


THE MIX OF NATIONALITIES



The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, with a population of 21,330,000, is a patchwork of ethnic entities. The country's 98,766-square-mile area (the size of Wyoming) is divided into six republics, plus two autonomous provinces (Vojvodina and Kosovo)—but, as the chart shows, none of these are as ethnically pure as their names suggest. Farming occupies almost half the population in a land which is two-thirds forested and mountainous. Per capita income figures for 1975 show Yugoslavia (\$1,340) trailing both Greece (\$2,601) and Bulgaria (\$1,420).



Yugoslavia

Thirty years after President Tito, now 85, broke with Moscow, Yugoslavia has evolved into the world's first "nonaligned," "atypical" communist state. But everything is relative. American travelers reaching Belgrade from Moscow almost feel as if they were back in the West. Others, arriving in Belgrade from the West, have no doubt that they are behind the Iron Curtain. Here Washington journalist Dusko Doder, in an informal essay drawn from his forthcoming book, looks at the country and its prospects "after Tito," and former U.S. Ambassador Laurence Silberman challenges the conventional American view of Yugoslavia's role on the world scene.



A LAND WITHOUT A COUNTRY

by Dusko Doder

Perhaps understandably, Yugoslavia's image in the West has never been sharply defined. Most Americans know little more about the country than that Marshal Tito fought the Nazis, defied Stalin, and in 1948 pulled out of the Soviet bloc. But even the Yugoslavs have a blurred conception of themselves. In ethnic terms, there is no such thing as a Yugoslav. There are Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians, and many other "nationalities." Although they share a common South (or *Yugo*) Slav origin, they speak different languages, write in different scripts, and until 1918 had never lived under a common flag.

Social differences are just as pronounced. In the north, the country is increasingly "bourgeois," the roads cluttered with billboards for Fiat, Lufthansa, and Coca Cola (*osvezaza najbolje* reads the sign—"refreshes best"). The region has been seduced, to borrow George Ball's phrase, by "ideology on four wheels." But in the backward south, peasants still tie two tractors together and drive them in opposite directions—as they once did with bulls—to determine which is the stronger. Throughout Yugoslavia, 9 out of every 10 homicides are due to blood feuds growing out of offended male pride or old tribal quarrels.

A Byzantine Politician

It has been said that there is, in fact, only one true Yugoslav: Tito. All nations, of course, have their great men, but Tito is unusual. As a dictator, he stands in sharp contrast to his contemporaries—the bloodthirsty Stalin, the fatuous Mussolini, the manic Hitler, the erratic Khrushchev, the unimaginative Franco. Tito is more humane; he has killed fewer people. He has been willing to experiment. And though he considers himself a Marxist, he is less an ideologue than a practical politician with a Byzantine mind.

In his mid-80s, Tito still jets around the world. His immense self-confidence has been reinforced, with age, by a growing conviction of his own greatness. Yet he retains a real hold on the people. "I am for Tito," a young textile worker in Pirot told me. "As long as he is alive, I know the Russians will not come here." And why should the Russians come? He motions toward the Bulgarian border. "Ask them over there."

Among intellectuals and some Party members, however, Tito's penchant for luxurious living provokes private sneers. As if to compensate for the rigors of his early life, 17 castles, villas, and hunting lodges are maintained for his use. For travel, the President has his choice of a special "blue train," a Boeing 727, a

*Dusko Doder, 40, is a reporter for the Washington Post and a former Wilson Center Fellow. Born in Yugoslavia in 1937, he came to the United States after World War II. He received his B.A. from Washington University in St. Louis in 1961 and holds advanced degrees in journalism and history from Columbia. As a foreign correspondent with United Press International, he served in London and Moscow (1968-71) and has covered Canada, Cuba, the Middle East, and the State Department for the Washington Post. From 1973 to 1976, he was based in Belgrade as chief of the newspaper's East European Bureau. This article has been adapted from Doder's *The Yugoslavs*, to be published this spring.*

yacht, and a fleet of limousines. The furniture inside the presidential compound on Uzicka Street in Belgrade might have been designed in Hollywood in the 1930s for a Samuel Goldwyn movie. Most Yugoslavs know this is not the way a Communist leader should live, but as one Yugoslav Marxist has noted: "It's far better to have a *bon vivant* type of dictator like Tito than an ascetic type like Stalin. Our man enjoys the good life and understands that *we* want to live better too."

