, 48, a former Washington Post and New York Times correspondent in Vietnam and a former Wilson Fellow, is the editor of The Wilson Quarterly and author of Big Story: How the American Press and Television Reported and Interpreted the Crisis of Tet 1968 in Vietnam and Washington (1977).

Army's Center for Military History benefits from a tradition of solid scholarship and freedom from censorship by higher-ups, as exemplified in its mammoth chronicles of World War II and the Korean War. Historian Charles MacDonald is directing the preparation of a 21-volume Vietnam series, covering not only combat but also such matters as the military's relations with the media, pacification, and decision-making at "Pentagon East" in Saigon. The first volume will appear sometime after 1980.

Disaster at Tet

The Defense Department has collected post-mortem essays by (and interviews with) leading Vietnamese émigrés dealing with the 1975 fall of South Vietnam for publication later this year. But neither the Defense Department nor the Joint Chiefs of Staff are likely to publish their respective official histories of the high-level Vietnam decision-making for years to come. The State Department publishes selected documents but does not "do" much diplomatic history. And the Central Intelligence Agency keeps its history, not surprisingly, in the vault at Langley, Virginia.

Few leading military figures have written useful nonofficial accounts. But General Westmoreland's *A Soldier Reports* (1976) is notable for (1) suggesting that in 1964 and early '65, what with political chaos in Saigon, the United States, prior to any massive troop commitments, could have honorably pulled out, and (2) showing how LBJ manipulated the U.S. commander in Vietnam into becoming, in effect, a spokesman for the administration in the domestic political arena.

Of the high-level Washington ac-

tors in the crucial Johnson era, only the late President and his chief national security aide Walt W. Rostow published their own book-length accounts. Former Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, former Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and the late General Earle Wheeler, chairman of the Joint Chiefs, did not.

LBJ's defensive, uncharacteristically bland *Vantage Point* (1971) slides over many key details; Doris Kearns's post-1968 interviews as recorded in *Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream* (1976) provide insights into the ex-President's fears and frustrations. Rostow's *Diffusion of Power* (1972) is crisp and kind to the President, even as Rostow implies that LBJ's irresolution helped to make the climactic Tet 1968 political crisis a "self-inflicted wound."

Vivid media accounts and some doubters within the Johnson Administration portrayed Hanoi's Tet offensive against the South's cities as a local "disaster" for the allies—although it turned out to be a costly military setback for Hanoi, even as it stunned Washington. Don Oberdorfer's *Tet!* (1971) remains a first-rate newsman's account of that drama, in Vietnam and on the homefront; he wrote without benefit of *The Pentagon Papers* and newer documentation. Filling in the Washington gaps is *The Unmaking of a President* (1977) by Herbert Y. Schandler (*WQ*, Summer 1977).

Memoirs to Come

No new *Pentagon Papers* has been published on the 1969–75 Nixon-Ford period and much remains obscure. Access to high-level documentation is difficult, but most of the key actors are still around. Among them, only former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, former CIA Di-

rector William Colby, and Mr. Nixon are known to be publishing memoirs.

Washington's zigzag diplomatic efforts to negotiate a deal with Hanoi began with "contacts" during the Kennedy era and ended in Kissinger's "peace with honor" of 1973. Ex-diplomat Chester L. Cooper's wry personal account, *The Lost Crusade* (1970), covers some of the Johnson-era maneuvering; the investigative reporting of David Kraslow and Stuart Loory details other early "peace feelers" and "contacts" in *The Secret Search for Peace in Vietnam* (1968).

The Other Side

A new comprehensive scholarly analysis of the 1963-73 diplomacy is Allan Goodman's well-knit *The Lost Peace* (1978). In Goodman's view, grave weakness lay in early and persistent U.S. hopes that gradual, limited increases in military pressure combined with a conciliatory diplomatic stance would lead to a negotiated settlement. This assumption helped to obscure "what the [ultimate] costs of intervention were likely to be and, equally important, what the ultimate gains [in Vietnam] might look like." The North Vietnamese, from the outset, had told Washington that there was really "nothing to negotiate"; Hanoi's objective was victory, not a return to the prewar status quo.

