

Liberals have pined too much for a culture less individualistic than America's reality is, according to Galston. "As FDR did

three-quarters of a century ago, we must mobilize and sustain a popular majority with the freedom agenda our times require."

## *In Your Face*

"The New Videomalaise: Effects of Televised Incivility on Political Trust" by Diana C. Mutz and Byron Reeves, in *American Political Science Review* (Feb. 2005), American Political Science Assn., 1527 New Hampshire Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

It's become fashionable to blame television shoutfests such as *The O'Reilly Factor* for Americans' growing disaffection with politics. But why should a bunch of shouting heads be such a turnoff?

To find out, political scientists Mutz and Reeves, of the University of Pennsylvania and Stanford University, respectively, corralled a group of hapless volunteers and sat them down—some with electrodes attached—to watch two versions of a political talk show created by the researchers.

In one version, the actors carried on a polite discussion, while in the other they interrupted each other, rolled their eyes, and generally misbehaved. All of the viewers found the "uncivil" show more entertaining, but differences emerged when they were given an opinion survey shortly after watching the two programs.

On the whole, those who saw the uncivil show suddenly recorded decreased levels of trust in politicians and the political system generally. (Interestingly, however, trust *increased* slightly among viewers who were identified in psychological tests as prone to conflict in their own lives.) Among those

who watched the civil show, there was no change. So, contrary to a lot of speculation, it's not political conflict that turns off Americans. It's incivility.

And it's not just incivility, but the particular form it takes on television, according to Mutz and Reeves. Television's "sensory realism" makes the shoutfests very much like real-life encounters. But in real life, people who fall into arguments tend before long to back off, physically as well as rhetorically. On talk shows, conflict brings the cameras zooming in for a screen-filling look at the combatants, while the host works to ratchet up the antagonism. It's a "highly unnatural" experience for viewers, and, as the electrodes Mutz and Reeves attached to some viewers showed, one that produces a physiological reaction much like the one created by real conflict. That, the two researchers conclude, is the source of the turnoff: "When political actors . . . violate the norms for everyday, face-to-face discourse, they reaffirm viewers' sense that politicians cannot be counted on to obey the same norms for social behavior by which ordinary citizens abide."

## FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE

### *What Does North Korea Want?*

"North Korea's Weapons Quest" by Nicholas Eberstadt, in *The National Interest* (Summer 2005), 1615 L St., N.W., Ste. 1230, Washington, D.C. 20036.

Most discussions of how to deal with North Korea's quest for nuclear weapons begin with the assumption that it's largely a problem of diplomacy. Pyongyang's aim is to obtain as much food, fuel, and other benefits as it can through international blackmail, this logic goes. Indeed, by crying nu-

clear, North Korean leader Kim Jong Il has extracted more than \$1 billion from the United States since 1995. Eberstadt, an American Enterprise Institute scholar, argues that the Communist North Koreans are playing a far more brutal game that many observers recognize.

From its founding in 1948, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has sought the reunification of the divided Korean peninsula under its own rule. For Pyongyang, the Korean War never ended, and unconditional victory over South Korea remains its aim. With a deeply impoverished population of less than 23 million, North Korea for years has nonetheless fielded an army of more than a million soldiers, the fourth largest in the world. But as long as South Korea is allied with the United States, even this immense force cannot do the job.

"To deter, coerce and punish the United States, the DPRK must possess nuclear weaponry and the ballistic missiles capable of delivering them into the heart of the American enemy," says Eberstadt. "This central strategic fact explains why North Korea has

been assiduously pursuing its nuclear development and missile development programs for over 30 years—at terrible expense to its people's livelihood, and despite all adverse repercussions on its international relations."

