

PERIODICALS

Reviews of articles from periodicals and specialized journals here and abroad

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POLITICS & GOVERNMENT

Bringing Back the "Single Tax"

"The Tax To End All Taxes: Where Is Henry George Now That We Need Him?" by David Hapgood, in *American Heritage* (April-May 1978), 383 West Center St., Marion, Ohio 43302.

Henry George (1839–97), perhaps America's most innovative economic theorist, may have been right in his notion of taxing land rather than the improvements on land. So writes Hapgood, author and former journalist.

Living in California just 10 years after the Gold Rush (1849), George observed that land, once cheap, was quickly concentrated in a few hands and then held off the market so that its price would rise. New settlers, unable to buy land cheaply, were forced to work for low wages and to suffer poverty in a land of plenty.

George rejected the standard radical proposals for land redistribution or nationalization. His remedy, set forth in his classic book *Progress and Poverty* (1880), was to allow private ownership of land but to let society collect the "unearned rent" on that land through taxation. The rent to be confiscated was the amount the owner could collect by renting out unimproved land, or if he had built on it, the portion of the rent attributable to the land alone.


George's "single tax" would pay for all the expenses of government, eliminating the need for any tax on the earnings of either labor or capital. By letting society recapture the land values that society itself had created through sheer demand, the owner would be forced to put his land to its most productive use or give it up. Hoarding land would no longer pay.

Hapgood argues that George's "single tax" today would benefit both the decaying cities and the vanishing countryside by reducing sprawl and encouraging more intensive use of the best-located land, especially

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With enthusiastic support from organized labor, Henry George ran for mayor of New York in 1886. Despite a lack of poll watchers—crucial in those days of stolen elections—George garnered a respectable 68,110 votes. Democrat Abram S. Hewitt won with 90,552, and the Republican candidate, Theodore Roosevelt, was third with 60,435.

Robert Schalkenbach Foundation, New York City



acreage along new highways or subway lines. Moreover, George would probably have taxed polluters heavily to halt environmental degradation, and taxed away part of the profits from mining and extraction to recover the benefits owed to society. "Henry George," says Hapgood, "speaks to the present quite as eloquently as he did to the past."

*The Disenchanted
Black Voter*

"Leaders Sans Troupes: Diregeants Noirs et Masses Noirs" by Laura Armand-Maslow, in *Revue Francaise de Science Politique* (Feb. 1978), 27 rue Saint Guillaume, 75341, Paris.

Politics for black Americans is currently marked by a curious dichotomy: There is a new unanimity and consensus on ideology and tactics among black political leaders, and, at the same time, a growing disinterest in politics among the black masses.

The consensus has been achieved, writes Armand-Maslow, a University of Paris political scientist, through a shift to the left by groups such as the NAACP and the National Urban League and a shift to the right by black revolutionary organizations that previously had failed to win mass support. The movement of black leaders into the political mainstream has resulted in a 400-percent increase in the number of black officeholders since 1958 (including the mayors of Los Angeles, Detroit, Atlanta, and Newark) and a virtual end to violent tactics since 1972.

But blacks have tended to concentrate their political activity at the

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municipal level, says Armand-Maslow. Black city dwellers have quickly become disillusioned by the failure of local black office-holders to improve urban conditions. Furthermore, black voters showed their indifference to national politics in 1976 when only 33 percent of eligible blacks voted in the presidential primaries and only 38 percent in the general election—a sharp drop from the late 1960s.

The real power available to black politicians is at the state and federal levels, where blacks have gained seniority and powerful committee positions in Congress and state legislatures. But black politicians must demonstrate an ability to solve problems of education, housing, and unemployment. Otherwise, Armand-Maslow concludes, they will evolve as a group apart from their power base and will ultimately be absorbed by the dominant white community.

Murky Ways

“Buggings, Break-Ins & the FBI” by James Q. Wilson, in *Commentary* (June 1978), 165 E. 56th St., New York, N.Y. 10022.

The recent prosecution of former FBI officials for having ordered illegal surreptitious entries and warrantless searches (commonly known as “black bag jobs”) raises difficult questions about the relationship between constitutional guarantees of privacy and the police problems of investigating well-organized conspiracies.

Current laws governing police wiretaps, surreptitious entries, and surveillance are murky, writes Wilson, a Harvard professor of government. As a result of a 1972 Supreme Court decision that distinguished between “foreign” and “domestic” security cases, the U.S. Justice Department directs its “warrantless electronic surveillance” only against agents of foreign powers. But as Wilson points out, “There is no existing legal standard by which one can easily judge whether an American citizen has ties sufficiently close to a foreign power to make him an agent of that power.”

Officials responsible for national security will be seriously handicapped if all searches or intercepts must meet the same standards for obtaining a judicial warrant as apply to criminal cases (i.e., showing probable cause that the person in question has committed or is about to commit a crime, or has in his possession the fruits of a crime).

Granted that there are reasonable grounds for warrantless surveillance in some cases, says Wilson, the authority to decide on the use of such techniques should not be left entirely in the hands of the President of the United States or his Attorney General. “What is needed,” he concludes, “is an independent review mechanism that can prevent unjustified or political uses of the national-security authority without having to follow the same standards now governing the issuance of warrants in ordinary criminal cases where prosecution, not intelligence, is the goal.”

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*Euthanasia
Made Easy*

"How to Terminate a Public Policy: A Dozen Hints for the Would-be Terminator" by Robert D. Behn, in *Policy Analysis* (Summer 1978), University of California Press, Berkeley, Calif. 94720.

Terminating a government program is never easy. It requires a strategy at least as elaborate as that used to launch the program in the first place. Certain rules should be followed, says Behn, an associate professor at Duke University. Among them:

Don't give advance notice—it only gives the beneficiaries and ideological supporters of the program time to mobilize political opposition. In January 1975, for example, President Ford decided to tell Congress in his February budget message that he was eliminating the White House Office of Telecommunications Policy. His decision was reported in the *New York Times* on January 16, and the President was forced to reverse himself in the face of stiff congressional opposition.

Focus attention on the harm caused by the policy. For example, when Jerome G. Miller, commissioner of Massachusetts's Department of Youth Services, wanted to close that state's reform schools in 1975, he focused public attention on the evils of those institutions rather than on the issue of how to handle delinquent children.

Avoid legislative votes. Why? Because a move to kill off a program is likely to be dealt with by the legislators who first helped to develop the program, and because legislative bodies facilitate compromise.

Recruit an outside terminator as program boss. (The Nixon administration named Howard J. Phillips as acting director of OEO—the Office of Economic Opportunity—in January 1973 for the sole purpose of dismantling the agency; to a large extent he succeeded.)

Do not encroach on legislative prerogatives. (Nixon failed to follow this rule and found himself confronting Congress over his failure to submit Phillips' name for Senate confirmation, rather than on the substantive issue of OEO's usefulness.)

Finally, Behn notes, there are ethical considerations: "If the termination of a public policy involves the abrogation of a government commitment . . . the terminators have an obligation to provide the policy's constituency a smooth transition to a benefitless future."

*Our Hydra-Headed
Attorney General*

"Reorganizing Politics out of the Department of Justice" by Mitchell Rogovin, in *American Bar Association Journal* (June 1978), 77 South Wacker Drive, Chicago, Ill. 60606.

Since 1900 many a U.S. president-elect has appointed his political campaign manager to the post of U.S. Attorney General. This made the appointee the nation's chief law enforcer and counsel to the President, as well as political adviser, patronage dispenser, and re-election campaign manager designate. (Among such appointees: Herbert Brownell,

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Robert F. Kennedy, and John Mitchell. Presidents Johnson and Carter broke with the tradition.)

This practice, says Rogovin, a former U.S. assistant attorney general, "places tremendous strain on the Justice Department's capacity to administer justice evenly and on the public's perception of the quality of justice administered."

There are more than 300 presidential appointees within the Justice Department, and the patronage system also is commonly used to fill some 1,700 attorney jobs in the 94 United States attorneys' offices around the country.

Rogovin urges that the Department be depoliticized. He would bar the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General, the solicitor general, and all assistant attorneys general from any political activity. Further, all U.S. attorneys and assistant U.S. attorneys should be made part of the career legal service. Finally, the Attorney General, as chief prosecutor, should not have the responsibility to "recommend, screen, and then defend the administration's appointments to the federal judiciary," as is now the case.

Only 8.3 percent of the Justice Department's \$2.3 billion budget for fiscal year 1978 is spent on general legal activities, while about 30 percent is devoted to grants given by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration and 10 percent to the Bureau of Prisons. Arguing that "public confidence in the impartial administration of justice is waning," Rogovin would also separate the Department from all correctional functions and from the politics of grant-making.

Keeping the Books

"Are We Starving Our Libraries?" by
Clint Page, in *Nation's Cities* (July 1978),
1620 Eye St. N.W., Washington, D.C.
20006.

Across the United States, urban libraries are cutting staffs, reducing hours and services, and buying fewer books and other materials because of inflation and reduced budgets, writes Page, associate editor of *Nation's Cities*.

Since 1967, the average price of a book has gone from \$8.43 to \$18.03, while magazine subscriptions have risen from an average of \$8.03 to \$24.59. Tax support is shrinking at a time when library administrators must remodel their buildings (many of them architectural landmarks) to make them more energy efficient and more accessible to the handicapped.

Large, urban libraries, says Page, serve whole states and entire regions (4 percent of the country's libraries meet 25 percent of the rural libraries' needs for interlibrary loans). Yet, state support of local public libraries is lagging. Despite the fact that libraries are educational institutions, state governments across the nation provide 43.6 percent of the financial support for public schools but only 12.9 percent of the support for public libraries.