During the war, little was known but much was written about Hanoi's goals, decisions, and political appeal in the South. A neglected early primer was Douglas Pike's *Viet Cong* (1966). Pike's brief 1978 *History of the Vietnamese Communist Party* and Robert F. Turner's *Vietnamese Communism* (1975) trace Party development back to the crucible of the anti-French struggle and note the

cohesion and stamina of Ho Chi Minh's ruling Politburo and the Party's operational trinity: organization, mobilization, motivation. "If there was a secret weapon in the Vietnam War," writes Pike, "this was it."

Much material on the Vietnamese Communists appears in earlier general works on Vietnam, including Joseph L. Buttinger's basic history, *Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled* (1967), and a 1976 sequel, *Vietnam: The Unforgettable Tragedy*; John T. McAlister's *Vietnam: The Origins of Revolution* (1969); Dennis J. Duncanson's *Government and Revolution in Vietnam* (1968); and Bernard Fall's *The Two Vietnams* (rev. 1964). Fall's Dien Bien Phu classic *Hell in a Very Small Place* (1966) and his combat vignettes in *Street Without Joy* (rev. 1963) provide a vivid picture of both Viet Minh and French tactics in 1946-54.


"Pacification" was the name given to the long-troubled American-assisted effort, from 1961 on, to root out rural Vietcong guerrillas and tax-collectors and bring relative security and socioeconomic uplift to the countryside, as distinct from the Big War against the North Vietnamese regulars.

"Vietnamization"

The Counter-Insurgency Era (1977) by Douglas Blaufarb, a CIA veteran, provides a critical overview of such antiguerrilla drives in both Vietnam and Laos. Robert Komer, who reorganized and led the Vietnam effort in 1967-68, speculates in *Bureaucracy Does Its Thing* (1972) that, if the allied drive had been organized better, earlier, U.S. troops might not have been needed in 1965 to save the South from collapse.

Komer & Co. do not come off as well as the Viet Cong in Harvey Meyerson's *Vinh Long* (1970), a

Gary Viskupic's *Washington Post* drawing illustrates the dramatic media portrayal of Hanoi's surprise 1968 Tet attacks against South Vietnam's cities.



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newsman's impressionistic portrait of a troubled Delta province in 1967.

Jeffrey Race's more scholarly *War Comes to Long An* (1971) describes the impressive rise and 1970 slump of the Viet Cong organization in another Delta province. In *The Village* (1972), F. J. West, a Marine analyst, traces the bittersweet experience of a Combined Action Platoon (14 Marines, 40 Vietnamese militiamen) shielding Quang Ngai peasants against both the Viet Cong and the occasional intrusions of regular U.S. troops. John L. Cook, a gung ho Army captain, describes "his" hamlet war northeast of Saigon in *The Advisor* (1973). As the local Vietcong faded and the Americans began pulling out in 1970, Cook writes, "I could see the difference between what was supposed to happen [under the Nixon 'Vietnamization' program] and what was actually happening. . . . The two had little in common."

Pilots and POWs

There has been no comprehensive history of the "gradualist" U.S. air effort in Southeast Asia. However, as a statistics-crammed study, *The Air War in IndoChina* (1972), prepared by a Cornell peace group, makes clear, most of the U.S. bombs fell not on the North but on the Ho Chi Minh

Trail in Laos and on targets in the South; Hanoi was relatively unscathed.

Guided tours by the North Vietnamese for selected Western newsmen and antiwar activists resulted in a dozen graphic accounts of bomb damage in the North, beginning with Harrison Salisbury's *Behind the Lines* (1967). The random destruction of the 1967 air war (and U.S. ground operations) in the South's Quang Ngai and Quang Tin Provinces is described in Jonathan Schell's *The Military Half* (1968).