One of 15 children of a Croatian peasant farmer, Josip Broz Tito was born near Zagreb in 1892. He left home while still in his teens and worked at odd jobs until he was drafted into the Austro-Hungarian army during World War I. Captured by the Russians, he joined the Bolsheviks when they seized power. He returned to Yugoslavia in 1920, joined the Communist Party, and in 1928 was arrested and imprisoned by the royalist government of King Alexander. After another sojourn in Moscow, he became secretary-general of Yugoslavia's clandestine 2,500-member Communist Party. By the time he began fighting the invading Germans in 1941, membership had climbed to a modest 12,000.

Tito had a gift for attracting bright young men, and he selected as deputies three men, all roughly 20 years younger than himself: Edvard Kardelj, a Slovene schoolteacher; Milovan Djilas, a Montenegrin writer and student leader; and Alexander Rankovic, a worker from Serbia. They would work with him for many years.* His guerrilla Partisans, meanwhile, emerged as the only force waging an uncompromising struggle against the Nazis. Tito won recognition—and supplies of arms—from the United States and Britain in 1943, as well as backing from Moscow. By 1945, he controlled the entire country.

Tito pursued rigorously Stalinist policies to crush domestic opposition after the war, but his foreign policy, which early hinted at his current "nonalignment" stance, was too independent for Stalin's taste. When the Russian leader sought to crush Tito in 1948, Tito fought back by adopting an even harsher Stalinist line at home. His anti-Western rhetoric reached new heights as he launched a massive effort to collectivize the countryside. At the same time, thousands of suspected Soviet sympathizers were jailed.

*Of the three, only Kardelj, Tito's heir apparent, remains in power. He has been a member of Yugoslavia's "collective presidency" since 1974. Djilas, author of *The New Class* (1957), *Wartime* (1977), and many other books, was expelled from the Communist Party in 1954 and imprisoned for five years. He now lives under a form of house arrest. Rankovic too is still alive; after serving as Minister of Interior and Vice President (and as chief of the country's secret police), he was ousted in 1966.

Russia's sudden economic blockade inflicted enormous suffering, and in 1950 Tito turned toward the West. (He had signaled his intentions a year earlier by sealing the Yugoslav-Greek border, thereby dooming the postwar Greek Communist insurgency.) Gradually he relaxed his police methods, abandoned collectivization, and began improvising a political-economic system of his own. The Yugoslav Communists were still Marxists, but as C. L. Sulzberger later put it, their dogma might "have been written by Groucho, not Karl."

The Last Hapsburg

Tito was never a romantic dreamer. More than anyone else in his regime, he understood the role of myth in politics. Ideology had to be adjusted to the mentality of backward Yugoslavs who saw the world in terms of ancient epics and legends. Tito reached the peasants not through appeals to class consciousness (they had none) but through displays of sheer physical courage and his movement's sympathy for all South Slav nationalities. He gave himself the title of Marshal in 1943—as he would later assume a regal lifestyle—in part because he realized that the trappings of power have a hold on an army of rustics.

The measure of Josip Broz Tito is not his vanity or his other human failings but the conception he has had of his country and its place in the world: nonalignment abroad and ethnic independence and "self-managing" socialism at home. As he said in 1945, he has no intentions of letting the big powers use Yugoslavia as "small change in their bargaining." At home, he has moved hesitantly away from the grim totalitarian practices of the postwar years and sought to offset the historical weight of Yugoslavia's accumulated ethnic hatreds. British historian A. J. P. Taylor has described Tito as "the last Hapsburg," an apt allusion to the problems involved in holding together a multinational state.

The Yugoslavs have been divided in the most profound way throughout the centuries. In the northwestern half of the country, for example, Roman Catholic Slovenes and Croats lived under Austro-Hungarian rule and belonged to the world of Europe. The Eastern Orthodox Serbs and Macedonians, on the other hand, were long plunged into the darkness that the conquering Ottoman Turks imposed on the Eastern Mediterranean world.

For more than a hundred years, a mad cycle of violence, insurrection, war, and conspiracy, culminating in the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand in 1914, gave the Balkans a repu-

YUGOSLAVIA: A CHRONOLOGY

1804–1817 After four centuries of Turkish rule, Serbian uprisings result in creation of a semiautonomous Serbian state.