Page urges immediate federal help in the form of adequate funding

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for the 1965 Library Services and Construction Act, designed to help states extend and improve library services, aid construction and inter-library cooperation, and provide special help to big-city libraries. (Congress *authorized* \$110 million for fiscal year 1978 and \$140 million for 1979, but only *appropriated* \$60.2 million each year.)

FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE

*The Country
They Love to Hate*

"Reflections on Anti-Americanism in Our Times" by Paul Hollander, in *Worldview* (June 1978), P.O. Box 986, Farmingdale, N.Y. 11735.

The United States has been the subject of more denunciation, hostility, and abuse by foreign ideologues and intellectuals than any other nation in the world.

Hollander, a University of Massachusetts sociologist, attributes this worldwide animosity to America's affluence, its pervasive cultural presence (which, thanks to American movies, magazines, and television, extends through much of the world), and the recent notion that the United States is a superpower without the will or capacity to achieve its foreign policy goals (e.g., in Indochina). Helping to tarnish the nation's image is the fact that so much is known about the United States. Also contributing is the strident anti-Americanism of American intellectuals (such as Herbert Marcuse, Noam Chomsky, and Susan Sontag) who seem ridden by guilt over the alleged injustice and corruption of their own social and political system.



American cartoonist Cobb expresses a common vision of America in this drawing of a rapacious Uncle Sam devouring an unending stream of the world's dwindling resources.

From Cobb Again (Glebe, N.S.W. Australia: Wild and Woolley Printing, Ltd., 1976).

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But what provokes the greatest hostility, or at least ambivalence, everywhere, Hollander argues, is America's "moral-ethical (and aesthetic) confusion." It is the "American spectacle of a moral and aesthetic free-for-all, of the astonishing ups and downs of moral (and philosophical-ideological) fashions" that most shocks outside observers because they fear its spread.

The export of these "confusions, of high and easily frustrated expectations, ethical relativism, nonmaterial insecurity, forms of spiritual malaise" alarms intellectual critics abroad because such "Americanization" seems to promise the decline of their own traditional values and institutions.

America's Failure of Imagination

"U.S. Policy and the Two Southeast Asias" by Donald E. Weatherbee, in *Asian Survey* (April 1978), University of California Press, Berkeley, Calif. 94720.

Since the end of the Indochina war, the members of the anticommunist Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)—Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Singapore—have sought to develop a "regional resilience" to the threat of communist subversion. It is an effort that depends on Western and—as yet, uncertain—American economic, political, and military involvement.

The 1975 defeat in Vietnam created a "new international reality in Southeast Asia," says Weatherbee, a professor at the University of South Carolina's Institute of International Studies. The perceived U.S. retreat from its regional commitments, the revived Sino-Soviet competition, and the swift consolidation of Communist power in Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam led the ASEAN nations to conclude that the balance of power in the region had tipped sharply in favor of the communists.

In their initial reaction, the ASEAN states tried to demonstrate their independence from the United States (e.g., the demands to close all U.S. installations in Thailand, the dismantlement of SEATO, and Philippine assertiveness in negotiations over U.S. base rights) and sought "normalization" of their relations with communist neighbors.

Now, says Weatherbee, the ASEAN states realize that their attempts to have the communists recognize Southeast Asia as a "Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality" has been viewed as a sign of weakness. Rather than accept communist Vietnam's demand for the elimination of all U.S. influence in Southeast Asia as a precondition for "neutrality," the ASEAN group seeks a more tangible American role in the region, including continued military and economic assistance.

However, they find Washington hamstrung by a Vietnam "backlash," preoccupied with human rights as an overriding issue, uncertain of America's real interests, and holding to a wait-and-see attitude. Instead of broadening its association with ASEAN, Weatherbee concludes, the United States—either by intention or default—is slipping toward a position equidistant from the two Southeast Asias. It is not so much a failure of nerve; it is a "failure of imagination."

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*Israeli Victory
Without Gain*

"What the Next Arab-Israeli War Might Look Like" by Steven J. Rosen, in *International Security* (Spring 1978), 9 Divinity St., Cambridge, Mass. 02138.

As the euphoria surrounding the 1977 autumn peace initiative by Egypt's President Anwar Sadat began to subside, there was speculation in Washington about the possibility of a fifth Arab-Israeli war. Such a struggle, says Rosen, Senior Research Fellow at Australia's National University, would result in a decisive Israeli battlefield victory, but no political or diplomatic gains for either side.

An Arab attack, intended to convince the Israelis that they cannot achieve security by military power alone, would seek a few, highly symbolic successes (e.g., capture of the Gidi and Mitla passes in the Sinai, or some portion of pre-1967 Israeli territory) rather than total victory. Sophisticated detection devices installed by Israel since the 1973 war would make an Arab surprise attack difficult and might compel an Israeli pre-emptive attack. Regardless of who strikes first, Israel would face Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and possibly Egypt, with Libya, Kuwait, Iraq, Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia joining in.

Israel would seek, and achieve, a quick and decisive victory, Rosen speculates, because of a vastly superior air force, experienced military personnel, a sophisticated early-warning radar system, and reliance on long-range, precision-guided bombs, rockets, and missiles.

The struggle would be brief (three to six days)—preventing super-power intervention—and would be a disaster for the Arabs, leading to a renewal of self-doubts and mutual recriminations. Saudi Arabia would be radicalized by the war experience and the United States would retreat further from its total support of Israel in order to appease the Arab oil-producing countries. Postwar Israel's diplomatic isolation would be worsened, her standard of living would decline further, and the basis for a political settlement would be more remote than ever. The most that might be hoped for in the aftermath, Rosen concludes, is that 1) all the Arabs would quietly abandon the military option; 2) there would be a lengthy stalemate; and 3) an eventual compromise territorial agreement would be reached.

*The "Ultimate"
Political Act*

"Assassination as Political Efficacy: Two Case Studies from World War I" by Douglas D. Alder, in *East European Quarterly* (Spring 1978), 1200 University Ave., Boulder, Colo. 80302.

When Crown Prince Franz Ferdinand was slain at Sarajevo by Bosnian nationalist Gavrilo Princip on June 28, 1914, Hapsburg officials in Vienna used the assassination as an excuse to attack Serbia and thereby precipitated World War I. On Oct. 21, 1916, Friedrich Adler, the son of Austria's Social Democratic Party leader, murdered Prime Minister

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Graf Karl Stürgh as a protest against the war and failed to arouse public support.

Both political assassinations were the work of naive, romantic idealists seeking a martyrdom that they never achieved. (Princip died, forgotten, in prison; Adler was pardoned.) In each case, says Alder, a Utah State University historian, the slayings removed key leaders but both were quickly replaced and their policies continued. Yet, the goals of the assassins were ultimately secured. A year after Princip's death, South Slav unification became a reality with the creation of Yugoslavia in 1919. A war-weary Austria surrendered, the Hapsburg Empire collapsed, and Adler was released from prison in time to help the Social Democrats create the First Austrian Republic.

Princip and Adler both sought to influence public opinion rather than government policy. "Their aim was not to cause change by removing a crucial personality but to draw attention to an issue by killing a renowned figure," says Alder. The common element in both cases was "systemic frustration"—an inability to arouse public feeling in support of an ideology (one nationalist, the other pacifist). Desperation led them to employ assassination—the act of "ultimate political pressure"—which had significant long-range results that they never anticipated.

Reviewing JFK's Legacy

"Bearing The Burden: A Critical Look at JFK's Foreign Policy" by Thomas G. Patterson, in *The Virginia Quarterly Review* (Spring 1978), One West Range, Charlottesville, Va. 22903.

Before his death in 1963, President John F. Kennedy reportedly expressed doubts about the wisdom of U.S. involvement in Vietnam and called for a re-examination of American Cold War attitudes. Apart from the nuclear test ban treaty, however, the real legacy of his foreign policy, argues Patterson, a University of Connecticut historian, must include a massive arms race, neglect of traditional diplomacy, global over-commitment, and "conspicuous reliance upon military force to solve diplomatic tussles."

Like many contemporaries, Kennedy and his advisers were members of the "containment generation," nurtured on such Cold War triumphs as aid to Greece and Turkey, the Marshall Plan, NATO, and Point Four. They were convinced that the nation must negotiate from strength; that communism was monolithic—a cancer feeding on poverty which had to be contained by countermeasures on a global scale.

The 1962 Cuban missile crisis offered the Kennedy administration a welcome opportunity to demonstrate toughness. But, in suspending private diplomacy in favor of a televised challenge to the Russians, Patterson argues, Kennedy "significantly increased the chances of war." Moscow was publicly humiliated and later reacted by launching a massive arms buildup.

Kennedy's belief that evolutionary economic development would insure noncommunist political stability in the Third World led to the

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Alliance for Progress and the Peace Corps, as well as to the counterinsurgency philosophy embodied in the Army's Green Berets. But Kennedy's concept of "nation-building" gave inadequate attention to the world's diversity and complexity, the variety of political forces and cultural traditions, and the compelling appeal of revolutionary dogmas. Finally, says Patterson, Kennedy "did not estimate the strain that would be placed on American resources and patience in this long-term, global role as policeman and teacher."

Would JFK have changed had he lived? Probably not, Patterson suggests. The President would have had to drop his hard-line advisers and their Cold War notions, admit error, and abandon his natural predilection for bold action.

Two Views on Human Rights

"The Carter Administration and Human Rights—Part I: A Crusade Quickly Cancelled" by Tracy Early; "Part II: A Commitment Sustained" by Patricia Derian, in *Worldview* (July-Aug. 1978), P.O. Box 986, Farmingdale, N.Y. 11735.

President Carter's human rights crusade has been abandoned, says Early, a New York writer, because "it endangered too many American interests without visibly weakening tyrannies abroad." Reduced to absurdity, "the crusade now amounts to looking at 105 countries receiving American aid or buying American weapons and finally deciding it is safe to penalize Nicaragua."

