

The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, with a population of 21,330,000, is a patchwork of ethnic entities. The country's 98,766-square-mile area (the size of Wyoming) is divided into six republics, plus two autonomous provinces (Vojvodina and Kosovo)—but, as the chart shows, none of these are as ethnically pure as their names suggest. Farming occupies almost half the population in a land which is two-thirds forested and mountainous. Per capita income figures for 1975 show Yugoslavia (\$1,340) trailing both Greece (\$2,601) and Bulgaria (\$1,420).



# Yugoslavia

Thirty years after President Tito, now 85, broke with Moscow, Yugoslavia has evolved into the world's first "nonaligned," "atypical" communist state. But everything is relative. American travelers reaching Belgrade from Moscow almost feel as if they were back in the West. Others, arriving in Belgrade from the West, have no doubt that they are behind the Iron Curtain. Here Washington journalist Dusko Doder, in an informal essay drawn from his forthcoming book, looks at the country and its prospects "after Tito," and former U.S. Ambassador Laurence Silberman challenges the conventional American view of Yugoslavia's role on the world scene.



## A LAND WITHOUT A COUNTRY

*by Dusko Doder*

Perhaps understandably, Yugoslavia's image in the West has never been sharply defined. Most Americans know little more about the country than that Marshal Tito fought the Nazis, defied Stalin, and in 1948 pulled out of the Soviet bloc. But even the Yugoslavs have a blurred conception of themselves. In ethnic terms, there is no such thing as a Yugoslav. There are Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians, and many other "nationalities." Although they share a common South (or *Yugo*) Slav origin, they speak different languages, write in different scripts, and until 1918 had never lived under a common flag.

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Social differences are just as pronounced. In the north, the country is increasingly "bourgeois," the roads cluttered with billboards for Fiat, Lufthansa, and Coca Cola (*osvezaza najbolje* reads the sign—"refreshes best"). The region has been seduced, to borrow George Ball's phrase, by "ideology on four wheels." But in the backward south, peasants still tie two tractors together and drive them in opposite directions—as they once did with bulls—to determine which is the stronger. Throughout Yugoslavia, 9 out of every 10 homicides are due to blood feuds growing out of offended male pride or old tribal quarrels.

### A Byzantine Politician

It has been said that there is, in fact, only one true Yugoslav: Tito. All nations, of course, have their great men, but Tito is unusual. As a dictator, he stands in sharp contrast to his contemporaries—the bloodthirsty Stalin, the fatuous Mussolini, the manic Hitler, the erratic Khrushchev, the unimaginative Franco. Tito is more humane; he has killed fewer people. He has been willing to experiment. And though he considers himself a Marxist, he is less an ideologue than a practical politician with a Byzantine mind.

In his mid-80s, Tito still jets around the world. His immense self-confidence has been reinforced, with age, by a growing conviction of his own greatness. Yet he retains a real hold on the people. "I am for Tito," a young textile worker in Pirot told me. "As long as he is alive, I know the Russians will not come here." And why should the Russians come? He motions toward the Bulgarian border. "Ask them over there."

Among intellectuals and some Party members, however, Tito's penchant for luxurious living provokes private sneers. As if to compensate for the rigors of his early life, 17 castles, villas, and hunting lodges are maintained for his use. For travel, the President has his choice of a special "blue train," a Boeing 727, a

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yacht, and a fleet of limousines. The furniture inside the presidential compound on Uzicka Street in Belgrade might have been designed in Hollywood in the 1930s for a Samuel Goldwyn movie. Most Yugoslavs know this is not the way a Communist leader should live, but as one Yugoslav Marxist has noted: "It's far better to have a *bon vivant* type of dictator like Tito than an ascetic type like Stalin. Our man enjoys the good life and understands that *we* want to live better too."

One of 15 children of a Croatian peasant farmer, Josip Broz Tito was born near Zagreb in 1892. He left home while still in his teens and worked at odd jobs until he was drafted into the Austro-Hungarian army during World War I. Captured by the Russians, he joined the Bolsheviks when they seized power. He returned to Yugoslavia in 1920, joined the Communist Party, and in 1928 was arrested and imprisoned by the royalist government of King Alexander. After another sojourn in Moscow, he became secretary-general of Yugoslavia's clandestine 2,500-member Communist Party. By the time he began fighting the invading Germans in 1941, membership had climbed to a modest 12,000.

Tito had a gift for attracting bright young men, and he selected as deputies three men, all roughly 20 years younger than himself: Edvard Kardelj, a Slovene schoolteacher; Milovan Djilas, a Montenegrin writer and student leader; and Alexander Rankovic, a worker from Serbia. They would work with him for many years.\* His guerrilla Partisans, meanwhile, emerged as the only force waging an uncompromising struggle against the Nazis. Tito won recognition—and supplies of arms—from the United States and Britain in 1943, as well as backing from Moscow. By 1945, he controlled the entire country.

Tito pursued rigorously Stalinist policies to crush domestic opposition after the war, but his foreign policy, which early hinted at his current "nonalignment" stance, was too independent for Stalin's taste. When the Russian leader sought to crush Tito in 1948, Tito fought back by adopting an even harsher Stalinist line at home. His anti-Western rhetoric reached new heights as he launched a massive effort to collectivize the countryside. At the same time, thousands of suspected Soviet sympathizers were jailed.

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\*Of the three, only Kardelj, Tito's heir apparent, remains in power. He has been a member of Yugoslavia's "collective presidency" since 1974. Djilas, author of *The New Class* (1957), *Wartime* (1977), and many other books, was expelled from the Communist Party in 1954 and imprisoned for five years. He now lives under a form of house arrest. Rankovic too is still alive; after serving as Minister of Interior and Vice President (and as chief of the country's secret police), he was ousted in 1966.

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Russia's sudden economic blockade inflicted enormous suffering, and in 1950 Tito turned toward the West. (He had signaled his intentions a year earlier by sealing the Yugoslav-Greek border, thereby dooming the postwar Greek Communist insurgency.) Gradually he relaxed his police methods, abandoned collectivization, and began improvising a political-economic system of his own. The Yugoslav Communists were still Marxists, but as C. L. Sulzberger later put it, their dogma might "have been written by Groucho, not Karl."

### **The Last Hapsburg**

Tito was never a romantic dreamer. More than anyone else in his regime, he understood the role of myth in politics. Ideology had to be adjusted to the mentality of backward Yugoslavs who saw the world in terms of ancient epics and legends. Tito reached the peasants not through appeals to class consciousness (they had none) but through displays of sheer physical courage and his movement's sympathy for all South Slav nationalities. He gave himself the title of Marshal in 1943—as he would later assume a regal lifestyle—in part because he realized that the trappings of power have a hold on an army of rustics.