1878 Treaty of Berlin makes Serbia an independent nation.

1903 Assassination of Serbian King Alexander I; installation of rival dynasty under Peter I.

1914 Assassination of Austria's Archduke Ferdinand in Sarajevo by Serbian nationalists; outbreak of disastrous war with Austria and World War I.

1918 Proclamation of Yugoslav Kingdom under Serb dynasty.

1934 Assassination of King Alexander III in Marseilles by Croatian separatists.

1941 Conquest of Yugoslavia by Nazi Germany.

1945 Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia proclaimed by Communist-dominated national assembly.

1948 Comintern in Moscow expels Yugoslavia for "doctrinal errors"; Soviet-Yugoslav rift begins.

1949 Tito closes border with Greece, thereby greatly aiding the defeat of the Communists in the Greek Civil War.

1951 Yugoslavia and U.S. sign agreement whereby the United States supplies arms to Yugoslavia.

1954 Milovan Djilas expelled from League of Communists for "doctrinal errors."

1955 Khrushchev visits Belgrade, repairing relations between U.S.S.R. and Yugoslavia.

1961 Belgrade Conference of Nonaligned Countries, led by India, Egypt, and Yugoslavia.

1965 Major reforms advance concept of "market socialism"; end of price controls; devaluation of dinar.

1966 Alexander Rankovic, Tito's chief of secret police, is ousted; police power is significantly restricted.

1968 Tito denounces Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia.

1971 Economic problems spark outburst of Croatian nationalism; Tito threatens to use army to maintain unity.

1973 Yugoslavia permits use of country's airspace to Soviet planes carrying supplies to Egypt during Yom Kippur War.

1974 Adoption of Fourth Constitution with provisions for collective presidency and greater decentralization.

1977 After some debate, the United States approves sale of nuclear reactors to Yugoslavia.

tation as "the powder keg of Europe." From the rubble of World War I, the Yugoslav union was born—the child of President Woodrow Wilson's doctrine of self-determination. It was a problem child from the start.

The most intense rivalry has occurred between the two largest nationalities—the Serbs and the Croats—who share a common language but little else. The smaller groups—the Slovenes and Macedonians—speak entirely different tongues; they have no leadership ambitions, but in other ways they are a problem, too. Each nationality has its own "national" church, which acts as spokesman for the ethnic community and, as a result, often bears the brunt of government repression. More police scrutiny is directed at the Croat Catholic Church, for example, than at any other organization in Yugoslavia.

Nationalist Passions

The 1.7 million Slovenes occupy the Alpine country in the far north. They speak an archaic Slavic language not easily understood by other Yugoslavs and have never had their own state. An industrious, practical people, they value the Yugoslav federation because it gives them a large market for their industrial goods. With 8.3 percent of Yugoslavia's population, the Republic of Slovenia accounts for 16.5 percent of the country's gross national product and more than 20 percent of its foreign trade.

Far to the south, the 1.6 million Macedonians farm among arid hills dotted with the symbols of long-vanished civilizations. In Macedonia, you needn't recreate the past; you are right in it—even though the men in Turkish-style black pantaloons and the women in long embroidered skirts carry transistor radios and haul their produce to the market in West German trucks.

The Croats, who number almost 5 million, are urbane and self-possessed, but nationalist passions run deeper among them than is generally believed. Many Croat intellectuals complain privately about the Yugoslav federation: "If Upper Volta can be independent, why not Croatia?" A proud people, the Croatians lost their independence in the 12th century, largely as the result of a quarrel over whether to use Latin or Glagolitic script. They were subsequently ruled by Hungarians, Austrians, and Turks, with portions of the Dalmatian coast under the control of Venice until 1805.

When the Croats joined Yugoslavia in 1918, they expected to be equal partners in the new state; instead, they were forced to accept a Serbian king. Centuries of subjugation have politically emasculated the Croat elite, whose experience lies in the realm

of intellectual opposition rather than in the exercise of political power. This has given an exclusivist character to Croat nationalists, particularly in their relations with the Serbs, whom they covertly fear and overtly despise.

The 9 million Serbs are as proud as the Croats—perhaps insufferably more so, because they are the only group of South Slavs who managed to throw off the foreign yoke (the last Turks were expelled early in the 19th century). Serbian ties with the Greek Orthodox Church are responsible for a bent for speculative thought that has left the Serbs without much notion of democratic procedures. It is not that they love freedom less, but that they love order more. Serbs have long dominated the army, the police, and the bureaucracy.