Two personal accounts by U.S. airmen provide a sense of the courage and frustration of the pilots who braved the North's strong air defenses: *Thud Ridge* (1969) by Colonel Jack Broughton and Frank Elkins' *The Heart of a Man* (1973), the posthumously published diary of a Navy carrier pilot.

Hundreds of pilots (and a few ground soldiers) wound up facing years of torture and privation in Communist prison camps. A dozen grim accounts have been published. Most revealing are John G. Hubbell's survey, *P.O.W.* (1976), and Zalin Grant's *Survivors* (1975), contrasting personal accounts of some POWs who collaborated with their captors and of some who did not.

THE ORDEAL OF THE "GRUNT," 1965-73

The experience of the American infantryman, or "grunt," in Vietnam varied greatly from year to year, from place to place. Combat historian S. L. A. Marshall's *The Fields of Bamboo* (1971), *Bird* (1968), *West to Cambodia* (1968), and *Ambush* (1969) describe the optimistic early days of 1965-66. Charles Coe's *Young Man in Vietnam* (1968) is a sensitive memoir of a young Marine lieutenant's trial by fire. *Close Quarters* (1977) by Larry Heinemann is a fictional recollection of battle and boredom west of Saigon in 1967-68 (*WQ*, Winter 1978).

Novelist Tim O'Brien's *If I Die in a Combat Zone* (1973) and his new *Going After Cacciato* (1978) realistically depict the draftee's 1969-70 ordeal in the Americal Division. An angry autobiography of a war-crippled Marine is Ron Kovic's *Born on the Fourth of July* (1976). In *The Lionheads* (1972), a bitter fictionalized account of search-and-destroy operations in the Delta, former Army Major Josiah Bunting writes: "Think of Primo Carnera going after Willie Pep in a pigsty ten miles square."

Journalists provided another flavor. *Times*man David Halberstam's chronicle of the Diem era, *The Making of a Quagmire* (1965) and his *The Best and the Brightest* (1972) got plenty of attention, but his fine short novel, *One Very Hot Day* (1967)—about U.S. advisers and South Vietnamese troops in the Delta—did not. Charles B. Flood's battle-reporting in *The War of the Innocents* (1970) is unmatched. The *Washington Post*'s Ward Just superbly conveys his own combat experience in *To What End* (1968). Michael Herr's *Dispatches* (1977) points up the madness, exaltation, and camaraderie in 1967-68 of both grunts and "parasitic" newsmen. Richard Boyle's *The Flower of the Dragon* (1972) portrays the erosion of G.I. discipline and morale as major American troop withdrawals began in 1969.

Unhappily, no broad detailed studies exist as yet of South Vietnam's frail but long-resilient administration and army. The collected *New Yorker* pieces of Robert Shaplen—*The Lost Revolution* (1966), *The Road from War* (1970)—convey an old Asia reporter's contemporary impressions: political fragmentation, governmental corruption, bureaucratic weakness. Howard Pennington's scholarly *Elections in South Vietnam* (1973) credits the Thieu regime with some zigzag moves in 1966-67 toward a working legislature. Allan Goodman's technical *Politics in War* (1973) suggests that by the end of 1969, the Saigon Par-

liament's lower house had begun to "link population to government" through legislators' services to constituents.

What of the 20 million ordinary South Vietnamese? The war's effects on these people became the subject of an abundant literature, focused largely on U.S. misdeeds. Jonathan Schell's *Village of Ben Suc* (1967), Daniel Lang's *Casualties of War* (1969), and Seymour Hersh's account of the 1968 massacre at *My Lai 4* (1970) survive as the best-written in this category. *Vietnam: The Unheard Voices*, (1969) by Don Luce and John Sommer is a protest against the war's impact on South Vietnamese

society. Focusing on Communist misdeeds, Douglas Pike's low-key *The Vietcong Strategy of Terror* (1970) includes an analysis of the 1968 Hue massacre.

Susan Sheehan's portraits of ordinary folk—a landowner, a soldier, a farmer, captured Communists—in *Ten Vietnamese* (1967), compiled with the help of Nguyen Ngoc Rao, are most illuminating. Rural society is covered by James B. Hendry's *The Small World of Khanh Hau* (1964) and *The Vietnamese and Their Revolution* (1970), by John T. McAlister, Jr. and French sociologist Paul Mus.