The measure of Josip Broz Tito is not his vanity or his other human failings but the conception he has had of his country and its place in the world: nonalignment abroad and ethnic independence and "self-managing" socialism at home. As he said in 1945, he has no intentions of letting the big powers use Yugoslavia as "small change in their bargaining." At home, he has moved hesitantly away from the grim totalitarian practices of the postwar years and sought to offset the historical weight of Yugoslavia's accumulated ethnic hatreds. British historian A. J. P. Taylor has described Tito as "the last Hapsburg," an apt allusion to the problems involved in holding together a multinational state.

The Yugoslavs have been divided in the most profound way throughout the centuries. In the northwestern half of the country, for example, Roman Catholic Slovenes and Croats lived under Austro-Hungarian rule and belonged to the world of Europe. The Eastern Orthodox Serbs and Macedonians, on the other hand, were long plunged into the darkness that the conquering Ottoman Turks imposed on the Eastern Mediterranean world.

For more than a hundred years, a mad cycle of violence, insurrection, war, and conspiracy, culminating in the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand in 1914, gave the Balkans a repu-

### YUGOSLAVIA: A CHRONOLOGY

**1804–1817** After four centuries of Turkish rule, Serbian uprisings result in creation of a semiautonomous Serbian state.

**1878** Treaty of Berlin makes Serbia an independent nation.

**1903** Assassination of Serbian King Alexander I; installation of rival dynasty under Peter I.

**1914** Assassination of Austria's Archduke Ferdinand in Sarajevo by Serbian nationalists; outbreak of disastrous war with Austria and World War I.

**1918** Proclamation of Yugoslav Kingdom under Serb dynasty.

**1934** Assassination of King Alexander III in Marseilles by Croatian separatists.

**1941** Conquest of Yugoslavia by Nazi Germany.

**1945** Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia proclaimed by Communist-dominated national assembly.

**1948** Comintern in Moscow expels Yugoslavia for "doctrinal errors"; Soviet-Yugoslav rift begins.

**1949** Tito closes border with Greece, thereby greatly aiding the defeat of the Communists in the Greek Civil War.

**1951** Yugoslavia and U.S. sign agreement whereby the United States supplies arms to Yugoslavia.

**1954** Milovan Djilas expelled from League of Communists for "doctrinal errors."

**1955** Khrushchev visits Belgrade, repairing relations between U.S.S.R. and Yugoslavia.

**1961** Belgrade Conference of Nonaligned Countries, led by India, Egypt, and Yugoslavia.

**1965** Major reforms advance concept of "market socialism"; end of price controls; devaluation of dinar.

**1966** Alexander Rankovic, Tito's chief of secret police, is ousted; police power is significantly restricted.

**1968** Tito denounces Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia.

**1971** Economic problems spark outburst of Croatian nationalism; Tito threatens to use army to maintain unity.

**1973** Yugoslavia permits use of country's airspace to Soviet planes carrying supplies to Egypt during Yom Kippur War.

**1974** Adoption of Fourth Constitution with provisions for collective presidency and greater decentralization.

**1977** After some debate, the United States approves sale of nuclear reactors to Yugoslavia.

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tation as "the powder keg of Europe." From the rubble of World War I, the Yugoslav union was born—the child of President Woodrow Wilson's doctrine of self-determination. It was a problem child from the start.

The most intense rivalry has occurred between the two largest nationalities—the Serbs and the Croats—who share a common language but little else. The smaller groups—the Slovenes and Macedonians—speak entirely different tongues; they have no leadership ambitions, but in other ways they are a problem, too. Each nationality has its own "national" church, which acts as spokesman for the ethnic community and, as a result, often bears the brunt of government repression. More police scrutiny is directed at the Croat Catholic Church, for example, than at any other organization in Yugoslavia.

#### **Nationalist Passions**

The 1.7 million Slovenes occupy the Alpine country in the far north. They speak an archaic Slavic language not easily understood by other Yugoslavs and have never had their own state. An industrious, practical people, they value the Yugoslav federation because it gives them a large market for their industrial goods. With 8.3 percent of Yugoslavia's population, the Republic of Slovenia accounts for 16.5 percent of the country's gross national product and more than 20 percent of its foreign trade.

Far to the south, the 1.6 million Macedonians farm among arid hills dotted with the symbols of long-vanished civilizations. In Macedonia, you needn't recreate the past; you are right in it—even though the men in Turkish-style black pantaloons and the women in long embroidered skirts carry transistor radios and haul their produce to the market in West German trucks.

The Croats, who number almost 5 million, are urbane and self-possessed, but nationalist passions run deeper among them than is generally believed. Many Croat intellectuals complain privately about the Yugoslav federation: "If Upper Volta can be independent, why not Croatia?" A proud people, the Croatians lost their independence in the 12th century, largely as the result of a quarrel over whether to use Latin or Glagolitic script. They were subsequently ruled by Hungarians, Austrians, and Turks, with portions of the Dalmatian coast under the control of Venice until 1805.

When the Croats joined Yugoslavia in 1918, they expected to be equal partners in the new state; instead, they were forced to accept a Serbian king. Centuries of subjugation have politically emasculated the Croat elite, whose experience lies in the realm

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of intellectual opposition rather than in the exercise of political power. This has given an exclusivist character to Croat nationalists, particularly in their relations with the Serbs, whom they covertly fear and overtly despise.

The 9 million Serbs are as proud as the Croats—perhaps insufferably more so, because they are the only group of South Slavs who managed to throw off the foreign yoke (the last Turks were expelled early in the 19th century). Serbian ties with the Greek Orthodox Church are responsible for a bent for speculative thought that has left the Serbs without much notion of democratic procedures. It is not that they love freedom less, but that they love order more. Serbs have long dominated the army, the police, and the bureaucracy.

At national soccer games between top Croatian and Serbian teams, animosity runs deep. In one recent game, Croatians jeered so loudly that the government-run television network cut the sound altogether. In an earlier game, jubilant Croats celebrated victory by heaving cars with Serbian license plates into the Adriatic. Both incidents occurred, appropriately, in a city named Split.