At national soccer games between top Croatian and Serbian teams, animosity runs deep. In one recent game, Croatians jeered so loudly that the government-run television network cut the sound altogether. In an earlier game, jubilant Croats celebrated victory by heaving cars with Serbian license plates into the Adriatic. Both incidents occurred, appropriately, in a city named Split.

Ethnic cleavages have been the most intractable of Yugoslav dilemmas. Before Tito, national rivalries produced a constant drama, marked by frequent assassinations (including King Alexander's in 1934), vocal opposition to Serbian predominance, and incessant meddling in Yugoslavia's ethnic affairs by other nations. During World War II, Serbs and Croats fought the Nazis but also slaughtered each other. Although some 1,700,000 Yugoslavs died in the war, only about 300,000 were killed by Germans. The rest were victims of fratricidal warfare—among Tito's Partisans, Draza Mihailovic's Chetniks, Croatian fascists, and others.

After Liberation

Out of this war-cum-civil war, Tito's Communist Party emerged as the only solid political force committed to the idea of South Slav unity. The Party had several advantages: able leadership, a clear sense of purpose, and a membership spanning all ethnic groups. Originally, the Communists adopted a centralized, "unitarist" approach to governing the nation (had not Marx proclaimed the natural erosion of ethnic differences under socialism?) and their rhetoric was enriched with confident predictions of future concord.

A largely fictitious federation was set up in which Slovenia, Macedonia, Croatia, and Serbia became constituent republics. A

DJILAS: THE AGONY OF LIBERATION

At the end of World War II, Yugoslavia erupted in bloody factional strife. The scars remain to this day. Milovan Djilas's vivid recollections of those turbulent times are from his recent book, Wartime.

How many victims were there? I believe that no one knows exactly, or will ever know. According to what I heard in passing from a few officials involved in that settling of scores, the number exceeds twenty thousand—though it must certainly be under thirty thousand, including the Chetniks, the Ustashi, and the Home Guards. They were killed separately, each group on the territory where they had been taken prisoner. A year or two later, there was grumbling in the Slovenian Central Committee that they had trouble with the peasants from those areas, because underground rivers were casting up bodies. They also said that piles of corpses were heaving up as they rotted in shallow mass graves, so that the very earth seemed to breathe. . . .

Yet [the secret police organization] continued to carry out executions, according to its own often local and inconsistent criteria, until late in 1945, when at a meeting of the Central Committee Tito cried out in disgust, "Enough of all these death sentences and all this killing! The death sentence no longer has any effect! No one fears death anymore!"

The war and the revolution were at an end. But the hatreds and divisions continued to bring destruction and death, both inside and outside the country.

© 1977 by Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc. Reprinted with permission.

region between Serbia and Croatia containing Serbs, Croats, and 1.5 million Islamic Slavs—mostly around the city of Sarajevo with its 100 mosques—was declared the (single) Republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina. Montenegro, a small Serb state whose people had defied the Turks and remained free in their wild mountains, become the sixth republic. Within the Serbian Republic were two autonomous regions: Kosovo, with its one million volatile Albanians (who have the highest birth rate in Europe), and Vojvodina, with a number of minorities, including Hungarians, Slovaks, Czechs, Romanians, and Ruthenians.

But government from Belgrade proved unwieldy. In the early 1960s, Tito sided with his Party's progressives and prepared the ground for the current experiment in which all nationalities are entitled to home rule and the right to full ethnic and cultural development—in fact as well as in law.

How serious is the ethnic problem now? It is impossible to say. The evidence is too contradictory. Young Yugoslavs have much more in common than their fathers ever did; they have also lived through an unprecedented 30 years of peace. Moreover, the whole country is in the throes of a consumerism that sharply diverts attention from the spiritual to the material. Yet ethnicity remains a sensitive issue. One Croat, when asked whether he was happy that Tito, a Croat, was in power, shot back, "Tito is not really a Croat. Tito is a Communist."

Ideology Without Fervor

Aside from the army, the League of Communists, led by Tito, is the only "national" institution in Yugoslavia. It defies conventional notions of a Communist Party as a tightly knit secular order imbued with ideological zeal. Quite the contrary. I have spoken to hundreds of Party members but have never found one who, when speaking privately, was a true believer. Undoubtedly among Yugoslavia's 1.4 million Party members there must be a few zealots, but it is difficult for an outsider to discover who they are.