Drawing upon Mus's work, journalist Frances Fitzgerald's passionate indictment of U.S. intervention, *Fire in the Lake* (1972) hailed the "narrow flame" of Hanoi's revolution and its cleansing effect on Vietnamese society.

Unanswered Questions

What she and other American writers have not explained is this: Why were most ordinary South Vietnamese willing to resist Hanoi's revolution for almost two decades—despite heavy casualties, much privation, and poor leadership?

For that matter, what kept the Americans going so long? John E. Mueller's eye-opening *War, Presidents, and Public Opinion* (1973) contradicts many popular assumptions. He says, among other things, that youths, Democrats, and the college-educated were more supportive of the war, at least through 1968, than were older folk, Republicans, and non-college graduates. In *Vietnam and the Silent Majority* (1970), Sidney Verba, Philip Converse, and Milton J. Rosenberg note that, of those Democrats who voted for "peace candidate" Eugene McCarthy in the 1968 New Hampshire primary, anti-John-

son "hawks" outnumbered anti-Johnson "doves" 3 to 2.

Even so, argues Thomas Powers in *The War at Home* (1973), the antiwar protests exacerbated a growing national political malaise that forced Lyndon Johnson and his successor to forgo any effort to "fight and win"; the protesters divided the Democratic party and thus helped elect Nixon in 1968 and 1972.

Personal accounts by student activists include Ken Hurwitz's *Marching Nowhere* (1971), which embraces Harvard, love, and the 1969 demonstrations in Boston and Washington, and Steven Kelman's *Push Comes to Shove* (1970).

The greening of the anti-war movement's quarrelsome middle-aged vanguard, "the re-emerged intellectual Left" is chronicled by Sandy Vogelgesang in *The Long Dark Night of the Soul* (1974), which contains an excellent bibliography of the sizable antiwar literature. Too often, she writes, the dissenting intellectuals "rejected serious politics in favor of psychodrama" and were largely ineffectual in converting the broader public. But, Vogelgesang notes, the dissenters dominated discussion of Vietnam in academe, shook the Eastern elite, and helped spur a re-examination of U.S. foreign policy.

Looking Back

Lastly, we have the recent post-mortems. Douglas Kinnard's *The War Managers* (1977) polls 173 former Army generals who served in Vietnam and finds them retrospectively condemning such things as exaggerated official "body counts" of enemy dead. Academics and former Washington "policy intellectuals" dominate the Council on Foreign Relations' uneven collection of essays,

The Legacy of Vietnam (1976), edited by Anthony Lake. More detailed, with a fresh focus on the military is *The Lessons of Vietnam* (1977), edited by W. Scott Thompson and Donaldson D. Frizzell of Tufts' Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.

The "hawkish" critique prevails in *All Quiet on the Eastern Front* (1976), an anthology edited by Anthony T. Bouscaren, featuring former Ambassador Graham Martin, General Westmoreland, and William F. Buckley. But it contains a poignant, non-hawkish elegy by the *Wall Street Journal's* veteran Peter R. Kann for his South Vietnamese friends who

were left behind, to succumb to Hanoi's superior discipline and tenacity.

"The stronger side is not necessarily the better side," Kann writes. "'Better' becomes a question of values, and much as I may respect Communist strength and stamina, I cannot accept [the claim] that the Spartan Communist society of North Vietnam is better than the very imperfect South Vietnamese society that I knew. . . . The new Vietnam will be powerful and successful and those are the qualities that seem to count among nations, as among men."