Ethnic cleavages have been the most intractable of Yugoslav dilemmas. Before Tito, national rivalries produced a constant drama, marked by frequent assassinations (including King Alexander's in 1934), vocal opposition to Serbian predominance, and incessant meddling in Yugoslavia's ethnic affairs by other nations. During World War II, Serbs and Croats fought the Nazis but also slaughtered each other. Although some 1,700,000 Yugoslavs died in the war, only about 300,000 were killed by Germans. The rest were victims of fratricidal warfare—among Tito's Partisans, Draza Mihailovic's Chetniks, Croatian fascists, and others.

#### **After Liberation**

Out of this war-cum-civil war, Tito's Communist Party emerged as the only solid political force committed to the idea of South Slav unity. The Party had several advantages: able leadership, a clear sense of purpose, and a membership spanning all ethnic groups. Originally, the Communists adopted a centralized, "unitarist" approach to governing the nation (had not Marx proclaimed the natural erosion of ethnic differences under socialism?) and their rhetoric was enriched with confident predictions of future concord.

A largely fictitious federation was set up in which Slovenia, Macedonia, Croatia, and Serbia became constituent republics. A



### DJILAS: THE AGONY OF LIBERATION

*At the end of World War II, Yugoslavia erupted in bloody factional strife. The scars remain to this day. Milovan Djilas's vivid recollections of those turbulent times are from his recent book, Wartime.*

How many victims were there? I believe that no one knows exactly, or will ever know. According to what I heard in passing from a few officials involved in that settling of scores, the number exceeds twenty thousand—though it must certainly be under thirty thousand, including the Chetniks, the Ustashi, and the Home Guards. They were killed separately, each group on the territory where they had been taken prisoner. A year or two later, there was grumbling in the Slovenian Central Committee that they had trouble with the peasants from those areas, because underground rivers were casting up bodies. They also said that piles of corpses were heaving up as they rotted in shallow mass graves, so that the very earth seemed to breathe. . . .

Yet [the secret police organization] continued to carry out executions, according to its own often local and inconsistent criteria, until late in 1945, when at a meeting of the Central Committee Tito cried out in disgust, "Enough of all these death sentences and all this killing! The death sentence no longer has any effect! No one fears death anymore!"

The war and the revolution were at an end. But the hatreds and divisions continued to bring destruction and death, both inside and outside the country.

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region between Serbia and Croatia containing Serbs, Croats, and 1.5 million Islamic Slavs—mostly around the city of Sarajevo with its 100 mosques—was declared the (single) Republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina. Montenegro, a small Serb state whose people had defied the Turks and remained free in their wild mountains, become the sixth republic. Within the Serbian Republic were two autonomous regions: Kosovo, with its one million volatile Albanians (who have the highest birth rate in Europe), and Vojvodina, with a number of minorities, including Hungarians, Slovaks, Czechs, Romanians, and Ruthenians.

But government from Belgrade proved unwieldy. In the early 1960s, Tito sided with his Party's progressives and prepared the ground for the current experiment in which all nationalities are entitled to home rule and the right to full ethnic and cultural development—in fact as well as in law.

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How serious is the ethnic problem now? It is impossible to say. The evidence is too contradictory. Young Yugoslavs have much more in common than their fathers ever did; they have also lived through an unprecedented 30 years of peace. Moreover, the whole country is in the throes of a consumerism that sharply diverts attention from the spiritual to the material. Yet ethnicity remains a sensitive issue. One Croat, when asked whether he was happy that Tito, a Croat, was in power, shot back, "Tito is not really a Croat. Tito is a Communist."

### **Ideology Without Fervor**

Aside from the army, the League of Communists, led by Tito, is the only "national" institution in Yugoslavia. It defies conventional notions of a Communist Party as a tightly knit secular order imbued with ideological zeal. Quite the contrary. I have spoken to hundreds of Party members but have never found one who, when speaking privately, was a true believer. Undoubtedly among Yugoslavia's 1.4 million Party members there must be a few zealots, but it is difficult for an outsider to discover who they are.

Ideological weakness among Yugoslav Communists is hardly surprising. Ideological conflict with the Russian Communists has left Yugoslavs disoriented. So have internal squabbles. First, Djilas was ousted in 1954 for advocating political pluralism. Then in 1966, Rankovic was expelled for opposing pluralism. Finally, Tito and Kardelj were themselves challenged in the 1970s on nationality issues by moderate Communists in Croatia and Serbia. These shifts have drained the Party's proclaimed ideology of its vigor and left the rank and file confused and cynical.

Ironically, the Communists have done far more to foster the average man's participation in politics than did Yugoslavia's earlier regimes. Yugoslavs have never felt part of a body politic; they are generally far less concerned with national politics than with local issues—which usually mean ethnic issues. That is why Tito's "self-management" doctrine, when finally applied in earnest in the mid-'60s, appeared so ideally suited to the country. In brief, self-management sought to replace centralized economic planning with decentralized decision-making on the regional, local, and even factory level. And it has indeed introduced elements of civic and economic responsibility while easing some ethnic tensions.

It has also produced an upsurge of nationalism among the regional Communist Parties. The crisis in Croatia in 1971 was a

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major jolt. There, the young Communist chiefs saw themselves as Croatia's national leaders, not as part of Yugoslavia's Communist leadership. Eventually, Tito drew the line. It was one thing to give workers more responsibility. It was quite another to watch centrifugal forces pull apart the ruling oligarchy. Tito set in motion a wholesale purge of the younger liberal regional officials, while adding several hundred thousand new members to the Party to replace ousted cadres. Party membership again became the prerequisite for all top jobs. "We had to do it," one senior Party official explained. "We were close to complete anarchy."

The Croatian crisis introduced a somewhat more repressive overall attitude in the mid-'70s (in 1975, for example, the regime banned the critical Marxist journal *Praxis*). Yet the Yugoslav system, taken on its own terms, still stands up well against other authoritarian systems. Despite the absence of serious public debate on key issues, a good deal more private and informal consultation occurs within the Yugoslav Party than in some political parties in the West. The hold of the Party on the average Yugoslav is like a choke collar on a dog: The leash is very long; one doesn't feel it until one forgets it exists. As Finance Minister Momcilo Cernovic once put it, the Party is "like a schoolmaster who doesn't use his stick often."

