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**FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE**


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Graf Karl Stürgh as a protest against the war and failed to arouse public support.

Both political assassinations were the work of naive, romantic idealists seeking a martyrdom that they never achieved. (Princip died, forgotten, in prison; Adler was pardoned.) In each case, says Alder, a Utah State University historian, the slayings removed key leaders but both were quickly replaced and their policies continued. Yet, the goals of the assassins were ultimately secured. A year after Princip's death, South Slav unification became a reality with the creation of Yugoslavia in 1919. A war-weary Austria surrendered, the Hapsburg Empire collapsed, and Adler was released from prison in time to help the Social Democrats create the First Austrian Republic.

Princip and Adler both sought to influence public opinion rather than government policy. "Their aim was not to cause change by removing a crucial personality but to draw attention to an issue by killing a renowned figure," says Alder. The common element in both cases was "systemic frustration"—an inability to arouse public feeling in support of an ideology (one nationalist, the other pacifist). Desperation led them to employ assassination—the act of "ultimate political pressure"—which had significant long-range results that they never anticipated.

### *Reviewing JFK's Legacy*

"Bearing The Burden: A Critical Look at JFK's Foreign Policy" by Thomas G. Patterson, in *The Virginia Quarterly Review* (Spring 1978), One West Range, Charlottesville, Va. 22903.

Before his death in 1963, President John F. Kennedy reportedly expressed doubts about the wisdom of U.S. involvement in Vietnam and called for a re-examination of American Cold War attitudes. Apart from the nuclear test ban treaty, however, the real legacy of his foreign policy, argues Patterson, a University of Connecticut historian, must include a massive arms race, neglect of traditional diplomacy, global over-commitment, and "conspicuous reliance upon military force to solve diplomatic tussles."

Like many contemporaries, Kennedy and his advisers were members of the "containment generation," nurtured on such Cold War triumphs as aid to Greece and Turkey, the Marshall Plan, NATO, and Point Four. They were convinced that the nation must negotiate from strength; that communism was monolithic—a cancer feeding on poverty which had to be contained by countermeasures on a global scale.

The 1962 Cuban missile crisis offered the Kennedy administration a welcome opportunity to demonstrate toughness. But, in suspending private diplomacy in favor of a televised challenge to the Russians, Patterson argues, Kennedy "significantly increased the chances of war." Moscow was publicly humiliated and later reacted by launching a massive arms buildup.

Kennedy's belief that evolutionary economic development would insure noncommunist political stability in the Third World led to the

**FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE**

Alliance for Progress and the Peace Corps, as well as to the counterinsurgency philosophy embodied in the Army's Green Berets. But Kennedy's concept of "nation-building" gave inadequate attention to the world's diversity and complexity, the variety of political forces and cultural traditions, and the compelling appeal of revolutionary dogmas. Finally, says Patterson, Kennedy "did not estimate the strain that would be placed on American resources and patience in this long-term, global role as policeman and teacher."

Would JFK have changed had he lived? Probably not, Patterson suggests. The President would have had to drop his hard-line advisers and their Cold War notions, admit error, and abandon his natural predilection for bold action.

### *Two Views on Human Rights*

"The Carter Administration and Human Rights—Part I: A Crusade Quickly Cancelled" by Tracy Early; "Part II: A Commitment Sustained" by Patricia Derian, in *Worldview* (July-Aug. 1978), P.O. Box 986, Farmingdale, N.Y. 11735.

President Carter's human rights crusade has been abandoned, says Early, a New York writer, because "it endangered too many American interests without visibly weakening tyrannies abroad." Reduced to absurdity, "the crusade now amounts to looking at 105 countries receiving American aid or buying American weapons and finally deciding it is safe to penalize Nicaragua."

The policy was applied inconsistently, Early contends. It was pursued in the Soviet Union, where the United States has little leverage, but less so in South Korea, where U.S. influence is substantial. At the same time, Carter's crusade encouraged both those Americans who favor a return to the Cold War and those who welcome any excuse to withhold foreign aid anywhere. The President, says Early, should have recognized "the dangers of moralistic posturing."

Mrs. Derian, Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, denies that the human rights effort has been abandoned. "Enhancing respect for human rights and human dignity remains a fundamental objective of U.S. foreign policy," she says.

Carter's human rights policy has been implemented on the basis of three principles: (a) that the policy is global and not aimed at any particular country; (b) that it should be implemented pragmatically, taking account of each country's situation; and (c) that it does not replace other U.S. foreign policy objectives, such as our national security, but will be pursued along with other significant national goals.

The United States has deferred bilateral economic assistance or opposed loans by the World Bank to countries that seriously violate human rights (e.g., Argentina). Human rights concerns have resulted in the reduction or denial of military aid to some countries (e.g., Ethiopia). The human rights policy of the United States will continue, says Derian, "because it is right and because it is in our national interest."