Ideological weakness among Yugoslav Communists is hardly surprising. Ideological conflict with the Russian Communists has left Yugoslavs disoriented. So have internal squabbles. First, Djilas was ousted in 1954 for advocating political pluralism. Then in 1966, Rankovic was expelled for opposing pluralism. Finally, Tito and Kardelj were themselves challenged in the 1970s on nationality issues by moderate Communists in Croatia and Serbia. These shifts have drained the Party's proclaimed ideology of its vigor and left the rank and file confused and cynical.

Ironically, the Communists have done far more to foster the average man's participation in politics than did Yugoslavia's earlier regimes. Yugoslavs have never felt part of a body politic; they are generally far less concerned with national politics than with local issues—which usually mean ethnic issues. That is why Tito's "self-management" doctrine, when finally applied in earnest in the mid-'60s, appeared so ideally suited to the country. In brief, self-management sought to replace centralized economic planning with decentralized decision-making on the regional, local, and even factory level. And it has indeed introduced elements of civic and economic responsibility while easing some ethnic tensions.

It has also produced an upsurge of nationalism among the regional Communist Parties. The crisis in Croatia in 1971 was a

major jolt. There, the young Communist chiefs saw themselves as Croatia's national leaders, not as part of Yugoslavia's Communist leadership. Eventually, Tito drew the line. It was one thing to give workers more responsibility. It was quite another to watch centrifugal forces pull apart the ruling oligarchy. Tito set in motion a wholesale purge of the younger liberal regional officials, while adding several hundred thousand new members to the Party to replace ousted cadres. Party membership again became the prerequisite for all top jobs. "We had to do it," one senior Party official explained. "We were close to complete anarchy."

The Croatian crisis introduced a somewhat more repressive overall attitude in the mid-'70s (in 1975, for example, the regime banned the critical Marxist journal *Praxis*). Yet the Yugoslav system, taken on its own terms, still stands up well against other authoritarian systems. Despite the absence of serious public debate on key issues, a good deal more private and informal consultation occurs within the Yugoslav Party than in some political parties in the West. The hold of the Party on the average Yugoslav is like a choke collar on a dog: The leash is very long; one doesn't feel it until one forgets it exists. As Finance Minister Momcilo Cernovic once put it, the Party is "like a schoolmaster who doesn't use his stick often."

A "Most Wonderful" Conspiracy

What makes Yugoslavia unique in the Communist world is its hybrid internal system—that mixture of socialism, capitalism, utopianism, and Balkan anarchism the Yugoslavs call *samoupravljanje*, or self-management. The country is a self-managed commonwealth; each citizen is a self-manager; together, citizens make decisions in a self-managed manner, suggesting a New England town meeting gone wild. Except for cars, homes, farms, land, and personal possessions, everything is owned by the state: banks, factories, newspapers, theaters, public utilities. The operation of each enterprise, however, from distribution of profits to capital investments, is supposed to be determined by its employees—unlike enterprises in the rest of the Communist bloc, where state and party bureaucrats make all the decisions.

Before the effects of Tito's economic alchemy were felt in the mid-'60s, Yugoslavia's system of central planning was almost identical to the Kremlin's. It was guided by experts in Belgrade who sought maximum growth, but it also produced waste, rigidity, uneven development, and chaotic distribution.

The replacement of Soviet-style economic centralism with self-management introduced the dynamism of the market place.

Many left-wing intellectuals outside Yugoslavia consider self-management an alternative to the two tested industrial systems, capitalism and communism, but as practiced in Yugoslavia it is really something else. Self-management, the dull official weekly *Kommunist* once noted in a rare flash of whimsy, "is the most wonderful ideological conspiracy in the world."

Self-management was hatched as an ideological conspiracy by Milovan Djilas and Edvard Kardelj in 1949 when, in the aftermath of Tito's feud with Stalin, Yugoslavia was expelled from the Communist movement. Djilas seized on Marx's idea of free associations of producers as a possible alternative to the Russian model: The six republics and most businesses would run themselves, with the government in Belgrade retaining responsibility for defense, foreign policy, and other "essential" functions. After much debate, Tito announced the new law of self-management in 1950.

For more than a decade, self-management existed primarily as a propaganda slogan, with most enterprises still controlled from Belgrade, but compelling practical reasons soon forced a more rational approach to the economy. The regime was faced with popular dissatisfaction. In 1958, some 4,000 coal miners staged a three-day strike in Slovenia—the first known strike in Tito's Yugoslavia. Stoppages spread rapidly. There were 225 strikes in 1962, and 271 in 1964.