### A "Most Wonderful" Conspiracy

What makes Yugoslavia unique in the Communist world is its hybrid internal system—that mixture of socialism, capitalism, utopianism, and Balkan anarchism the Yugoslavs call *samoupravljanje*, or self-management. The country is a self-managed commonwealth; each citizen is a self-manager; together, citizens make decisions in a self-managed manner, suggesting a New England town meeting gone wild. Except for cars, homes, farms, land, and personal possessions, everything is owned by the state: banks, factories, newspapers, theaters, public utilities. The operation of each enterprise, however, from distribution of profits to capital investments, is supposed to be determined by its employees—unlike enterprises in the rest of the Communist bloc, where state and party bureaucrats make all the decisions.

Before the effects of Tito's economic alchemy were felt in the mid-'60s, Yugoslavia's system of central planning was almost identical to the Kremlin's. It was guided by experts in Belgrade who sought maximum growth, but it also produced waste, rigidity, uneven development, and chaotic distribution.

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The replacement of Soviet-style economic centralism with self-management introduced the dynamism of the market place.

Many left-wing intellectuals outside Yugoslavia consider self-management an alternative to the two tested industrial systems, capitalism and communism, but as practiced in Yugoslavia it is really something else. Self-management, the dull official weekly *Kommunist* once noted in a rare flash of whimsy, "is the most wonderful ideological conspiracy in the world."

Self-management was hatched as an ideological conspiracy by Milovan Djilas and Edvard Kardelj in 1949 when, in the aftermath of Tito's feud with Stalin, Yugoslavia was expelled from the Communist movement. Djilas seized on Marx's idea of free associations of producers as a possible alternative to the Russian model: The six republics and most businesses would run themselves, with the government in Belgrade retaining responsibility for defense, foreign policy, and other "essential" functions. After much debate, Tito announced the new law of self-management in 1950.

For more than a decade, self-management existed primarily as a propaganda slogan, with most enterprises still controlled from Belgrade, but compelling practical reasons soon forced a more rational approach to the economy. The regime was faced with popular dissatisfaction. In 1958, some 4,000 coal miners staged a three-day strike in Slovenia—the first known strike in Tito's Yugoslavia. Stoppages spread rapidly. There were 225 strikes in 1962, and 271 in 1964.

The Economic Reform Act of 1965 ended centralized economic planning and introduced a market system. In a single stroke, the government shifted responsibility for business operations to employees, who were forced to sink or swim on their own. At first, factories stopped hiring, then began laying off workers. The shock brought self-management to life. The number of strikes dropped sharply.

### **A Touch of Madness**

Perhaps, just perhaps, self-management might have worked properly in a highly advanced, ethnically homogeneous country, or in a Yugoslavia where all nationalities were in a comparable state of economic and social development. That was not the case. Although the acquisition of regional home rule, whose development paralleled that of industrial self-management, led to a laissez-faire economy and the release of unsuspected business talents, it also fueled graft, corruption, and cutthroat competition, and the country lurched into the bourgeois world.

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There was a good deal of chaos to it all—and a touch of madness. The system quickly created regional interests, practically destroyed the unity of Tito's Party, and revived his ingrained fear of ethnic nationalism. Since 1972, Tito's lieutenant, Edvard Kardelj, has been charged with doctoring the system to keep it from acting up again. The state and the Party have reverted to the old system of tight control.

Faults and pretensions aside, self-management has introduced some real changes. It has legitimized self-expression and dissent—to a degree. More importantly, with its help Yugoslavia has managed a smoother transition to industrialization than any other East European country. The traditional agricultural society that existed before World War II (in 1938, 80 percent of all Yugoslavs lived on farms) has all but disappeared. Three out of five Yugoslavs now work in industries or services. Illiteracy is down to 15 percent; 70 percent of the people have electric stoves; purchases of cars, washing machines, and TV sets in the period 1968–73 showed a 100 percent jump over the preceding two decades.

But as historian Sir Charles Webster once cautioned, there is a difference between participating *in* and participating *at* decision-making, and self-management swings indecisively between the two. In some places, workers really run the show. In others, the enterprise is under management's thumb. One executive told me that his company had placed a Lear jet at his disposal. When requesting permission to land, his pilots are routinely asked to identify the owner of the craft. "I have trained them to reply to these queries, 'The jet belongs to the working people of —,'" he said and gave the name of his company. He then broke into convulsive laughter.

If one of the problems of self-management is that it has not been successful enough, the other is that it has been too successful. With the elimination of state-subsidized jobs, Yugoslav unemployment climbed sharply. It now stands at 11 percent. One result has been a dramatic increase in the export of migrant labor, as young Yugoslavs travel to other parts of Western Europe to seek work. For 60 percent of these young workers, a West European job is their first.

About one million Yugoslavs at any given time are dispersed over the Continent from Sweden to Switzerland to France, most of them doing the hard, dirty jobs that prosperous West Europeans are no longer willing to do. Like migrants from Greece, Turkey, Italy, and Portugal, they man the assembly lines of automobile plants in Sweden, Germany, and France, clean the streets of Paris and Geneva, collect garbage in Zurich, and

### MILITARY POLICY

*Defense Doctrine:* Sensitive to their anomalous position between the Eastern and Western powers, the Yugoslavs base their defense upon the concept of a "nation in arms." A strong regular Army and a very large Territorial Force are the main components of the Yugoslav deterrent.

*Regular Forces:* Consisting of 20 divisions, the 193,000-man regular Army is well trained and well led. Domestic production accounts for 80 percent of arms needs, but sophisticated weapons must be imported. The Air Force is equipped with 287 combat aircraft largely of Soviet make, although a Yugoslav/Romanian fighter has been developed. The Army sees itself as the guardian of national unity in the face of both internal and external threats. In case of attack, the Army is to provide time for the Territorial Force to mobilize.

*Territorial Force:* Created in the late 1960s, the Territorial Force and its youth auxiliary numbers 900,000 and will eventually reach 3 million. Participation is compulsory, with units organized and commanded locally. In case of invasion, it is estimated that 77 percent of the population would be enlisted in the resistance. Belgrade hopes that the very existence of this force makes it clear to Moscow that Yugoslavia will be a far more difficult target than Czechoslovakia was in 1968.

unload cargo in Malmo. All earn handsome wages, especially by Yugoslav standards.

To get the money for a house (and a de luxe model Peugeot), Franjo Fric, a stocky, curly-haired lathe operator, left his hometown in Croatia in 1969 and spent two years in a Daimler-Benz automobile plant near Stuttgart in West Germany. There was no other way; in Yugoslavia he made the equivalent of \$90 a month. "That was too little for my family. I wanted a house."

