

## FOREIGN POLICY &amp; DEFENSE

*Israeli Victory  
Without Gain*

"What the Next Arab-Israeli War Might Look Like" by Steven J. Rosen, in *International Security* (Spring 1978), 9 Divinity St., Cambridge, Mass. 02138.

As the euphoria surrounding the 1977 autumn peace initiative by Egypt's President Anwar Sadat began to subside, there was speculation in Washington about the possibility of a fifth Arab-Israeli war. Such a struggle, says Rosen, Senior Research Fellow at Australia's National University, would result in a decisive Israeli battlefield victory, but no political or diplomatic gains for either side.

An Arab attack, intended to convince the Israelis that they cannot achieve security by military power alone, would seek a few, highly symbolic successes (e.g., capture of the Gidi and Mitla passes in the Sinai, or some portion of pre-1967 Israeli territory) rather than total victory. Sophisticated detection devices installed by Israel since the 1973 war would make an Arab surprise attack difficult and might compel an Israeli pre-emptive attack. Regardless of who strikes first, Israel would face Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and possibly Egypt, with Libya, Kuwait, Iraq, Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia joining in.

Israel would seek, and achieve, a quick and decisive victory, Rosen speculates, because of a vastly superior air force, experienced military personnel, a sophisticated early-warning radar system, and reliance on long-range, precision-guided bombs, rockets, and missiles.

The struggle would be brief (three to six days)—preventing super-power intervention—and would be a disaster for the Arabs, leading to a renewal of self-doubts and mutual recriminations. Saudi Arabia would be radicalized by the war experience and the United States would retreat further from its total support of Israel in order to appease the Arab oil-producing countries. Postwar Israel's diplomatic isolation would be worsened, her standard of living would decline further, and the basis for a political settlement would be more remote than ever. The most that might be hoped for in the aftermath, Rosen concludes, is that 1) all the Arabs would quietly abandon the military option; 2) there would be a lengthy stalemate; and 3) an eventual compromise territorial agreement would be reached.

*The "Ultimate"  
Political Act*

"Assassination as Political Efficacy: Two Case Studies from World War I" by Douglas D. Alder, in *East European Quarterly* (Spring 1978), 1200 University Ave., Boulder, Colo. 80302.

When Crown Prince Franz Ferdinand was slain at Sarajevo by Bosnian nationalist Gavrilo Princip on June 28, 1914, Hapsburg officials in Vienna used the assassination as an excuse to attack Serbia and thereby precipitated World War I. On Oct. 21, 1916, Friedrich Adler, the son of Austria's Social Democratic Party leader, murdered Prime Minister

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Graf Karl Stürgh as a protest against the war and failed to arouse public support.

Both political assassinations were the work of naive, romantic idealists seeking a martyrdom that they never achieved. (Princip died, forgotten, in prison; Adler was pardoned.) In each case, says Alder, a Utah State University historian, the slayings removed key leaders but both were quickly replaced and their policies continued. Yet, the goals of the assassins were ultimately secured. A year after Princip's death, South Slav unification became a reality with the creation of Yugoslavia in 1919. A war-weary Austria surrendered, the Hapsburg Empire collapsed, and Adler was released from prison in time to help the Social Democrats create the First Austrian Republic.

Princip and Adler both sought to influence public opinion rather than government policy. "Their aim was not to cause change by removing a crucial personality but to draw attention to an issue by killing a renowned figure," says Alder. The common element in both cases was "systemic frustration"—an inability to arouse public feeling in support of an ideology (one nationalist, the other pacifist). Desperation led them to employ assassination—the act of "ultimate political pressure"—which had significant long-range results that they never anticipated.

### *Reviewing JFK's Legacy*

"Bearing The Burden: A Critical Look at JFK's Foreign Policy" by Thomas G. Patterson, in *The Virginia Quarterly Review* (Spring 1978), One West Range, Charlottesville, Va. 22903.

Before his death in 1963, President John F. Kennedy reportedly expressed doubts about the wisdom of U.S. involvement in Vietnam and called for a re-examination of American Cold War attitudes. Apart from the nuclear test ban treaty, however, the real legacy of his foreign policy, argues Patterson, a University of Connecticut historian, must include a massive arms race, neglect of traditional diplomacy, global over-commitment, and "conspicuous reliance upon military force to solve diplomatic tussles."

Like many contemporaries, Kennedy and his advisers were members of the "containment generation," nurtured on such Cold War triumphs as aid to Greece and Turkey, the Marshall Plan, NATO, and Point Four. They were convinced that the nation must negotiate from strength; that communism was monolithic—a cancer feeding on poverty which had to be contained by countermeasures on a global scale.

The 1962 Cuban missile crisis offered the Kennedy administration a welcome opportunity to demonstrate toughness. But, in suspending private diplomacy in favor of a televised challenge to the Russians, Patterson argues, Kennedy "significantly increased the chances of war." Moscow was publicly humiliated and later reacted by launching a massive arms buildup.

Kennedy's belief that evolutionary economic development would insure noncommunist political stability in the Third World led to the