The policy was applied inconsistently, Early contends. It was pursued in the Soviet Union, where the United States has little leverage, but less so in South Korea, where U.S. influence is substantial. At the same time, Carter's crusade encouraged both those Americans who favor a return to the Cold War and those who welcome any excuse to withhold foreign aid anywhere. The President, says Early, should have recognized "the dangers of moralistic posturing."

Mrs. Derian, Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, denies that the human rights effort has been abandoned. "Enhancing respect for human rights and human dignity remains a fundamental objective of U.S. foreign policy," she says.

Carter's human rights policy has been implemented on the basis of three principles: (a) that the policy is global and not aimed at any particular country; (b) that it should be implemented pragmatically, taking account of each country's situation; and (c) that it does not replace other U.S. foreign policy objectives, such as our national security, but will be pursued along with other significant national goals.

The United States has deferred bilateral economic assistance or opposed loans by the World Bank to countries that seriously violate human rights (e.g., Argentina). Human rights concerns have resulted in the reduction or denial of military aid to some countries (e.g., Ethiopia). The human rights policy of the United States will continue, says Derian, "because it is right and because it is in our national interest."

ECONOMICS, LABOR & BUSINESS

Advocacy, Inc.

"How Good Are Advocacy Ads?" by Lynn Adkins, in *Dun's Review* (June 1978), 666 Fifth Ave., New York, N.Y. 10019.

During the late 1960s and early 1970s, along with other U.S. institutions, Big Business was subjected to severe press criticism, public skepticism, and increased federal regulation. A few corporation managers turned to advocacy advertising in response—either to upgrade their "image" or to speak out on major business-related issues.

Mobil Corp., with \$4 million budgeted for such advertising in 1978, took the most hard-hitting ideological stance, urging both energy deregulation and curbs on Big Government. The American Forest Institute adopted a softer line in its ads ("Trees, the Renewable Resource") against too-strict curbs on timber-harvesting.

How effective were the Mobil and A.F.I. ads? Adkins, a *Dun's Review* editor, cites a recent Yankelovich, Skelly, and White, Inc. poll of both the public and "leaders" in government, labor, Wall Street, etc. Mobil obtained higher readership (e.g., 90 percent of government leaders polled) but lower agreement (33 percent) than did A.F.I. (56 percent). Mobil's ads, said Yankelovich, were too "antagonistic" and "abrasive" for many of those polled; A.F.I.'s ads were better received.

A Mobil spokesman, Adkins reports, doubted that one could ever measure the effectiveness of the company's ads in quantitative terms.

On public-issue ads generally, the pollsters said, only 6 percent of the public found them "very credible," and as many as 53 percent said they were "not credible." Most companies, says Adkins, have chosen to run less obtrusive "soft-sell" ads to enhance their corporate images (Shell, Weyerhaeuser), and have opted for less expensive ways to influence policy, such as old-fashioned lobbying.

Help Wanted

"Second Thoughts About Illegal Immigrants" by Michael L. Wachter, in *Fortune* (May 22, 1978), 541 N. Fairbanks Ct., Chicago, Ill. 60611.

The influx of illegal immigrants from Mexico, Latin America, and Asia has continued despite the crowding of the unskilled labor market by both the 1950s "baby boom" generation and unprecedented numbers of young women.

This is partly explained, says Wachter, a University of Pennsylvania economist, by the fact that while unemployment averaged 6.25 percent between 1970 and 1977, generous welfare payments were reducing the total pool of job-seekers by lowering the cost of not working.

Despite Congress's extensions of minimum-wage coverage, there are

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nearly as many low-wage jobs in the United States today as in 1967. Jobs paying less than the current \$2.65-per-hour minimum wage are readily available in exempt industries, such as food service, and in other categories like domestic service, where enforcement is lax. Spurned by many Americans, these jobs are attractive to the illegal aliens moving in at the bottom of the wage structure.

Nevertheless, Wachter argues, available statistics suggest that about 50 percent of all illegal aliens earn wages at or above the legal minimum. Assuming that illegal aliens constitute 30 percent of the nation's lowest-skilled labor, if all of them were forced to leave the country, wages at the bottom of the job ladder would be driven up. Of the estimated 6 million jobs now held by illegal aliens, Wachter estimates, as many as 3.5 million jobs might simply disappear. Some 2.5 million would be taken by low-skilled U.S. citizens at higher wages, and the U.S. unemployment rate (5.7 percent as of June 1978) would drop by approximately 1.2 percent.

Illegal immigration, however, is likely to continue, Wachter predicts. The United States badly needs the low-wage labor to supplement the shortage of teen-agers entering the labor pool. The only real question is whether the immigrant labor will be legal or illegal. Wachter concludes that Washington must decide soon whether to open or shut U.S. borders, or to introduce a system of temporary "guest" workers like that which exists in Western Europe.


Reassessing the Distress Factor

"Unemployment: It's Not What It Used to Be" by Harrison H. Donnelly, in *Congressional Affairs* (July 15, 1978), 1414 22nd St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037.

Unemployment in the United States fell sharply in June—down from 6.1 percent in May to 5.7 percent—but economists disagree on the validity of these figures and how to interpret them. Increases in welfare and unemployment benefits for example, which permit people to remain out of work for longer periods, and the larger numbers of women and young people in the work force have combined to lessen the value of simple unemployment figures as an indicator of America's overall economic distress or well-being.

"The unemployment rate," says Donnelly, a reporter for *Congressional Quarterly*, "conceals vast differences among subgroups of the population." For example, the unemployment rate for blacks and other minorities was 11.9 percent in June 1978, more than double the moderate 4.9 percent level for all whites; the adult female unemployment rate was 6.1 percent, compared with 2.9 percent for men; the unemployment rate for black women was 11.3 percent, versus 7.8 percent for black males; and the unemployment rate for minority teen-agers was 37.1 percent.

But the "discomfort" of being unemployed is far less today than in the past. Almost three-fifths of all American families have more than

ECONOMICS, LABOR & BUSINESS**SELECTED UNEMPLOYMENT RATES**, seasonally adjusted

one breadwinner. And unemployment insurance provides succor for the short-term or seasonal jobless. (The June figures show that almost half of the unemployed had been out of work for less than five weeks.)

A National Commission on Unemployment Statistics is now studying new definitions of employment and unemployment that could make a substantial difference in the way local and national jobless rates are computed. Current methods, Donnelly notes, exclude from the ranks of the unemployed the estimated 842,000 "discouraged" workers who have given up trying to find a job. Moreover, persons seeking part-time work are counted as unemployed, while members of the armed forces are not considered part of the nation's labor force, thereby skewing unemployment rates, especially in areas near large military bases.

SOCIETY***The (Un)Happy Homemaker***

"Are Working Women Really More Satisfied?" by James D. Wright, in *Journal of Marriage and the Family* (May 1978), National Council on Family Relations, 1219 University Ave. S.E., Minneapolis, Minn. 55414.

The number of working women in the United States has jumped sharply in recent years (the labor-force participation rate for women over 16 increased from 31.8 percent in 1947 to 46.1 percent in 1974), but social scientists still disagree as to who leads the more satisfying life—the full-time mother and housewife or the woman with a job outside the home.

Some studies have tended to support the "bored housewife" theme;

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they suggest that the working woman is generally happier and more satisfied with her life than the woman who does not work. But some of these findings, says Wright, of the Social and Demographic Research Institute at the University of Massachusetts, have been based on only a small sampling of predominantly working-class women.

Analyzing data from broader surveys conducted by the National Opinion Research Center, Wright finds that working women "typically carry the double burden of work and household commitments." They may enjoy their outside earned income and increased independence, but "pay for these benefits in reduced free time for themselves, a more hectic pace, and a more complicated life."

Surprisingly, neither working women nor housewives express much "outright dislike" for housework; and Wright's analysis of overall happiness, satisfaction with work in and out of the home, marital satisfaction, and attitudes toward family and careers shows "no consistent, substantial, or statistically significant differences."

In the aggregate, Wright concludes, "homemakers" are just as happy or unhappy as women who work. The impression of "confusion, isolation, loneliness, and alienation among American housewives" is just as mythical as the image of the totally "satisfied" working woman.

*Junkyard
Playgrounds*

"Loose On the Playground" by Richard Louv, in *Human Behavior* (May 1978), 12031 Wilshire Blvd., Los Angeles, Calif. 90025.

"Adventure playgrounds"—where children are encouraged to entertain themselves by building forts, shacks, and treehouses out of donated scrap lumber, or to construct mud slides, tunnels, lakes, and dams—are slowly gaining popularity in America.

The concept, writes Louv, *Human Behavior* contributing editor, began in Copenhagen in 1943. Landscape architect C. T. Sorensen observed that children ignored the standard playgrounds he had designed and were instead playing on construction sites and in junkyards. He designed a popular junkyard playground, and the idea spread. There are now more than 200 adventure playgrounds in Britain, where bombed-out city blocks were fenced off after World War II and given over to children, who created their own world from the rubble.

Recreation officials in this country complain that children quickly tire of traditional playground equipment—the slides, swings, and cement turtles. Proponents of junkyard playgrounds, Louv writes, see them as an antidote to television, which, it is said, blunts childrens' creativity and self-reliance.

Minneapolis built the nation's first adventure playground in 1950. Now there are 18, including one in Huntington Beach, Calif., with a 30-foot mud slide, lakes for fishing and swimming, rope bridges spanning the water, shacks, and forts—an enticing combination that often draws more than 500 children a day. Structures are periodically torn down or demolished by the children so they can create new ones from a

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random supply of scrap materials, such as old packing crates.