He was 34 when he went to Germany and didn't speak German. He lived in a factory dormitory with other Yugoslavs, four to a room, working overtime whenever possible, preparing his own food, and saving his money. "After a month," he recalls, "I was making the same salary as a German worker. And because I didn't spend it, I had enough after two years to come home and carry out my plan."

There is no reliable figure on the number of Yugoslavs who have lived and worked in the industrial centers of Western

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Europe since the early 1960s, but it is probably several million. Yugoslavia has benefited enormously. Expatriate Yugoslavs send home more than \$1 billion a year, the largest single source of hard currency for the Tito government. The sheer size of the current Yugoslav contribution to West European industry is staggering. Those one million workers—"our seventh republic," as the weekly Yugoslav newsmagazine *NIN* called them—account for nearly 20 percent of the country's labor force. This involvement in Western Europe has provided returning Yugoslav workers with the skills that helped propel Yugoslavia into the technical age.

Psychologically, the West is Yugoslavia's new frontier. Yugoslav migrants bearing cardboard suitcases and the stamp of Balkan life arrive in the industrial cities looking like turn-of-the-century immigrants at Ellis Island. They return home in new clothes that testify to the indelible marks of the West. The migrants' re-entry is frequently painful.

Finally, there is the political aspect. The expatriates have seen democracy at work and have become acquainted with the notion of social consensus. In Sweden, for example, they are permitted to vote in local elections even though they are foreigners. After returning home, they are not likely to accept authoritarian decision-making without a challenge.

#### **Titoism Without Tito**

In the winter of 1976, Belgrade's diplomatic community was buzzing with one of those periodic rumors about Tito's failing health. The Western wire services broadcast the speculation, and diplomats made cautious inquiries. As usual, the Yugoslav press said nothing. Then a week or so later, a photograph of Tito popped up on the front pages of the papers: Tito hunting in the Bosnian mountains, posing with a rifle beside the body of a dead brown bear. It was Tito's annual bear-hunting picture. But as the President grows older, his hunting exploits become less believable, and the temptation to crack jokes about them becomes greater and greater.

With the passing of charismatic leaders, countries invariably turn inward. Lesser men get bogged down in domestic problems, and dreams of masterstrokes in foreign policy fade. Tito's heir must come to grips with the most difficult question before the country: How much individual freedom can be permitted? Tito has grappled with the question for years, sidestepping the issue in many ingenious ways. He has adopted a series of half measures—consumerism, open borders, self-manage-

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ment, ethnic rights, freedom of movement—all to divert attention from the central question.

But Tito's heirs, whoever they are, will not have the broad popular appeal needed to sustain the Titoist illusion that something new has emerged at the juncture of Eastern and Western Europe and that new Marxist truths have been discovered. The genius of Tito has never lain in ideology but always in practical policy. He has sought to force on his country a cultural renaissance and an industrial revolution in only three decades. His has been an era of dramatic innovation. His heirs must seek a different muse.

It would be impossible today, short of cataclysmic civil war or direct Soviet intervention, to turn Yugoslavia into a people's democracy of the East European type. It would be equally impossible for Tito's heirs to turn the country quickly into a Western democracy. So cornered, they will probably try to maintain the status quo—Titoism without Tito. But the status quo cannot be maintained for long. Tito's successors will have to move toward reform or find new props to shore up the autocracy.

For the new, younger men, this will be a dialectical situation. They have helped set in motion an improbable process of change and reform. In their lifetimes, they have seen the country transformed by electricity, technology, upward mobility. Despite these achievements, the right of the people to pursue their destiny in a free political environment has been denied. The country now seems to have reached the point where it is ready for the ultimate test, the test of personal freedom, without which all previous social experiments seem like ploys and illusions behind which an oligarchy simply maintained itself in power.

"We are in the age of Communist Reformation," one prominent Belgrade writer told me. "In the 16th century you had different ways of interpreting the Bible. Now you have different ways of interpreting Marx. The regime remains authoritarian, there's no doubt about that. But it took Tito five years to close down *Praxis*. In Russia, they could have done it in a few days without any fuss. The younger men would like to see a pluralistic society in Yugoslavia. As long as the old Partisans are in power, nothing like that will happen. But eventually . . ."





## TITOISM AND BEYOND

*by Laurence Silberman*

What is Yugoslavia's significance now? What will it be after Tito? Conventional answers usually point to the country's anomalous international position—neither Eastern nor Western, neither capitalist nor (in the Soviet sense) communist, neither neutral nor satellite. But these are descriptive clichés, not answers.

A real analysis of Yugoslavia's importance must focus on more tangible factors: on its geographical position, its volatile ethnic situation, its much-touted internal system of "self-management," and its "nonaligned" foreign policy. These elements define modern Yugoslavia. And, collectively, they must underlie any speculation about Yugoslavia after Tito.

Yugoslavia's geostrategic importance, for example, cannot be denied, especially with Greece and Turkey feuding within the NATO alliance, with Italy sliding deeper into a political morass, and with the Middle East as troubled as ever. What are the ramifications of Yugoslavia returning completely to the Russian orbit? What are the consequences of closer ties with the West?

And what of the thorny nationalities question? Surely a resolution of Yugoslavia's ethnic tensions, particularly the centrifugal tendencies of Croats and Albanians, has implications for other nations facing similar challenges—Spain with its Basque minority, Great Britain with its Welsh and Scottish separatists, and most importantly, the Soviet Union, where more than half the population is not of Russian stock.

Then, too, there is Yugoslavia's precariously balanced internal structure, that indigenous brand of communism the Yugoslavs call "self-managing socialism" and outsiders dub "Titoism." Some Western analysts—among them, many State Department policymakers—view this hybrid regime as a possi-

ble model for the evolution of Eastern Europe. Others—Soviet planners, perhaps?—appear to find it a pattern for the evolution of *Western* Europe. And some American academics see it as a pacesetting example for the Third World. Indeed, they argue, there may be characteristics even the United States would do well to emulate.

Such analysts assume that Yugoslavia is important because it is betwixt and between: because it has forged an attractive middle course between the competing powers, ideologies, and cultures of capitalist West and communist East.\* Yugoslavia, in this analysis, is like Bossom, the young Member of Parliament who rose to deliver his maiden speech. "Bossom, Bossom," muttered Winston Churchill, rolling the name over on his tongue. "Why, it is neither the one thing nor the other." When in fact, I would argue, Yugoslavia is rather *more* one thing than the other: more communist than socialist, more authoritarian than democratic, more anti-American than nonaligned. And much of the country's significance lies in the fact that the United States has failed to realize this.