The Economic Reform Act of 1965 ended centralized economic planning and introduced a market system. In a single stroke, the government shifted responsibility for business operations to employees, who were forced to sink or swim on their own. At first, factories stopped hiring, then began laying off workers. The shock brought self-management to life. The number of strikes dropped sharply.

A Touch of Madness

Perhaps, just perhaps, self-management might have worked properly in a highly advanced, ethnically homogeneous country, or in a Yugoslavia where all nationalities were in a comparable state of economic and social development. That was not the case. Although the acquisition of regional home rule, whose development paralleled that of industrial self-management, led to a laissez-faire economy and the release of unsuspected business talents, it also fueled graft, corruption, and cutthroat competition, and the country lurched into the bourgeois world.

There was a good deal of chaos to it all—and a touch of madness. The system quickly created regional interests, practically destroyed the unity of Tito's Party, and revived his ingrained fear of ethnic nationalism. Since 1972, Tito's lieutenant, Edvard Kardelj, has been charged with doctoring the system to keep it from acting up again. The state and the Party have reverted to the old system of tight control.

Faults and pretensions aside, self-management has introduced some real changes. It has legitimized self-expression and dissent—to a degree. More importantly, with its help Yugoslavia has managed a smoother transition to industrialization than any other East European country. The traditional agricultural society that existed before World War II (in 1938, 80 percent of all Yugoslavs lived on farms) has all but disappeared. Three out of five Yugoslavs now work in industries or services. Illiteracy is down to 15 percent; 70 percent of the people have electric stoves; purchases of cars, washing machines, and TV sets in the period 1968–73 showed a 100 percent jump over the preceding two decades.

But as historian Sir Charles Webster once cautioned, there is a difference between participating *in* and participating *at* decision-making, and self-management swings indecisively between the two. In some places, workers really run the show. In others, the enterprise is under management's thumb. One executive told me that his company had placed a Lear jet at his disposal. When requesting permission to land, his pilots are routinely asked to identify the owner of the craft. "I have trained them to reply to these queries, 'The jet belongs to the working people of —,'" he said and gave the name of his company. He then broke into convulsive laughter.

If one of the problems of self-management is that it has not been successful enough, the other is that it has been too successful. With the elimination of state-subsidized jobs, Yugoslav unemployment climbed sharply. It now stands at 11 percent. One result has been a dramatic increase in the export of migrant labor, as young Yugoslavs travel to other parts of Western Europe to seek work. For 60 percent of these young workers, a West European job is their first.

About one million Yugoslavs at any given time are dispersed over the Continent from Sweden to Switzerland to France, most of them doing the hard, dirty jobs that prosperous West Europeans are no longer willing to do. Like migrants from Greece, Turkey, Italy, and Portugal, they man the assembly lines of automobile plants in Sweden, Germany, and France, clean the streets of Paris and Geneva, collect garbage in Zurich, and

MILITARY POLICY

Defense Doctrine: Sensitive to their anomalous position between the Eastern and Western powers, the Yugoslavs base their defense upon the concept of a "nation in arms." A strong regular Army and a very large Territorial Force are the main components of the Yugoslav deterrent.

Regular Forces: Consisting of 20 divisions, the 193,000-man regular Army is well trained and well led. Domestic production accounts for 80 percent of arms needs, but sophisticated weapons must be imported. The Air Force is equipped with 287 combat aircraft largely of Soviet make, although a Yugoslav/Romanian fighter has been developed. The Army sees itself as the guardian of national unity in the face of both internal and external threats. In case of attack, the Army is to provide time for the Territorial Force to mobilize.

Territorial Force: Created in the late 1960s, the Territorial Force and its youth auxiliary numbers 900,000 and will eventually reach 3 million. Participation is compulsory, with units organized and commanded locally. In case of invasion, it is estimated that 77 percent of the population would be enlisted in the resistance. Belgrade hopes that the very existence of this force makes it clear to Moscow that Yugoslavia will be a far more difficult target than Czechoslovakia was in 1968.

unload cargo in Malmo. All earn handsome wages, especially by Yugoslav standards.