The accident rate is no higher than in traditional parks and there have been no serious injuries, says Louv. Liability insurance remains the greatest problem, though all but one of the existing adventure playgrounds have insurance protection provided by the cities' regular carriers with no additional premiums. More difficult to overcome is the popular resistance in low-income areas, where residents say they already have enough shacks and junk (they want asphalt playgrounds and concrete turtles). And disputes persist among recreation officials over what properly constitutes "play" in a technological, urban society.

Fear and Loathing in the Classroom

"Analysis and Critique of HEW's *Safe School Study Report to the Congress*" by Robert J. Rubel, in *Crime and Delinquency* (July 1978), 411 Hackensack Ave., Hackensack, N.J. 07601.

New federal data on "violent" schools in America reveal such odd patterns as these: A teacher who is robbed once by students in one two-month period is 60 times as likely to be raped by pupils during the next two-month period as one who has not been robbed; 41 percent of school bombings occur on Tuesdays; a student runs the greatest risk of being assaulted on Wednesdays.

Yet, classroom violence in America is not as pervasive as many believe, writes Rubel, director of research at the Institute for Reduction of Crime in College Park, Md., analyzing a 1978 report by the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. Only 8 percent of all school principals complain of more than 7 incidents of violence per month (a level considered "serious"), and many report that violence has leveled off since 1973.

More serious than the financial or physical damage is the climate of apprehension and disruption that violence creates. Some 33 percent of junior high school students in large cities report they avoid certain dangerous areas of their schools (most frequently a restroom), and 7 percent reported living in constant fear. Such fear tends to cause student absenteeism, which in turn affects federal or state per-pupil cost reimbursements to schools.

Yet, Rubel says, the HEW study disproves two pervasive beliefs: first, that schools cannot do much to reduce crime and violence because these are broad social ills; and, second, that outsiders are responsible for most school violence (except in cases of trespassing and breaking and entering, between 74 and 98 percent of all offenses are committed by youngsters enrolled in the school).

It is clear, Rubel concludes, that the factors *not* under the educators' control are far less important than such school-controlled variables as number of students per teacher, class size, and the principal's own qualities of fairness, firmness, and consistency in helping individual teachers to maintain discipline.

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Short Is Beautiful

"Short Beautiful" by Thomas Samaras, in *The Futurist* (August 1978), World Future Society, P.O. Box 30369, Bethesda Branch, Washington, D.C. 20014.

The ever-increasing stature and size of North American and North European people has long been regarded as a good thing—a result of prosperity, better diet, and superior medical care. However, in ecological terms, human bigness is unquestionably bad.

So writes Samaras, a California systems analyst. Short people require less food, oxygen, water, clothing, and other vital resources. A 5-percent increase in stature, for example, generally results in a 16-percent increase in body weight, requiring roughly 16 percent more food. An increase in stature of 5 percent also results in a 10-percent increase in surface area, meaning 10 percent more cloth and leather to cover the body and feet. American men of all ages now average 5'9"; and 18-year-old males average about 5'10". Adult males in Revolutionary times averaged 5'6".

FAMOUS SHORT PEOPLE

Science	Military	Haile Selassie	Athletics
Albert Einstein	Napoleon	George Wallace	Nadia Comaneci
Marie Curie	T. E. Lawrence		Bobby Riggs
Buckminster Fuller		Business	Mario Andretti
Margaret Mead	Politics	Andrew Carnegie	Juan Rodriguez
	John Adams	Aristotle Onassis	Sammy Lee
Arts	James Madison	Henry Ross Perot	Pelé
Pablo Picasso	Benjamin Harrison	Armand Hammer	Joe Walcott
Toulouse Lautrec	David Ben Gurion	Harold Geneen	Phil Rizzuto

The economic impact of increasing stature and weight is staggering, says Samaras. For example, if one compares two future American populations of 500 million people with a one-foot average difference in height, the estimated costs of clothing, food, shelter, furnishings, personal items, and transportation would be more than \$500 billion per year greater for the taller and heavier population.

From a study of height, weight, and age data, Samaras concludes that shorter people live from 6 to 20 percent longer than tall people, depending on their profession; are disproportionately stronger; have greater endurance; and are equally intelligent and creative. Many shorter-than-average people have excelled in sports (Olympic gymnast Olga Korbut), business (Aristotle Onassis), the arts (Picasso), and politics (James Madison).

Nevertheless, Americans tend to admire tallness (starting salaries of college graduates over 6'2" are 12 percent higher than those of shorter job applicants); and the average height of Americans has been increasing by about one inch every 30 years. Samaras argues that it is time to discourage the adulation of bigness and to determine, through research, both the best average human size and the factors that are causing Americans to grow taller.

SOCIETY***Redefining "Life"***

"Consensus and Controversy in Medical Practice: The Dilemma of the Critically Ill Patient" by Diana Crane, in *Annals of the American Academy* (May 1978), 3937 Chestnut St., Philadelphia, Pa. 19104.

American physicians are moving toward a *social* definition of "life"—defining an individual as being alive in terms of his ability to interact with others, rather than by purely physical criteria.

Questioning more than 3,000 neurosurgeons, pediatric heart surgeons, internists, and pediatricians, University of Pennsylvania sociologist Crane found that most physicians (75 percent) agreed that salvageable patients (capable of resuming social roles even minimally and temporarily) with purely physical damage should be treated. Unsalvageable patients with mental damage, they agreed, should not be treated. But the doctors could not agree on the appropriateness of treating salvageable patients with mental damage and unsalvageable patients with purely physical damage.

For example, 89 percent of the neurosurgeons said they would operate on a salvageable patient with a blood clot on the brain if the damage was entirely physical, but only 55 percent would operate if the damage was mental. In the hypothetical case of a patient with a malignant brain tumor that was spreading to other parts of the body, only 22 percent said they would operate on this unsalvageable patient if the tumor affected the patient's mental faculties, but 50 percent would operate if the tumor affected only the patient's physical capabilities.

Organized medicine in the United States has not yet set guidelines for physicians in these matters, Crane observes, although the American Hospital Association has endorsed a "bill of rights" for patients, which includes the right to refuse treatment "to the extent permitted by law." Unlike the Swiss Academy of Medicine, which permits doctors to cut off life-prolonging treatment for dying or comatose patients, the American Medical Association has applauded court decisions that forbid such withdrawal of treatment.

PRESS & TELEVISION***The Not-So-Great Panama Debate***

"Covering the Canal, Or, How the Press Missed the Boat" by Walter LaFeber, in *MORE* (June 1978), P.O. Box 30056, Washington, D.C. 20014.

President Carter predicted in February on national television that the debate over the Panama Canal treaties would symbolize our maturity as a great power.

Instead, says Cornell historian LaFeber, due to a dismal performance

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by the news media, the American public was treated to little more than misleading stories that “misinterpreted public opinion polls, focused on the personal contest . . . between the President and Senate leaders, and culminated in pious warnings that the treaties were not all that significant after all. . . .” Moreover, the media failed to tell the public much of anything about Panama and why the Panamanians had struggled for years to obtain the treaties giving them *de jure* independence from U.S. colonial control.

The reporting on poll results failed to convey the fact that they showed most Americans cared little about who operated the canal so long as the United States had the right, in emergencies, to move its ships to the head of the line and to intervene militarily to keep the waterway open. Once these conditions were guaranteed by the amendments sponsored by the Senate leaders—Democrat Robert Byrd of West Virginia and Republican Howard J. Baker of Tennessee—no amount of anti-treaty propagandizing through the media made much difference.

LaFeber found “pathetic” most of the coverage of Panama’s economic and political complexities, its military government, its views on the canal debate (which was being broadcast by National Public Radio to Panama, complete with insults to the country and its “maximum leader”) or why Panamanians rioted even after the Senate ratified the first treaty (which guarantees the canal’s permanent neutrality). Panamanian President Omar Torrijos’ alleged involvement in narcotics traffic received more attention in the U.S. media than any other internal Panamanian issue, even though the charges had little to do with the treaties.

Thanks in part to TV and the press, what was to have been a great debate “turned out to be neither great nor much of a public debate over the substance of foreign policy.”

A Plea for Press Restraint

“Our Right of Privacy Needs Protection from the Press” by Arthur R. Miller, in *Human Rights* (Spring 1978), 1155 E. 60th St., Chicago, Ill. 60637.

A free press is crucial to maintaining democracy and exposing government abuses—a truth the designers of our constitutional protections found sufficiently self-evident to enshrine in the Bill of Rights. But is the press too free? Sometimes, says Miller, a Harvard law professor, restraints on the press are appropriate, notably when press freedom conflicts with another fundamental freedom—an individual’s right to privacy.

Americans are beginning to recognize that their right to privacy has been jeopardized by growing numbers of government, commercial, and institutional files and data banks containing information about their private lives. Watergate’s exposure of overzealous surveillance activities by the FBI and CIA underscored this concern for privacy. Now,

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says Miller, "The constant pressure by the press for the expansion of its liberties and its right of inquisition surely contributes to the erosion of privacy and emphasizes the need for protection."

Miller applauds those statutes—opposed by newsmen—that protect individuals from unwarranted public attention (i.e., laws prohibiting the naming of rape victims and restricting the release of certain criminal records). He particularly objects to the zeal of gossip columnists and the revelation of private details of a person's life without cause (e.g., reporters' interest in the sexual preferences of Oliver Sipple, who thwarted an assassination attempt against President Ford on Sept. 22, 1975).

Miller sees a "disturbing situation" at present: Newspapers and magazines have become almost immune to libel suits, justify intrusive and even illegal *means* by touting "beneficial" *ends*, and assert the right to publish any "truth" no matter how private. What is needed is more press self-restraint, says Miller, and, failing that, court action to establish a better balance between press freedom and privacy.

Taxing TV Promos

"A Modest Proposal to Pay for Excellence" by Martin Mayer, in *American Film* (June 1978), P.O. Box 966, Farmingdale, N.Y. 11737.