#### Joycean Fictions

Take its internal system, for example. One cannot deny that Yugoslavia has introduced elementary aspects of a market economy; that its businesses have some degree of autonomy; or that political repression is less heavy-handed than in other Eastern European countries. But these modifications of orthodox, Russian-style communism are minor compared to Yugoslavia's efforts to adapt and apply basic Marxist ideology. "Self-management," after all, was never intended as a break from communism; it was a *post hoc* rationale to soften the blow of Yugoslavia's expulsion from the Communist movement in 1948. The Yugoslavs wanted, and got, their own compass; but the needle points in the same general direction as before.

To be sure, one hears diaphanous lectures in Yugoslavia about "restrictions" on the Communist Party, about what it should and should not do. But although the Party is called the "League of Communists"—deliberately suggestive of a friendly discussion group that does not actually decide issues, like the Ripon Society or the League of Women Voters—the fiction wears thin when, as in December of 1975, Tito sternly reminds his countrymen that they are governed by a Communist Party

\* These scholars owe a considerable debt to Russian dissident Andrei Sakharov's controversial "convergence" theory. See *Progress, Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom*, New York: Norton, 1968.

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dictatorship whose function is to lead.

This inability to articulate squarely the extent of Communist Party control is reflected in the oft-amended Yugoslav Constitution (which reads like *Finnegans Wake*) and in a series of recent statutes (which Yugoslavs describe as an "impenetrable fog"). The Constitution is thought to point to greater *decentralization*—politically and economically. However, Belgrade's actual tendencies reveal a push toward greater *centralization*.

In Yugoslavia, there is still political repression; even private thoughts, privately confided to a private diary, can lead to imprisonment. The most effective way of dealing with a recalcitrant, "heretical" bureaucracy remains the purge. And since 1971, when Croatian and Serbian liberalism frightened Tito into tightening Belgrade's control, Yugoslavia, in my view, has been tending toward more repression, not less.

Is this the Yugoslavia proffered as a model for East and West and South? Eastern Europeans may envy the relative freedom Yugoslavs now enjoy. But the Poles, Czechs, East Germans, and Hungarians—even the Russians—do not take Yugoslavia's institutional structures seriously. Without the presence of Soviet troops, as the Czechs tried to show in 1968, the rest of Eastern Europe would quickly liberalize beyond the point Yugoslavia has reached.

In Western Europe and America, only academic romantics enchanted by false images of workers' councils dancing around maypoles believe Yugoslav "self-management," with all its contradictions, worth emulation. Even the radicals of the Third World, infatuated with verbal Marxism, have not paid close attention to Yugoslavia's domestic policies. Indeed, during my time in Belgrade, Third World diplomats seemed particularly patronizing towards Yugoslavia's static experimentation.

### Anti-American Nonalignment

By contrast, Yugoslav foreign policy commands enormous Third World attention and admiration. Tito has deftly maneuvered between the two superpowers, and he helped found the 86-member "nonaligned" bloc that has successfully manipu-

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*The importance of Yugoslavia's strategic location on the Adriatic Sea is reinforced by the ideological diversity of her neighbors. The United States has no current aid agreement with Tito but did provide just under \$700 million in military assistance between 1951 and 1959. Economic aid totaled \$2.2 billion during the years 1951 through 1966, with most of this coming during the 1950s.*


lated the United Nations in order to amplify and thereby exaggerate its own power. The mistake here is to take "nonalignment" to mean nonalignment. For it does not.

Yugoslavia follows an anti-American foreign policy. It is structurally independent of the Soviets but pursues similar basic goals. And while nonalignment has brought some tangible economic benefits to Yugoslavia—such as cheaper Libyan and Iraqi oil, as well as joint industrial ventures with African nations—it is a strategy based less on pragmatism than on ideology.

Tito, with India's Nehru and Egypt's Nasser, launched the nonaligned movement in 1961. Its members range from Brazil and Argentina on the right to Cuba and North Korea on the left; the fulcrum, however, is decidedly to the left of center. The nonaligned nations, led by Yugoslavia, consistently oppose the Western democracies—particularly American economic and political power. They have called for the "decolonization" of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands and for withdrawal

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*In October of 1949, the Soviet humor magazine Krokodil portrayed Tito as ready to sell Yugoslavia to Wall Street and likened him to Adolf Hitler.*



of U.S. troops from South Korea. In the United Nations, they supported the "Zionism-is-racism" resolution of 1975.

But that's not all. The Yugoslavs allowed Soviet overflights to supply the Arab armies in 1973 and the pro-Soviet MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) during the Angolan civil war in 1976. They have fed fictional accounts to the State Department concerning their violations of the terms of at least half a dozen trade contracts with the United States. And most recently, they have sent U.S.-built tanks to Ethiopia in blatant disregard of solemn agreements with this country.

#### **After Tito, What?**

As I have noted before,\* U.S. policy toward the Yugoslavs, oddly, takes little of this into account. To paraphrase Dr. Johnson, the State Department has but two ideas about Yugoslavia, and they are wrong ones: that our *only* interest in Yugoslavia is to prevent it from sliding back into the Soviet bloc; and that we further that end by providing open-ended military and economic support. On the first point, surely U.S. interests also include undercutting Yugoslav attempts to frustrate American aims throughout the world. Moreover, the Yugoslavs stayed Moscow's hand without our help for three years (1948-51) and have maintained a credible deterrent ever since. A Russian invasion against a "population in arms" on rugged Balkan terrain would cost Moscow dearly. On the second point, our one-way friendship seems only to have encouraged the Yugoslavs to see how far they can go. It may well be that the *less* support Yugoslavia got from the United States, the *more* it would feel obliged to resist Soviet pressure in order to maintain its autonomy.

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\* See "Yugoslavia's 'Old' Communism: Europe's Fiddler on the Roof," in *Foreign Policy*, Spring 1977.

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Whatever the merits of that argument, U.S. policy toward Yugoslavia will probably undergo a major upheaval when 85-year-old Josip Broz Tito finally relinquishes his astonishingly persistent hold on this life. The questions then facing the Yugoslavs will be the very ones confronting State Department planners: What will happen to Tito's foreign policy ventures? What will become of Yugoslavia's mixed-bag domestic program? And how will the Soviets respond? No one can answer these questions; at best we can only guess.