A VIETNAM BOOKLIST

Air War Study Group, Cornell Univ., *The Air War in IndoChina* (Beacon, rev. 1972)

Douglas Blaufarb, *The Counter-Insurgency Era: U.S. Doctrine and Performance* (Free Press, 1977); Anthony T. Bouscaren, ed., *All Quiet on the Eastern Front: The Death of South Vietnam* (Devin-Adair, 1976); Richard Boyle, *The Flower of the Dragon: The Breakdown of the U.S. Army in Vietnam* (Ramparts, 1972); Jack Broughton, *Thud Ridge* (Lippincott, 1969); C. D. Bryan, *Friendly Fire* (Putnam's, 1976); Josiah Bunting, *The Lionheads* (Brazilier, 1972); Joseph L. Buttinger, *Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled* (Praeger, 1967); *Vietnam: The Unforgettable Tragedy* (Horizon, 1976)

Philip Caputo, *A Rumor of War* (Holt, 1977); Charles Coe, *Young Man in Vietnam* (Four Winds Press, 1968); John L. Cook, *The Advisor* (Dorrance, 1973); Chester L. Cooper, *The Lost Crusade: America in Vietnam* (Dodd, Mead, 1970)

Dennis J. Duncanson, *Government and Revolution in Vietnam* (Oxford, 1968)

Frank Callihan Elkins, *The Heart of a Man* (Norton, 1973)

Bernard Fall, *Hell in a Very Small Place: The Siege of Dien Bien Phu* (Lippincott, 1966), *Street Without Joy: Insurgency in Indochina,*

1946-63 (Stackpole, rev. 1963), *The Two Vietnams: A Political and Military Analysis* (Praeger, rev. 1964); Frances Fitzgerald, *Fire in the Lake: The Vietnamese and the Americans in Vietnam* (Little, Brown, 1972); Charles B. Flood, *The War of the Innocents* (McGraw-Hill, 1970)

Leslie Gelb and Richard Betts, *The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked* (Brookings, 1978, forthcoming); Allan E. Goodman, *The Lost Peace: America's Search for a Negotiated Settlement of the Vietnam War* (Hoover, 1978), *Politics in War: The Bases of Political Community in South Vietnam* (Harvard, 1973); Zalin Grant, *Survivors* (Norton, 1975); Senator Gravel, ed., *The Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department History of United States Decisionmaking on Vietnam* (Beacon, 1971)

David Halberstam, *The Best and the Brightest* (Random, 1972), *The Making of a Quagmire* (Random, 1965), *One Very Hot Day* (Houghton Mifflin, 1967); Larry Heinemann, *Close Quarters* (Farrar, 1977); James B. Hendry, *The Small World of Khanh Hau* (Aldine, 1964); Michael Herr, *Dispatches* (Knopf, 1977); Seymour Hersh, *My Lai 4: A Report on the Massacre and Its Aftermath* (Random, 1970); Gerald Hickey, *Village in Vietnam* (Yale, 1964); Edwin B. Hooper, Dean C. Allard, and Oscar P. Fitzgerald, *The United States Navy and the Vietnam Confrontation, Vol. 1: The Setting of*

the Stage to 1959 (Government Printing Office, 1976); John G. Hubbell et al., *P.O.W.: A Definitive History of the American Prisoner of War Experience in Vietnam, 1964-1973* (Reader's Digest Press, 1976); Ken Hurwitz, *Marching Nowhere* (Norton, 1971)

Lyndon B. Johnson, *The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963-1969* (Holt, 1971); Ward S. Just, *To What End: Report from Vietnam* (Houghton Mifflin, 1968)

Doris Kearns, *Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream* (Harper, 1976); Steven Kelman, *Push Comes to Shove: The Escalation of Student Protest* (Houghton Mifflin, 1970); Douglas Kinnard, *The War Managers* (Univ. Press of New England, 1977); Robert W. Komer, *Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: Institutional Constraints on U.S.-GVN Performance in Vietnam* (Rand, 1972); Ron Kovic, *Born on the Fourth of July* (McGraw-Hill, 1976); David Kraslow and Stuart Loory, *The Secret Search for Peace in Vietnam* (Random, 1968)