Since it began in 1969, national public television programming in the United States has been funded by a mix of congressional appropriations, corporate and foundation contributions, and individual donations—an inadequate and uncertain financial base. (Approximately 45 percent of the current \$70-million annual budget comes from federal tax dollars.)

Congress rejected a variety of other financial support arrangements, including the annual license fee on each television set with which Britain funds the programs of the BBC. Mayer, an author and critic, suggests charging broadcasters in this country a fee for the air time they now use to promote themselves and their upcoming programs.

"If the stations and networks were made to pay one-tenth of what they would charge advertisers for this time," says Mayer, "the resulting fund would total \$175 million a year." If broadcasters decided to reduce their self-promotion rather than pay for it, there would be less money in the production fund for public television, but also less advertising "clutter" to annoy television viewers.

The proceeds from the charge on promotional air time, Mayer argues, should be allocated to programs that might otherwise be rejected by public television because of their high cost or limited audience appeal. Completed programs could be offered for sale to the networks or independent stations but provided without charge to public, noncommercial stations. Finances aside, the sooner that public television programming decisions can be insulated from the pressures that accompany congressional funding, says Mayer, the better.

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The Moon Message

"Korean Moon: Waxing or Waning?" by Leo Sandon, Jr., in *Theology Today* (July 1978), P.O. Box 29, Princeton, N.J. 08540.

The theology of the Unification Church of Rev. Sun Myung Moon is clearly heretical from the standpoint of classical Christian theology, but it is a Christian heresy—the product of almost 200 years of Christian missionary teaching interacting with the Korean culture.


As a Christian mutation, writes Sandon, professor of religion at Florida State University, it is in the interest of the main-line Christian churches to engage in open dialogue with it.

Sandon believes that the Moonist movement in America has peaked but is not about to disappear. Whatever its prospects, the movement raises crucial questions about "the nature of conversion and commitment among young adults . . . about the need for thoughtful morality and spirituality; and about the hunger in America for community. . . ."

Some 3,000 to 5,000 young Americans, many of them graduates of the better universities, have joined the Moonies, apparently drawn by its comprehensive belief system and the absence of meaningful alternatives. "To argue that the Moonist solution is inane, preposterous, or unrealistic is hardly a substitute for our not having any specific vision of the future," says Sandon.

The Moonies have rejected contemporary permissiveness for a rigorous morality, a spirituality characterized by a "robust prayer life and a liturgical orderliness seldom found in conventional American religious life," and a communal lifestyle that is fulfilling. Sandon argues that the

The emblem of the Unification Church symbolizes the unification of Christianity. The center circle represents God, while the 12 rays emanating outward represent the 12 gates to the new Jerusalem mentioned in Revelation 21:10-14 ("On the gates the names of the twelve tribes of the sons of Israel were inscribed").



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essential strength of the movement is not to be found in the logic of its doctrine but rather "in the experience of warm, chaste, unselfish, morally principled, and ordered fraternity"—none of which is incompatible with Christian theology.

Conjugal Confusion

"Christianity, Marriage, and Sex" by Francis X. Murphy, C.S.S.R., in *Commonweal* (June 16, 1978), 232 Madison Ave., New York, N.Y. 10016.

Roman Catholic moralists and theologians are re-evaluating the Church's attitude toward love and sex. Despite the "ecclesial arrogance" displayed by Cardinal Alfredo Ottaviani and his conservative associates in the papal curia during Vatican Council II (1964) in opposing any change in the Church's moral and doctrinal teachings, the Council provoked a deeper examination of human sexuality and a closer look at the Church's views on the subject. So writes Father Murphy, rector of Holy Redeemer College in Washington, D.C.

Much of the confusion now surrounding Catholic teachings on conjugal love springs from the mistaken notion that the basic guidelines have been "uniform and constant from the beginning." Not so, says Murphy, citing differing views of love and marriage expressed by Jesus, St. Paul, Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, and others.

By the time of Vatican II, the early pre-Augustine view of marriage as "a sacramental covenant with God as a third party and the joys of carnal and spiritual love its primary component" had long since been replaced in Church doctrine by a legalistic vision of marriage as a contract between two parties, sealed by coitus. This view, Murphy says, "narrowed the function of sex to the process of procreation" and relegated "the energy, joy, pleasure, and love involved in erotic experience to the realm of the sinful—in thought, word, and deed—if indulged outside of marriage."

Vatican II legitimized a pluralism of opinion among diverse schools of moral and doctrinal theology. The Church now relies on a welter of "approved authors" (e.g., Andrew Greeley in *Sexual Intimacy*) who explore Christian approaches to sexuality. This has brought a remarkable liberalization of the Church's views on what constitutes the state of matrimony and the role of sexual love. For example, the Rota, the Vatican's principal marriage tribunal, has recognized that a lack of love necessarily negates the marriage bond—a finding, Murphy notes, that must logically apply as well "to the situation in which love that once existed in a marriage has been totally eradicated and replaced by hatred."

Confusion persists, Murphy concludes, when the Vatican reiterates the absolutist positions of previous ages, as in the 1974 and 1975 documents dealing with masturbation and homosexuality. But among the achievements of the post-Council debate is the fact that in its 1975 Declaration Regarding Sexual Ethics, the Holy See accepted the absolute nature of sexuality as the foundation of the human person.

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*Religious
Restlessness*

"Alienation and Apostasy" by Wade Clark Roof, in *Society* (May-June 1978), Box A, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, N.J. 08903.

The rising popularity of many new religious and quasi-religious groups in America reflects a larger disarray. Many Americans are abandoning their earlier religious identities, writes Roof, a University of Massachusetts sociologist.

Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center show that religious defection is occurring primarily among the young (the proportions for liberal Protestants, Jews, and Catholics average about 15 percent among the 18-25 age group), but that Americans of all ages are less inclined to identify themselves as members of a religious community than was the case 20 years ago. (Some 6.7 percent of Americans now describe themselves as having no religious affiliation, compared with 2.7 percent in 1957.)

Religious defection is most prevalent among college-educated males living in the West and Northeast. But income level, employment, and marital status appear to make little difference in defection rates. Rather than being marginal people, says Roof, "young defectors are prone to come from affluent, middle-class families and are likely to be married and hold jobs."

Disenchantment with established churches occurs far more frequently among those who embrace the so-called "new morality" and a permissive attitude toward marijuana, abortion, homosexuality, sexual behavior, and protest activity.

Roof doubts that the new morality will replace the old or that religious defection will increase sharply in the near future. In fact, defection may have "bottomed out" among the very young even as it spreads through society as a whole. To a considerable extent, the long-term future of the main-line religious institutions depends on how well they can adjust to changing values and lifestyles.

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*Positive Impacts
of Negative Ions*

"Ions in the Air" by Albert P. Krueger and Sheelah Sigel, in *Human Nature* (July 1978), Subscription Dept., P.O. Box 10702, Des Moines, Iowa 50340.

Scientists have long recognized that certain natural phenomena—radioactive elements in the soil, cosmic ray activity, the shearing of water molecules in waterfalls, and persistent winds like the *foehn* in Germany and the *mistral* of France—can influence the formation of air

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ions—molecules of common atmospheric gases that have taken on a positive or negative electrical charge.

The effects of air ions on living matter (including bacteria, plants, and human beings) are readily apparent but not thoroughly understood, write Krueger, a biometeorologist, and Sigel, a psychologist, both of the University of California at Berkeley. It is known, for example, that depletion of ions in the air may increase susceptibility to respiratory infection. Conversely, enhancing the negatively-ionized atmosphere of a Swiss bank for a 30-week test period produced a 94 percent reduction in the incidence of respiratory illness among bank employees.

Furthermore, recent experiments have shown that a net increase in negative ions reduces the concentration in the blood stream of serotonin, a potent neurohormone. Krueger and Sigel assert that, like the serotonin-reducing drug Reserpin, this change in blood chemistry has a calming effect on humans; negative-ion therapy has also been found to relieve pain in severe burn victims.

Ion concentrations in the air fluctuate naturally, but there is a trend toward continuous depletion because pollutants combine with ions and render them biologically inert. Modern ventilating equipment also tends to reduce ion levels. Chronic ion deprivation, the authors warn, may cause "discomfort, lassitude, and loss of mental and physical efficiency." However, future research may make it possible to establish optimum air-ion standards, to replenish ion-depleted air, and to find increasing uses for ions in the treatment of pain and respiratory illness.

Problem-Solving for Mutual Profit

"The Dynamics of International Technology Flow" by Denis Goulet, in *Technology Review* (May 1978), Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Mass. 02139.

Modern technology flows to Third World countries through many channels. By far the most significant channels today are the Western companies that export products or manufacture them overseas and the Western consultant firms that specialize in solving problems for a fee.

Developing countries, writes Goulet, Senior Fellow at the Overseas Development Council in Washington, D.C., are beginning to realize that there is a vast difference between technology "transfer" in the traditional sense (e.g., through exports of machinery or licensing contracts) and the "genuine assimilation of technology," which gives the recipient both a measure of control and the promise of future technological independence.

While the international companies see technology transfers as "strategies for successful marketing," the poorer countries view the acquisition of technology as an end in itself. The companies will give up only as much technology as they must to achieve access to new Third World markets. Western consultants, meanwhile, act as "technical gatekeep-

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ers" who advise clients about new technologies that might be useful to them.

Yet, the technologies in which Western consulting firms specialize (e.g., design and problem-solving services) are not easily transferred, Goulet observes. It is easier to train engineers to build dams than to train feasibility experts of consultant-firm caliber who can evaluate dam siting, cost, and design problems. It is the absence of these skills that makes developing countries technologically dependent on outsiders. The difficulty with consulting firm contracts for technology transfer is that a lot of problem-solving takes place but not much transfer of technology.