The North Koreans already possess short-range Scud-style missiles and biochemical weapons that menace Seoul, and intermediate No Dong-type missiles capable of reaching Japan. They are now working on improved long-range missiles that will be capable of striking the U.S. mainland. Armed with nuclear warheads, such missiles, as former U.S. secretary of defense William J. Perry warned in 1999, might make Washington hesitate at a time of crisis on the Korean peninsula. And uncertainty in Seoul about what Washington would do might lead to a breakup of the U.S.–South Korean

EXCERPT

## *Memo from London*

*Had policymakers troubled to consider what befell the last Anglophone occupation of Iraq they might have been less surprised by the persistent resistance they encountered in certain parts of the country during 2004. For in May of 1920 there was a major anti-British revolt there. This happened six months after a referendum (in practice, a round of consultations with tribal leaders) on the country's future, and just after the announcement that Iraq would become a League of Nations mandate under British trusteeship rather than continue under colonial rule. Strikingly, neither consultation with Iraqis nor the promise of internationalization sufficed to avert an uprising.*

*In 1920, as in 2004, the insurrection had religious origins and leaders, but it soon transcended the country's ancient ethnic and sectarian divisions. The first anti-British demonstrations were in the mosques of Baghdad, but the violence quickly spread to the Shiite holy city of Karbala, where British rule was denounced by Ayatollah Muhammad Taqi al-Shirazi, the historical counterpart of today's Shiite firebrand, Moktada al-Sadr. . . .*

*This brings us to the second lesson the United States might have learned from the British experience: Reestablishing order is no easy task. In 1920 the British eventually ended the rebellion through a combination of aerial bombardments and punitive village-burning expeditions. Even Winston Churchill, then the minister responsible for the Royal Air Force, was shocked by the actions of some trigger-happy pilots and vengeful ground troops. And despite their overwhelming technological superiority, British forces still suffered more than two thousand dead and wounded. Moreover, the British had to keep troops in Iraq long after the country was granted full sovereignty. Although Iraq was declared formally independent in 1932, British troops remained there until 1955.*

—Niall Ferguson, professor of history at Harvard University and advocate of American empire, in *Daedalus* (Spring 2005)

military alliance long before any actual strike. Nuclear weapons, in short, may be Pyongyang's best hope for achieving its long-cherished objective of reunification.

No one should have been shocked—though many around the world apparently were—by Pyongyang's claim in February that it possessed nuclear weapons and would not give them up “under any circumstances.” U.S. intelligence has long assumed

that North Korea has one or two nuclear devices. To renounce such weapons would be tantamount to giving up its vision of reunification, Eberstadt argues, and with it the justification the regime has used since its founding for all the terrible sacrifices it has demanded of its people. Keeping the world safe from North Korea will be a more “difficult, expensive, and dangerous undertaking” than many people want to believe.

## *Latin Lessons for Iraq*

“The Follies of Democratic Imperialism” by Omar G. Encarnación, in *World Policy Journal* (Spring 2005), World Policy Institute, New School Univ., 66 Fifth Ave., 9th fl., New York, N.Y. 10011.


“There is no people not fitted for self government,” declared the idealistic American president, and so saying, he dispatched an expeditionary force abroad to topple a “government of butchers.” To the president's vast surprise, the Americans weren't universally hailed as liberators, and thousands rallied around the dictatorship to fight the invading Americans.

That president was not George W. Bush but Woodrow Wilson, who sent U.S. Marines to Mexico in 1914 to overthrow General Victoriano Huerta, who had seized power in a coup the year before. Anti-American riots, at first confined to Mexico City, spread to Costa Rica, Guatemala, Chile, Ecuador, and Uruguay. A mediation conference ended in failure because Wilson wouldn't budge from his demand that Huerta relinquish power and hold free elections. Huerta fled Mexico later that year, but democracy didn't arrive in Mexico until 2000.

In the Caribbean and Central America, argues Encarnación, a political scientist at Bard College, “Wilson's military occupations and attempts at creating democracy” during his two terms in

office only “paved the way for a new generation of brutal tyrannies,” including those of Fulgencio Batista in Cuba and Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua. The United States ruled the Dominican Republic from 1916 to 1924, reorganizing much of the government and creating a national constabulary in order to help civilian leaders stay in power. A civil war that broke out after the Americans left ended only in 1930, when Rafael Trujillo, commander of the very National Guard the Americans had created, seized power, inaugurating 31 years of harsh dictatorial rule.

Encarnación sees behind President



*U.S. Marines, sent into Mexico by Woodrow Wilson to overthrow General Victoriano Huerta in 1914, await orders at the port of Veracruz.*