OTHER NATIONS

Was It Luck	"The Napoleonic Myth" by Correlli Bar- nett, in The Illustrated London News (May
or Genius?	1978), British Publications Inc., 11-03 46th Ave., Long Island City, N.Y. 11101.

Napoleon Bonaparte, Emperor of France, was a master of modern public relations who brilliantly portrayed himself as a national hero and military genius. In reality, argues Barnett, author of the new biography *Bonaparte*, Napoleon "was not a heroic genius or a master of war at all, but an overconfident gambler pursuing a fundamentally unsound system of war and statecraft."

Many of Bonaparte's costly campaigns were launched to further his personal political interests—to consolidate his shaky regime (France was bankrupt in 1795 after six years of war and revolutionary turmoil)—rather than to enhance the security or well-being of France. He is credited with instituting a new era of warfare—abandoning complex supply systems in favor of fast maneuvers and quick, decisive battles. But his method of providing money and food for his army by stripping the enemy countryside led to popular uprisings, notably in

Italy, that forced him to disperse his troops to protect his own lines of communication.

The battlefield victories—from Montenotte in 1796 to Ligny in 1815—that gave Bonaparte his military fame, says Barnett, were "the product of quick-witted opportunism and fast, hard punching, of sheer energy and ruthless will to win, together with an army to match. They were victories of sheer pugilistic skill over ponderous, slow-reacting, conventionally minded opponents."

Bonaparte's technique of advancing without adequate supplies or transport worked well as long as his opponents failed

to recognize his precarious position and his critical need for rapid victory. By avoiding decisive battle and conducting a protracted war (a strategy the Russians developed by accident in 1812), Bonaparte's enemies could have destroyed him long before Waterloo.

Decelerating Eurocommunism

"Eurocommunism: Who's in Charge?" by Don Cook, in *The Atlantic Monthly* (June 1978), Box 1857, Greenwich, Ct. 06830.

There is strong evidence to suggest that (on instructions from Moscow) the French Communist Party under Georges Marchais intentionally shattered its alliance with the Socialists in order to destroy any chance of a leftist victory in the French parliamentary elections late last year. The behavior of the French Communists has exposed the myth of

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