"The 'transfer' of technology is no neutral, value-free technical activity," Goulet concludes. It occurs in a competitive arena. It is up to the developing countries to devise more sophisticated policies to make this process serve their long-term social goals and national objectives.

Exploiting the Gulf Stream

"Benjamin Franklin and the Gulph Stream" by Frederick P. Schmitt, in *Oceans* (May-June 1978), Oceanic Society, Fort Mason, San Francisco, Calif. 94123.

Ben Franklin, America's Renaissance man, was the first person to map the waters of the Gulf Stream, gleaned data on the great "ocean river" from his own scientific observations and the whaling experience of a Nantucket sea captain.

Franklin's interest in the "Gulph Stream," writes Schmitt, curator of the Whaling Museum at Cold Spring Harbor, N.Y., was stirred in 1769 by complaints that the supposedly fast mail packets plying the Atlantic between Falmouth, England, and New York were taking two weeks longer than ordinary merchant ships bound from London to Rhode Island.

Although Franklin had noticed the great stream, with its carpet of floating gulfweed, as early as 1726 during a sea voyage to London, he did not appreciate its significance until his cousin, Captain Timothy Folger, explained that the fast westbound merchant ships were skippered by Rhode Island men who understood that it was wiser to cross the Gulf Stream quickly than try to buck its northerly three-mile-per-hour current. Franklin persuaded his Nantucket cousin to prepare a sketch of the "ocean river" with instructions on how to benefit from or avoid its brisk flow.

As Deputy Postmaster General of the British Colonies in North America, Franklin had copies of Folger's sketch sent to Falmouth where, Schmitt writes, "the packet skippers paid no attention."

Franklin, the scientist, continued his studies of the Gulf Stream, measuring its temperature during subsequent transatlantic voyages with a thermometer suspended from a line. He knew the waters were warmer in the current, and he hoped to devise a method for navigators

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Nantucket whaling captains gave Ben Franklin the data to prepare this 1769 chart of the "Gulph Stream."



Courtesy of the American Philosophical Society

to determine exactly when they entered or passed through the stream. Franklin found 18th-century mariners reluctant to take advice from a landsman. Modern day scientists, Schmitt observes, recently employed satellite photographs—not Franklin’s charts—in a study aimed at persuading captains of ocean-going vessels to take advantage of the Gulf Stream’s swift currents to save fuel.

*“Greenhouse”
for Truffles*

“French Science Robs the Truffle of its Gallic Romance and its Rarity, with the First Crop from a Greenhouse” by Rudolph Chelminski, in *Horticulture* (May 1978), 125 Garden St., Marion, Ohio 43302.

The black truffle (*Tuber melanosporum*), so highly prized for the mysterious subtlety of its flavor in *pâté feuilletée*, *foie gras* and *poularde de Bresse*, has become prohibitively expensive (\$160 per pound at retail) for all but the wealthiest, most obsessed gourmards. But now a research team for the French Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA) has, for the first time, succeeded in seeding, cultivating, and bringing to fruition the highly prized delicacy.

All past attempts at truffle seeding have failed, says Chelminski, a former *Life* staffer now living in France. Moving truffle-producing soil from one locale to another did not work; and all too often, productive truffle grounds have mysteriously turned barren. Truffle production in France, which amounted to 2,000 tons in 1892, now average 25 to 50 tons per year.

The successful “greenhouse” cultivation of truffles was the work of agronomic engineer Jean Grente, director of INRA’s plant pathology station at Clermont-Ferrand. Grente began his efforts on the assumption that the truffle is not a parasite, as commonly believed, but rather mycorrhizal in nature—living in mutually beneficial symbiosis with

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the root system of its host tree.

Grente synthesized the mycorrhizal association between truffle (really a mushroom) and tree, obtaining pure cultures from fresh truffles and cooking them in a controlled environment until they germinated and produced mycelia, the plant's vegetative part. The truffle mycelia were then married to oak and hazel tree seedlings in a calcareous (chalky) soil free of other competing microorganisms. A transplanted hazel seedling produced its first truffle in December 1977.

Some 150,000 mycorrhized seedlings have been sold, at prices ranging from \$3.50 to \$6.50 per plant, and distributed (exclusively within France and Italy) through Agri-Truffe, a private society. They are expected to produce high quality truffles within 3 to 5 years, and Grente predicts production of 250 tons a year in 10 to 15 years.

The Artful Origins of Knowledge

"Art Opens Way For Science" by Jon B. Eklund, in *Chemical and Engineering News* (June 5, 1978), American Chemical Society, 1155 16th St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

As a general rule, "pure" science discoveries are later elaborated by engineers and other technicians as "applied" science. However, says Eklund, curator of chemistry at the Smithsonian Institution's National Museum of History and Technology, the reverse is often the case; a broad body of empirical knowledge is developed first from which scientific principles and basic research follow later.

This is particularly true of the artists and artisans who throughout history have discovered and exploited particular properties of matter long before scientists noted these properties or attempted to explain them.

For example, early Chinese bronze castings (1200 B.C.) reflect the design limitations imposed by the use of sectional clay molds and the properties of bronze at the temperatures that the metal worker could achieve. The same was true of the red and black vases of classical Greece (500 B.C.), which could only be produced by artists with an empirical knowledge of the subtle properties of the clays and glazes used.

Eklund argues that the so-called "scientific revolution" of the 17th century produced a science of chemistry stemming from a knowledge of acids and corrosive alkalies associated with art, particularly etching. And the 18th-century European search for true "hard-paste" porcelains to match the hardness and luster of those from China and Japan produced a vast amount of experimentation with the behavior of different materials at high temperatures and led to the invention of crude devices to measure temperatures by the amount of shrinkage observed in a small cylinder of clay. The geologist subsequently borrowed the instruments and techniques of the ceramist to prove the vital role of heat in the development of the earth's mineral formations.

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*Taking Vengeance
on the Beaver*

"The War Between Indians and Animals"
by Calvin Martin, in *Natural History*
(June–July 1978), Box 6000, Des Moines,
Iowa 50340.

The pre-modern American Indian is widely viewed as a noble savage who lived in harmonious balance with nature, taking from it only what necessity demanded and respecting animals and plants as fellow spiritual beings. A new look at the historical record by Martin, a Rutgers historian, shows that at certain periods the Indian perceived his relationship with nature to have gone awry and engaged in a fearful slaughter of game that amounted almost to a declaration of war.

A striking example of this behavior, Martin writes, occurred in eastern Canada in the late 15th century just before there was major direct Indian contact with whites. Diseases such as smallpox and influenza, brought by European fishermen and voyagers to the Canadian shore, preceded the newcomers inland and decimated aboriginal populations totally lacking in immunological resistance.

The Indian, believing that game animals possessed the power to inflict disease, and as yet unaware of the white menace, felt that the game had broken the traditional "compact of mutual courtesy" between animals and men. For some obscure reason, the wildlife had become angered and had unleashed their most potent weapon against man. In response, the Indians of the Northeast counterattacked with a vengeance. As some Micmac Indians termed it, they were "making war upon the beaver."

When the French and British fur traders arrived on the scene with manufactured goods to exchange for furs, the psychological basis for near-extinction by Indian hunters of many varieties of Canadian wildlife had already been established.

*The Battle
of the Fibers*

"Cotton Versus Polyester" by T. Leo van Winkle, John Edeleanu, Elizabeth Ann Prosser, and Charles A. Walker, in *American Scientist* (May–June 1978), 345 Whitney Ave., New Haven, Ct. 06511.

Environmentalists in recent years have extolled the benefits of "natural" processes and products over "synthetic" ones—especially those man-made items derived from such nonrenewable resources as petroleum. But in terms of energy consumption, it is not at all clear that cotton, a "natural" fiber, is less costly to society than "synthetic" polyester fibers made from oil and gas.

An analysis by van Winkle, a Catholic University engineering professor, and three colleagues, compares the energy consumption involved

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in the full lifetime cycle of a cotton shirt and a shirt containing polyester fibers. While it takes considerably less energy to produce cotton lint than polyester fiber (613 kWh per 100 lbs. versus 2,158 kWh for the synthetic), and 25 percent less energy to make a cotton shirt than one containing synthetics, the advantage is lost in the wearing and maintenance (washing/drying/ironing) cycles. The total energy requirements for the manufacture and energy-intensive maintenance of a cotton shirt is 115.5 kWh, and for the more durable 65/35 polyester/cotton blend shirt it is 72.4 kWh.

When land-use factors are considered, the advantages of synthetics become even more pronounced. Van Winkle and his research associates estimate that if cotton were to replace man-made fibers in U.S. textile production, it would require a 35.6 percent increase in total cotton acreage. "With the increasing world population requiring increased food supplies," the authors contend, "it would be well-nigh impossible to divert this much prime cropland from food to cotton production."


Debunking the Starfish Myth

"The Crown-of-thorns Crisis in Australia: A Retrospective Analysis" by Richard A. Kenchington, in *Environmental Conservation* (Spring 1978), Elsevier Sequoia, S.A., P.O. Box 851, 1001 Lausanne 1, Switzerland.

Inadequate research, poor sampling techniques, and the eagerness of the news media for a sensational story combined to create the great crown-of-thorns starfish "menace" of the late 1960s and early '70s.

So says Australian marine biologist Kenchington, who suggests that the advent of scuba-diving technology led to greatly increased exploration of Australia's 2000-kilometer-long Great Barrier Reef and the dis-

Acanthaster planci, measuring up to two and a half feet across, envelops living coral by extruding its stomach through its mouth.



Photograph by C. H. Edmondson

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covery in 1962 that large areas of the reef were infested with coral-eating crown-of-thorns starfish (*Acanthaster planci*).