Even in the late 1930s, Tito was called *Stari* ("the old one") by his much younger subordinates—who today make up the aging Yugoslav leadership. No one in the country in a position of influence has known a time when Tito didn't potentially, if not actually, exercise ultimate authority. No matter how much the Yugoslavs seek to discount the impact of Tito's death by prior arrangements to assure continuity—the Constitution, for instance, provides for a collective nine-man presidency to succeed the Marshal—it is unlikely that Titoism, in *all* its unique manifestations, can long survive its creator.

Yugoslav foreign policy seems most likely to change. After Tito, it will probably recede in importance both to the Yugoslavs and to the world. When a leader achieves a greater impact on the global stage than his country's size or wealth would dictate, his death is usually followed by a period of retrenchment. India turned inward after Nehru, France after De Gaulle, Ghana after Nkrumah, Indonesia after Sukarno, Egypt after Nasser. (Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat's bold Mideast initiatives have been prompted largely by a desire to disentangle Egypt from foreign conflict.)

### Pluralism's Appeal

But what will turning inward do to Yugoslavia's internal development? Will the system gravitate towards the West? The Belgrade leadership denies this—as, of course, it must. But the average Yugoslav does, in fact, look towards Western Europe to see the direction of Yugoslav change. The influence of Western culture is pervasive and Western economic progress, which Yugoslavs envy, is seen by most Yugoslavs as inextricably linked to Western political structures.

Even the new middle class—those professionals, technocrats and intellectuals who achieved newfound status under Tito's Communism, and who might be thought to have much to gain by a continuation of the status quo—appear sympathetic to political pluralism and restraints on government power. Natu-

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rally, the Communist Party does not lightly contemplate loss of its influence. But there are diverging currents within that organization, and certainly some of its leaders are not immune to pluralism's appeal. Edvard Kardelj, the most influential Yugoslav after Tito, recently predicted in his typically elliptical fashion the evolution of a unique Yugoslav pluralism. That he spoke in such terms at all—"pluralism" had been officially taboo—reveals the party's sensitivity to underlying currents.

The Army is another matter; it is probably the most conservative force in Yugoslavia, and anti-Western attitudes are a good deal more prevalent in the military than many in the West have hoped or imagined. While the only real function of the Yugoslav military (Belgrade's propaganda to the contrary) is to deter and, if need be, counter a threat from the Soviet Union, the military is indoctrinated in training as if the primary threat were from NATO. Even a gradual move towards Western pluralism could be bumpy, and the Yugoslav military—like most militaries—prefers a stable political climate.

Post-Tito Yugoslavia could well move towards the West in fits and starts, dragging the military along like a sea anchor. But there are two unknowns: the nationalities problem and the Soviets. We simply cannot know how virulent Croatian or, for that matter, Albanian separatism will become. Some recent Croatian émigrés have displayed a shocking, devil-take-the-hindmost attitude towards Croatian independence. This view is not dominant inside Croatia, but one would be foolish to discount it. Any sign of real separatism, as opposed to simple Croatian desires for greater federalism, might decisively chill Belgrade's push for liberalization.

As for the Soviets, there may well be a small planning group in the Kremlin whose job it is to calculate the degree of Yugoslav deviance that amounts to abandonment of communism and, thereby, deals an unacceptable blow to the Leninist doctrine of inevitable triumph. If so, the Soviet response is unpredictable; unfortunately, so too is that of the United States.



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## BACKGROUND BOOKS

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### YUGOSLAVIA

In 1937 British novelist and journalist Rebecca West, with her banker husband, spent an Easter holiday in Yugoslavia. The vitality of its people and the primitive countryside captured her imagination. She went on to immerse herself in the research for **BLACK LAMB AND GREY FALCON: A Journey Through Yugoslavia** (Viking, 1941). Her 1,180-page book remained in print for 33 years and is still available in most libraries. It may be the best book ever written about Yugoslavia.

Dame Rebecca's rich, old-fashioned mixture of travelogue, cultural history, and political reportage builds slowly but once begun is hard to put down. She combines an encyclopedic knowledge of political theory and the past with a gift for conveying ideas through the reality of people, places, and events.

A willful, charming trio of Yugoslavs meets the travelers on the railway station platform as they arrive in Zagreb and provides a kind of chorus for her narrative. They are Constantine, a Serbian Jew of Polish descent who sees Yugoslavia as a political necessity; Valetta, who believes in an autonomous Croatia and "might suddenly stop smiling and clench his long hands and offer himself up to martyrdom for an idea"; and Gregorievitch, the oldest, also a Croat and veteran of the struggle against Austro-Hungarian domination. To Gregorievitch, Yugoslavia is "the Kingdom of Heaven on earth" and Valetta is a traitor, while Constantine "seems impious in the way he takes the nation for granted."

Their Yugoslavia—a nation-state that emerged from World War I after centuries of alien rule—is not Tito's Yugoslavia, any more than Rebecca West's Europe of wagon-lits and leisure is today's Europe

of autobahns, 747s, and hurry-up. But her chronicle of quarrels among compatriots in a period of relative freedom from outside pressures between the wars links the present to the historic past.

A good, brief survey of the country's divided East-West background is provided in **A SHORT HISTORY OF YUGOSLAVIA: From Early Times to 1966**, edited by Stephen Clissold (Cambridge, 1966, cloth; 1968, paper). Five noted British historians and observers of the Balkans offer lucid studies of the individual states and regions that were patched together to make Yugoslavia in 1918; these are followed by analyses of political, economic, and military developments to the mid-'60s.

What happened in the mountains and fertile valleys of Yugoslavia before its first incarnation as a unified, predominantly peasant state is too complex for successful compression, even in the 282 pages of the Cambridge *Short History*. But the essayists clarify the importance of the resistance offered by the Yugoslav peasantry to the invading armies that from time immemorial have marched into southeastern Europe. Much of the energy of these disparate rural groups was devoted to attempts to absorb, dominate, or unite with one another against a common enemy.

The Turkish victory at Kosovo in 1389 led to the destruction of the medieval Serbian state, the conversion to Islam of most of Bosnia and Hercegovina, and the dependence of Croatia and Dalmatia on the Catholic powers (Hungary, Austria, Venice). Not until the plight of Macedonian Christians, recoiling before further "Ottomanization," precipitated the Balkan Wars of 1912-13 was Turkey finished in Europe. The imprint of the eastern



(Ottoman) empire remained—just as the influence of the western (Austro-Hungarian) empire survived Woodrow Wilson's insistence on Yugoslavia's independence following World War I.