Anthony Lake, ed., *The Legacy of Vietnam: The War, American Society, and the Future of American Foreign Policy* (New York Univ., 1976); Daniel Lang, *Casualties of War* (McGraw-Hill, 1969); Guenter Lewy, *America in Vietnam* (Oxford, 1978, forthcoming); Don Luce and John Sommer, *Vietnam: The Unheard Voices* (Cornell, 1969)

S. L. A. Marshall, *Ambush: The Battle of Dau Tieng, Also Called the Battle of Dong Minh Chau, War Zone C, Operation Attleboro, and Other Deadfalls in South Vietnam* (Cowles, 1969); *Bird: The Christmas Battle* (Cowles, 1968); *The Fields of Bamboo: Dong Tre, Trung Luong and Hoa Hoi, Three Battles Just Beyond the South China Sea* (Dial, 1971); *West to Cambodia* (Cowles, 1968); John T. McAlister, *Vietnam: The Origins of Revolution* (Knopf, 1969); John T. McAlister and Paul Mus, *The Vietnamese and Their Revolution* (Harper, 1970); Harvey Meyerson, *Vinh Long* (Houghton Mifflin, 1970); John E. Mueller, *War, Presidents, and Public Opinion* (Wiley, 1973)

Don Oberdorfer, *Tet!* (Doubleday, 1971); Tim O'Brien, *Going After Cacciato* (Delacorte, 1978); *If I Die in a Combat Zone, Box Me Up and Ship Me Home* (Delacorte, 1973)

Howard R. Penniman, *Elections in South Vietnam* (American Enterprise Institute, 1973);

Douglas Pike, *History of the Vietnamese Communist Party* (Hoover, 1978); *Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam* (M.I.T., 1966); *The Vietcong Strategy of Terror* (U.S. Mission, Saigon, 1970); Thomas Powers, *The War at Home: Vietnam and the American People, 1964-1968* (Grossman, 1973)

Jeffrey Race, *War Comes to Long An: Revolutionary Conflict in a Vietnamese Province* (Univ. of Calif., 1971); Walt Rostow, *The Diffusion of Power: An Essay in Recent History* (Macmillan, 1972)

Harrison E. Salisbury, *Behind the Lines: Hanoi, December 23-January 7* (Harper, 1967); Herbert Y. Schandler, *The Unmaking of a President: Lyndon Johnson and Vietnam* (Princeton, 1977); Jonathan Schell, *The Military Half: An Account of Destruction in Quang Ngai and Quang Tin* (Knopf, 1968); *The Village of Ben Suc* (Knopf, 1967); Robert Shaplen, *The Lost Revolution: The U.S. in Vietnam, 1946-1966* (Harper, rev. 1966); *The Road From War: Vietnam, 1965-1970* (Harper, 1970); U. S. G. Sharp and William C. Westmoreland, *Report on the War in Vietnam* (Government Printing Office, 1969); Susan Sheehan, *Ten Vietnamese* (Knopf, 1967); Frank Snepp, *Decent Interval: An Insider's Account of Saigon's Indecent End Told by the CIA's Chief Strategy Analyst in Vietnam* (Random, 1977)

W. Scott Thompson and Donaldson D. Frizzell, eds., *The Lessons of Vietnam* (Crane, Russak, 1977); Robert F. Turner, *Vietnamese Communism: Its Origins and Development* (Hoover, 1975)

U.S. Marine Corps, *The Marines in Vietnam, 1954-73: An Anthology and Annotated Bibliography* (USMC, History and Museums Div., 1974)

Sidney Verba et al., *Vietnam and the Silent Majority: The Dove's Guide* (Harper, 1970); Sandy Vogelgesang, *The Long Dark Night of the Soul: The American Intellectual Left and the Vietnam War* (Harper, 1974)

F. J. West, *The Village* (Harper, 1972); William C. Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports* (Doubleday, 1976); Robert H. Whitlow, *The U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1954-64* (USMC, History and Museums Div., 1977)

NOTE: The academic Vietnam Studies Group issues a useful *Bulletin* on current research. Address: Marta Nicholas, SEAC, Box 17, 5828 S. University Ave., Chicago, Ill. 60637.