Although little was known about either reef ecology or the starfish, some scientific authorities hypothesized that the starfish infestation was something new, abnormal, and probably caused by human tampering with the environment. Subsequent surveys, which were inadequately financed and hampered by the extent and remoteness of the rich coral cover, did little to discourage speculation by the news media and environmentalists that the Great Barrier Reef would eventually collapse, exposing the entire Queensland coast to the erosive force of the Pacific Ocean.

In the absence of effective means of dealing with the menace (hand collecting and chemical treatment proved either impractical or dangerous to other marine life), the Australian government opted for further study and delay. By 1970 it was apparent that predictions of impending doom were unwarranted; even where the starfish's ravages had been great, the coral soon regenerated itself.

Further studies showed that the *A. planci* population explosion was a relatively short-lived phenomenon resulting from temporary changes in ocean salinity and temperature that had nothing to do with the hand of man. Analysis of reef sediments more than 3,000 years old demonstrated the recurring nature of starfish infestations, Kenchington writes, and showed that they were "natural but infrequent episodes in the long-term ecological balance of the Great Barrier Reef."

The Porpoise Success Story

"The Tuna/Porpoise Problem: Behavioral Aspects" by Karen Pryor and Kenneth S. Norris, in *Oceanus* (Spring 1978), 1172 Commonwealth Ave., Boston, Mass. 02134.

For many years, fishermen have capitalized on the tendency of yellow-fin tuna to swim beneath schools of "spotted" and "spinner" porpoises (genus *Stenella*) in the tropical eastern Pacific. The *Stenella* schools usually travel and feed within 20 meters of the ocean surface and are easily spotted by fishing boats.

By using speedboats to herd the porpoises into a milling group, the tag-along tuna school may be efficiently encircled by huge nets. In the process, however, the air-breathing porpoises may easily become entangled in the nets and suffocate. All this has provoked widespread public concern.

However, since the early 1960s, according to Pryor, a marine biologist, and Norris, professor of natural history at the University of California, Santa Cruz, fishermen have used a variety of new equipment and techniques to release the encircled porpoises. To reduce entanglement, today's nets are required by federal law to have fine, 1¼-inch mesh at points where the *Stenella* are allowed to escape. Other gear improvements have minimized "canopies" or bulges in the net in

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which porpoises may become trapped.

Such refinements have reduced porpoise mortality from an average 3.8 deaths per ton of tuna caught in 1971 by the U.S. fleet to 0.26 per ton in 1977. This death toll is low enough to permit porpoise populations to increase, and, while the matter may continue to be debated in emotional terms, the authors cautiously conclude that porpoise deaths are "perhaps no longer a major ecological problem."

A Plea for Conservation

"The Real Meaning of the Energy Crunch" by Daniel Yergin, in *The New York Times Magazine* (June 4, 1978), 229 W. 43rd St., New York, N.Y. 10036.

A serious real energy crisis—avoidable only if Americans drastically cut their consumption of oil—will arrive in the middle or late 1980s. It will be marked by astronomical prices for OPEC oil caused by an increase in world demand from the current 28–31 million barrels per day to an estimated 45 million barrels per day, the uppermost limit of OPEC production.

A dramatic rise in oil prices (double or triple present levels), continues Yergin, a member of the Harvard Business School's Energy Research Project, will bring about a resurgence of hyperinflation, reduced investment and purchasing power in the industrial nations, severe balance-of-payments problems, widespread unemployment, and, perhaps, "a major recession, even a world depression." The political effects, he adds, will be just as severe; nations will fight each other for oil, and the Soviets may feel compelled to "take bold risks" to extend their influence over the Persian Gulf oil-producing states.

Global dependence on Saudi Arabia, which controls one-fourth of the world's oil and therefore controls OPEC, will make the Saudis the linchpin of the world economy. A natural disaster, a terrorist attack, or a coup d'état in Saudi Arabia could have a shattering impact on world events.

Yergin discounts the importance of new oil from Alaska and the North Sea (Alaska will only make up for declining oil production in the lower 48 states, and North Sea production will peak at 5 or 6 million barrels per day in 1985). He says the development of nuclear power is stalemated by "cost, technical problems, environmental risks, doubts about safety, and, most recently, the dispute over nuclear proliferation." Coal and solar energy are inadequate alternatives.

Americans, Yergin concludes, must stop assuming that "big technology" and alternative energy sources will fill the gap and must begin to recognize the importance of reducing world demand for oil through conservation. The United States, he contends, can cut its energy use by at least 30 percent without significant changes in the American standard of living by "an adroit mixture" of incentives, regulation, public education, and energy-pricing policies. Reduced energy consumption may be difficult to achieve politically, but it is essential.

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The Newest Wave

"Here Comes The Fringe" by Steve Lawson, in *Horizon* (June 1978), 381 West Center Court, Marion, Ohio 43302.

A "Third Wave" of audacious and innovative British playwrights is beginning to make its mark on the English theater. These writers—Stephen Poliakoff, Barrie Keefe, Snoo Wilson, Steve Gooch—were spawned in small, makeshift theaters that have sprung up in Edinburgh, Glasgow, Sheffield, and Liverpool as well as in London.

"Young, committed, and astonishingly prolific," the Third Wave dramatists, says Lawson, literary manager of the Williamstown (Mass.) Theater Festival, "reject conventional drawing-room comedy and psychological drama in favor of using the stage as a forum for political and cultural issues" (e.g., the struggle for human dignity and fulfillment in an urban society still ruled by outmoded convention and notions of class). Their inspiration comes from the movies, rock music, and sick humor of today's pop culture.

Third Wave plays deal heavily in violence, alienation, and the distortion of man by his environment. Lawson says it is unlikely that the new playwrights would have flourished without the proliferation of English theaters dedicated to experimental works and without the new freedom bestowed by Parliament in 1968 when it abolished the Lord Chamberlain's powers of censorship.

Typical of the new works is Poliakoff's *Strawberry Fields*, which takes place almost entirely on a British highway and depicts two young right-wingers determined to restore Britain to a previous condition of purity. Whether such plays will win wide and lasting audience acceptance remains to be seen. But they have already made an impact, says Lawson, "by extending their drama beyond the fringe, beyond naturalism, beyond conventional plot lines and into new historical, political, and colloquial areas."

From Agitation to Auto-Destruction

"Art and Anarchism" by John A. Walker, in *Art and Artists* (May 1978), Hansom Books, P.O. Box 294, 2 & 4 Old Pye St., off Strutton Ground, Victoria St., London SW1P 2LR.

The anarchist of the popular imagination is a bomb-throwing madman bent on destroying authority through mindless terror. In fact, anarchism as a political philosophy (buttressed by a substantial literature) influenced late-19th-century European thought far more strongly than its main ideological rival, Marxism. The principal anarchist philosophers—William Godwin, Pierre Joseph Proudhon, Max Stirner, and Prince Pëtr Kropotkin—believed in a self-governing society made

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up of small communes where power was decentralized and people would spurn the accumulation of private property.

Many important artists and art critics of the day—Gustave Courbet, Camille and Lucien Pissarro, Proudhon, Paul Signac—endorsed the social objectives of anarchism, says art historian Walker. Bourgeois hostility and the declining status of the artist, after the demise of aristocratic patronage and the invention of photography, combined to convince many artists that the anarchist vision promised greater financial security while satisfying their own deep commitment to “individual autonomy, independence, and freedom.”

In anarchist theory, art played a number of roles, including agitation, propaganda, social criticism, and fund-raising. But despite their saturation with anarchist thought, neither the 19th-century impressionists and post-impressionists nor the 20th-century Dadaists truly married art and anarchist ideology.

Not until German artist Gustav Metzger invented “auto-destructive” art in the 1950s did anarchism come close to producing an authentic artistic statement. By spraying acid on stretched nylon, Metzger created art that destroyed itself in the very act of creation. In using violence creatively without producing a commodity for the marketplace, Walker argues, Metzger attained the elusive unity of art and politics that earlier anarchists had sought.

*Feeding Culture
May Imperil Art*

“Centrality Without Philosophy: The Crisis In The Arts” by Joseph Wesley Zeigler, in *New York Affairs* (vol. 4, no. 4, 1978), New York University, Graduate School of Public Administration, 4 Washington Square North, New York, N.Y. 10003.

Soaring attendance figures for dance and symphony concerts and theater, opera, and museum events, combined with increased public funding, have produced a major change in the arts in America. Since 1966 the number of U.S. professional resident dance companies has grown from 10 to 70; the number of professional (nonprofit) theater ensembles has quadrupled (to 450). Appropriations by the states for the arts have risen from \$4 to \$70 million, and for fiscal year 1979 President Carter has budgeted \$150 million for the U.S. National Endowment for the Arts.

Despite, and because of, this massive growth, writes Zeigler, a consultant to arts institutions, the arts revolution has reached a turning point. While subsidized “expansion” and “decentralization” have spawned cultural hubs in Cincinnati, Milwaukee, Houston, Toledo, and many other cities, thinly dispersed federal funding has forced some arts groups like the Joffrey Ballet to curtail their programs. The New York City Ballet and Opera companies have come close to extinction, and at least one major cultural arena, New York’s City Center, has all but shut down—“a victim of its own expansion,” Ziegler writes.

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Public funding may "breed culture," but it may also "imperil art." New York City, for example, recently launched a program to pay 300 artists \$10,000 each, plus other benefits, for one year's work. To many people, this sounds utopian; to others, like *New York Times* critic Hilton Kramer, it is an indiscriminating "welfare program for artists" that encourages mediocrity.

Will future government-assisted growth emphasize quantity or quality? Will public funding reward popularity or original talent? Better management alone will not solve the crisis in the arts, Zeigler warns, for the problem is above all one of leadership and philosophy. What are needed are visionary men and women—artists and managers—who want to inspire the best the arts have to offer.