That this political amalgam of antagonistic rural peoples lasted through the inter-war years is remarkable. That the imposed and inherited differences among them erupted in civil war even as they fought against the Axis occupiers is no surprise. That their union was reaffirmed by the Partisans and then was formally re-established "under the stern guidance of Marshal Tito's Communist regime" is, as Clissold remarks, "a notable achievement."

U.S. diplomat Walter R. Roberts, in **TITO, MIHAILOVIĆ, AND THE ALIENS, 1941-45** (Rutgers, 1973), gives a well-documented account of the World War II Resistance and the civil war in which Tito triumphed over Droža Mihailović's Chetniks. Tito emerged as "a foreign Party leader who did not owe his existence to the Soviet Union" and who therefore could not be "a true and reliable Communist in Stalin's eyes." Roberts concludes that only an Allied landing in Yugoslavia might have altered the outcome of the internal struggle.

Dissident Yugoslav writer Milovan Djilas has published 12 books in the West. **THE NEW CLASS** (Praeger, 1957, cloth; 1974, paper), which followed his 1954 break with Party leaders, was a devastating portrayal of Communist bureaucrats and bigwigs. His latest, **WARTIME** (Harcourt, 1977), is an old Partisan's account of the brutal 1941-45 struggles that Roberts covers as an outsider.

A variety of analyses of Yugoslavia's special hybrid brand of socialism have appeared in the 1960s and '70s. Today's Yugoslavia is a political scientist's dream and an irresistible challenge to sociologists and economists.

**YUGOSLAVIA AND THE NEW COMMUNISM**, by George W. Hoffman

and Fred Warner Neal (Twentieth Century Fund, 1962) is the enduring granddaddy of these books. The authors voice the scholarly consensus: After Tito (his death or "retirement" was a bone already being chewed 16 years ago), Titoism—neither totalitarian nor democratic—will endure.

Tensions notwithstanding, Yugoslav institutions are still as likely to succeed as they are to fail in realizing "their own proclaimed principles of self-managing socialist democracy," according to Denison Rusinow in **THE YUGOSLAV EXPERIMENT, 1948-1974** (Univ. of Calif., 1977). Rusinow, who has worked in Yugoslavia and in Austria with the American Universities Field Staff since 1963, provides a good introduction to domestic politics.

No comparable single study dealing with Yugoslav foreign policy exists. However, John C. Campbell's **TITO'S SEPARATE ROAD: America and Yugoslavia in World Politics** (Harper, 1967) traces Belgrade's changing ties not only with Washington but also with the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and the Third World from Tito's 1948 split with Stalin. "Yugoslavia needs both the East and the West in its trade and other economic relations," Campbell wrote 10 years ago. Most U.S. diplomats today share his opinion that the West "has the opportunity . . . to strengthen the country's independence." A. Ross Johnson's **YUGOSLAVIA: In the Twilight of Tito** (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1974) covers recent twists and turns in Yugoslav nonalignment policy and military strategy. His prognosis: "For all its internal controversies, Yugoslavia will at worst muddle through."

In **AN ESSAY ON YUGOSLAV SOCIETY** (White Plains, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, International Arts and Sciences Press, 1969) and **THE YUGOSLAV ECONOMIC SYSTEM: The First Labor-Managed Economy in the Making** (Sharpe, 1976),

Branko Horvat, a provocative Belgrade economist, criticizes foibles and weaknesses that he knows first hand. He writes that Yugoslav socialism will stand or fall on its success at the factory level, and that "there is still a long way to go to the realization of genuine self-management."

Barnard professor Deborah D. Milenkovitch, in **PLAN AND MARKET IN YUGOSLAV ECONOMIC THOUGHT** (Yale, 1971), questions whether a socialist state can decentralize and remain socialist. It can, she concludes, but she believes that centrally planned production and investment decisions in Yugoslavia became impossible for strictly political reasons. The interests of the six republics differed so sharply that "no consensus about . . . objectives . . . [or] development strategy was possible."

An interesting new addition to the literature on Tito's Yugoslavia is **PRAXIS: Marxist Criticism and Dissent in Socialist Yugoslavia** (Indiana Univ., 1977), edited by Gerson S. Sher. The *Praxis* group, named after the bimonthly journal published in Belgrade from 1965 until its suppression by the authorities in 1975, were Marxist dissidents. The magazine was perhaps the most freewheeling publication in the Communist world and an ornament of Yugoslavia's unique road to socialism. Notable in Sher's volume is a reprint from the final issue of an article by novelist Dobrica Ćosić (himself a lifelong Communist and until 1968 a member of the Serbia Party's central committee). "We have been deceived, but we are also swindlers," says Ćosić. "Deprivation of freedom is, socially, the worst crime."

In January of this year, Ćosić's new novel, **A TIME OF DEATH** (Harcourt,

1978), appeared in English translation. Set in 1914, it is an epic of the period when the peasant army of Serbia fought starving Austrian troops, while Serbia's Prime Minister was trying to secure Russian aid, and Serbia and Bulgaria also warred over a helpless Macedonia. The confusion of nations and interests against which personal dramas are played out reflects the great themes of Yugoslav historical fiction.

The classic among such novels is Ivo Andrić's **THE BRIDGE ON THE DRINA** (Allen & Unwin, 1959; Univ. of Chicago, 1977, paper). Dr. Andrić, a Yugoslav diplomat, wrote in the Serbo-Croatian language. *Bridge*, first published in Belgrade in 1945, won the Nobel Prize for literature in 1961. It is a deeply moving story about passing generations—Moslem and Christian—in the Bosnian town of Visegrad. Their lives are dominated by a stone bridge of remarkable grace and strength built in the 16th century at the order of an enlightened grand vizier. Yet another Yugoslav symbol (with Rebecca West's black lamb and grey falcon), the bridge survives winter ice, spring floods, wars, and local feuds until it is blown up in the fighting between Serbian and Austrian troops in the Balkan Wars. As the bridge crumbles under shellfire, the town's eccentric old Moslem *hodja* dies, thinking, as his heart gives out: "Anything might happen. But one thing could not happen; it could not be that great and wise men of exalted soul who would raise lasting buildings for the love of God, so that the world should be more beautiful and man live in it better and more easily, should everywhere and for all time vanish from this earth . . . That could not be."

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EDITOR'S NOTE. *Advice and comments on a number of books were supplied by Laura D'Andrea Tyson, assistant professor of economics, the University of California at Berkeley, and a participant in a conference on Yugoslavia held by the Kennan Institute of the Wilson Center in October 1977. Ruzica Popovitch, Yugoslav area specialist at the Library of Congress, also made valuable suggestions.*