To get the money for a house (and a de luxe model Peugeot), Franjo Fric, a stocky, curly-haired lathe operator, left his hometown in Croatia in 1969 and spent two years in a Daimler-Benz automobile plant near Stuttgart in West Germany. There was no other way; in Yugoslavia he made the equivalent of \$90 a month. "That was too little for my family. I wanted a house."

He was 34 when he went to Germany and didn't speak German. He lived in a factory dormitory with other Yugoslavs, four to a room, working overtime whenever possible, preparing his own food, and saving his money. "After a month," he recalls, "I was making the same salary as a German worker. And because I didn't spend it, I had enough after two years to come home and carry out my plan."

There is no reliable figure on the number of Yugoslavs who have lived and worked in the industrial centers of Western

Europe since the early 1960s, but it is probably several million. Yugoslavia has benefited enormously. Expatriate Yugoslavs send home more than \$1 billion a year, the largest single source of hard currency for the Tito government. The sheer size of the current Yugoslav contribution to West European industry is staggering. Those one million workers—"our seventh republic," as the weekly Yugoslav newsmagazine *NIN* called them—account for nearly 20 percent of the country's labor force. This involvement in Western Europe has provided returning Yugoslav workers with the skills that helped propel Yugoslavia into the technical age.

Psychologically, the West is Yugoslavia's new frontier. Yugoslav migrants bearing cardboard suitcases and the stamp of Balkan life arrive in the industrial cities looking like turn-of-the-century immigrants at Ellis Island. They return home in new clothes that testify to the indelible marks of the West. The migrants' re-entry is frequently painful.

Finally, there is the political aspect. The expatriates have seen democracy at work and have become acquainted with the notion of social consensus. In Sweden, for example, they are permitted to vote in local elections even though they are foreigners. After returning home, they are not likely to accept authoritarian decision-making without a challenge.

Titoism Without Tito

In the winter of 1976, Belgrade's diplomatic community was buzzing with one of those periodic rumors about Tito's failing health. The Western wire services broadcast the speculation, and diplomats made cautious inquiries. As usual, the Yugoslav press said nothing. Then a week or so later, a photograph of Tito popped up on the front pages of the papers: Tito hunting in the Bosnian mountains, posing with a rifle beside the body of a dead brown bear. It was Tito's annual bear-hunting picture. But as the President grows older, his hunting exploits become less believable, and the temptation to crack jokes about them becomes greater and greater.

With the passing of charismatic leaders, countries invariably turn inward. Lesser men get bogged down in domestic problems, and dreams of masterstrokes in foreign policy fade. Tito's heir must come to grips with the most difficult question before the country: How much individual freedom can be permitted? Tito has grappled with the question for years, sidestepping the issue in many ingenious ways. He has adopted a series of half measures—consumerism, open borders, self-manage-

ment, ethnic rights, freedom of movement—all to divert attention from the central question.

But Tito's heirs, whoever they are, will not have the broad popular appeal needed to sustain the Titoist illusion that something new has emerged at the juncture of Eastern and Western Europe and that new Marxist truths have been discovered. The genius of Tito has never lain in ideology but always in practical policy. He has sought to force on his country a cultural renaissance and an industrial revolution in only three decades. His has been an era of dramatic innovation. His heirs must seek a different muse.

It would be impossible today, short of cataclysmic civil war or direct Soviet intervention, to turn Yugoslavia into a people's democracy of the East European type. It would be equally impossible for Tito's heirs to turn the country quickly into a Western democracy. So cornered, they will probably try to maintain the status quo—Titoism without Tito. But the status quo cannot be maintained for long. Tito's successors will have to move toward reform or find new props to shore up the autocracy.

For the new, younger men, this will be a dialectical situation. They have helped set in motion an improbable process of change and reform. In their lifetimes, they have seen the country transformed by electricity, technology, upward mobility. Despite these achievements, the right of the people to pursue their destiny in a free political environment has been denied. The country now seems to have reached the point where it is ready for the ultimate test, the test of personal freedom, without which all previous social experiments seem like ploys and illusions behind which an oligarchy simply maintained itself in power.

"We are in the age of Communist Reformation," one prominent Belgrade writer told me. "In the 16th century you had different ways of interpreting the Bible. Now you have different ways of interpreting Marx. The regime remains authoritarian, there's no doubt about that. But it took Tito five years to close down *Praxis*. In Russia, they could have done it in a few days without any fuss. The younger men would like to see a pluralistic society in Yugoslavia. As long as the old Partisans are in power, nothing like that will happen. But eventually . . ."