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That Noisy Isle

"Will There Always Be An England?" by William Haley, in *The American Scholar* (Summer 1978), 1811 Q St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20009.

England has fallen from its imperial heights as rapidly as any nation in history. Prime Minister James Callaghan's Labor Party government currently faces grave labor agitation and economic woes, friction with its European Common Market partners, and pressure to give autonomy to Scotland and Wales.

But, although Britain seems to be teetering on the brink of ruin, it will survive, says Haley, former director-general of the BBC and editor of *The Times* of London.

The English are still making important adjustments. They are renegotiating the social contract against a background of rapid social reform that "proved false to its promises and damaging in its effects," Haley writes. Nationalization of major industries and health services at the end of World War II resulted in bureaucratic waste and inefficiency.

Today, Britain experiences iconoclasm and dissent, exacerbated by the nation's rapid decline in world power. Authority is no longer trusted; the masses of people feel that the "professionals" have let them down. Big labor, "the most powerful organized force in the land," is frequently disruptive; the unions lack internal cohesion and cannot always control their own members.

But the questioning of established values is not new; Britain's adversary system of law and politics reflects a "national passion for argument," says Haley. What has changed is the scale of debate, thanks to the expanded role of press, radio, and television. Britain "is an isle full of noises." What is really happening, he suggests, is that "a healthy skeptical English democracy is seeking to establish new foundations."

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*Was It Luck
or Genius?*

"The Napoleonic Myth" by Correlli Barnett, in *The Illustrated London News* (May 1978), British Publications Inc., 11-03 46th Ave., Long Island City, N.Y. 11101.

Napoleon Bonaparte, Emperor of France, was a master of modern public relations who brilliantly portrayed himself as a national hero and military genius. In reality, argues Barnett, author of the new biography *Bonaparte*, Napoleon "was not a heroic genius or a master of war at all, but an overconfident gambler pursuing a fundamentally unsound system of war and statecraft."

Many of Bonaparte's costly campaigns were launched to further his personal political interests—to consolidate his shaky regime (France was bankrupt in 1795 after six years of war and revolutionary turmoil)—rather than to enhance the security or well-being of France. He is credited with instituting a new era of warfare—abandoning complex supply systems in favor of fast maneuvers and quick, decisive battles. But his method of providing money and food for his army by stripping the enemy countryside led to popular uprisings, notably in Italy, that forced him to disperse his troops to protect his own lines of communication.

The battlefield victories—from Montenotte in 1796 to Ligny in 1815—that gave Bonaparte his military fame, says Barnett, were "the product of quick-witted opportunism and fast, hard punching, of sheer energy and ruthless will to win, together with an army to match. They were victories of sheer pugilistic skill over ponderous, slow-reacting, conventionally minded opponents."

Bonaparte's technique of advancing without adequate supplies or transport worked well as long as his opponents failed to recognize his precarious position and his critical need for rapid victory. By avoiding decisive battle and conducting a protracted war (a strategy the Russians developed by accident in 1812), Bonaparte's enemies could have destroyed him long before Waterloo.

*Decelerating
Eurocommunism*

"Eurocommunism: Who's in Charge?" by Don Cook, in *The Atlantic Monthly* (June 1978), Box 1857, Greenwich, Ct. 06830.

There is strong evidence to suggest that (on instructions from Moscow) the French Communist Party under Georges Marchais intentionally shattered its alliance with the Socialists in order to destroy any chance of a leftist victory in the French parliamentary elections late last year. The behavior of the French Communists has exposed the myth of

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Eurocommunism, writes Cook, Paris correspondent for the *Los Angeles Times*.

The Russians had reason to fear that if the French Communists came to power with the Socialists, a Communist victory in Italy would inevitably have followed, thereby producing an end to détente and a return to the Cold War. Détente, contends Cook, permits the Russians to pursue other world ventures without risk and encourages the Western trade and credits essential to the economic well-being of Eastern Europe.

Since the election defeat, Cook writes, "Marchais has dropped all the cosmetics and returned to his true Stalinist colors—to the irritation and bitterness of comrades who really believed in Eurocommunism. . . ." The French Communist Party remains the most Moscow-oriented of all the parties in Western Europe.

The Italian Communists now seem to be as close to power as party leader Enrico Berlinguer and the Kremlin want them to be. And in Spain, Communist leader Santiago Carrillo continues to keep his distance from Moscow while building a party structure that can assure central control while gathering electoral support "among the wary, newly democratized Spaniards."

The "self-inflicted defeat" of the Left in the French election, says Cook, "has abruptly checked the concept of cooperative Eurocommunism cresting in some European wave of the future." The French political situation is frozen at least until the 1981 presidential election and perhaps until the National Assembly elections in 1983. Disillusionment with communism among leftist intellectuals, especially in France, is "complete," says Cook. In neither France nor Italy "does the Left seem to be going anywhere at all."

Loosening Ties

"COMECON Blues" by Nora Beloff, in *Foreign Policy* (Summer 1978), P.O. Box 984, Farmingdale, N.Y. 11737.

While members of the European Common Market move fitfully toward greater economic and political integration, the East European counterpart that calls itself COMECON (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance), with headquarters in Moscow, remains a group of six East European states (plus Cuba, Mongolia, and Vietnam) whose economic ties are so loose that the bloc cannot collectively negotiate on equal terms with the West.

COMECON countries, writes Beloff, former political correspondent for *The Observer* of London, remain so weakly integrated after almost 30 years (Joseph Stalin set up COMECON in 1949) that they will sell each other products for which there is an international market "only if payment is in convertible exchange." (As much as 10 percent of internal COMECON trade is settled in U.S. dollars.)

Today, recession in the West is promoting COMECON integration by

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making it difficult for the East European nations to diversify their trade or reduce their dependence on Moscow. Beloff argues that the West has ample reasons, both political and economic, to expand trade with Eastern Europe. The Soviet and U.S. economies are somewhat complementary, and Western Europe has surplus goods, including machinery and consumer items, that the East bloc countries want and need.

Obstacles to expanded trade are very real; most East European products are not competitive in world markets in terms of price or quality. Nevertheless, Beloff contends, the West can encourage trade by abandoning "sudden and brutal acts of protectionism" and preventing political or ideological disputes from disrupting economic cooperation.


*The Options
for Zimbabwe*

"What Economic Road?" by Roger Riddell, in *Africa Reports* (May-June 1978), Transaction, Inc., Rutgers University, New Brunswick, N.J. 08903.

What is the economic future for an independent Zimbabwe? Supporters of Prime Minister Ian Smith's plan for an internal settlement of Rhodesia's racial conflict would continue the present export-oriented economic system while removing the more overt forms of racial discrimination. This strategy, says Riddell, a staff member of the Catholic Institute for International Relations, promises little to the black majority of 5.2 million. (More than 80 percent of urban black workers earn incomes below the urban poverty level of \$1,652 per year.)

The Rhodesian economy, during its recent boom (1969-75), failed to provide jobs for some 250,000 blacks entering the labor force in that prosperous period. Any plan to raise the incomes of rural blacks, Riddell argues, would require a tenfold increase in investment in traditional agriculture to upgrade the Tribal Trust Lands and to resettle blacks (some 500,000 families) on underutilized white-owned land.

Leaders of the Patriotic Front (Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe) seek "a radical change away from settler-colonialism towards a more



Two-thirds of Rhodesia's 5.2 million blacks live in rural areas, most of them on 39.9 million acres of Tribal Trust Lands (shown in red). The 249,000 Europeans own 45 million acres—almost half the country's total area.

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socialist, self-reliant, economic structure," says Riddell. This is likely to mean nationalization of all land, the resettlement of large numbers of rural blacks, and a system of communal farming units; reorganization of industry to produce goods for mass consumption; control of foreign investment; and a narrowing of income differentials at the expense of managerial, industrial, and bureaucratic job holders.

Such a strategy would be bitterly opposed by the small but powerful group of people (blacks as well as whites) who do well under the existing system. Riddell concludes that the Ian Smith option entails little structural change, and thus offers little chance of solving basic economic inequities. The Popular Front option presents huge short-term problems but does address the needs of the poor majority, and "holds out the greatest hope for the war-weary Zimbabweans."

A Post-Terror Prognosis

"Between Repression and Reform: A Stranger's Impressions of Argentina and Brazil" by Fritz Stern, in *Foreign Affairs* (July 1978), 428 East Baltimore St., Baltimore, Md. 21202

Democracy in Latin America has all but disappeared over the last decade. Even in countries where democratic institutions survive, social and economic conditions are inhospitable to healthy liberal democracy. But, despite authoritarian trends, Stern, a Columbia University historian, finds "a presumption for change" in Argentina and Brazil.

This presumption is rooted partly in Latin America's traditional ties with Europe, strengthened now by Common Market investments and trade. The recent transition to democracy managed by Spain and Portugal may prove a handy model for reform. And the success of Latin America's military-technocratic regimes in restoring order and promoting economic growth also argues, paradoxically, for change; with terrorism and inflation under control, how can repression be justified?

Unfortunately, a state of latent repression remains in Argentina under the military junta of President Jorge Rafael Videla, even though most foreign observers (and Argentinians) believe the "war" against left-wing Montonero terrorism has been won. The government, which came to power in 1976 determined to crush the guerrillas, seems afraid to admit victory for fear of being called to account for past excesses once repression is relaxed.

In Brazil, the benefits of a long economic boom (1968-74) have been slow to filter down to the masses, and unions are denied the right to strike. Lately, there have been some changes. The regime of President Ernesto Geisel has lifted censorship for most newspapers, and police torture seems to have been halted (as of April 1977).

Both countries, still suffer from their leaders' indifference to the ideals of democracy, including such preconditions of reform as the rule of law and broader participation in political and economic life by all strata of society.